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Introduction and review of the literature
1 Introduction
Dutch gasoline stations located at the German and Belgian borders have complained about the
increase in excise duties on caz fuels. This environmentally-motivated increase was introduced
in July 1997. It was accompanied by a decrease in holdership taxes on cars and should
contribute to a reduction in congestion and the environmental problems related to caz use. The
owners of gas stations at the borders claimed considerable losses, because customers could buy
their fuel more cheaply at the other side of the border.
In December 1997, the parties to the `United Nations framework on climate change' gathered
in Kyoto at the third convention to discuss international action on global warming. That it
is hard to reach an agreement was shown in past meetings (the Unced in Rio de Janeiro and
earlier conventions in Berlin and Geneva), where results were rather limited. The reductions
that have been proposed before the convention starts by three large parties, Japan, the EU and
the US, differ widely.
New measures on an obligatory `manure account,' that is, the bookkeeping of all nutrient flows
in the farm, for all pig breeders are expected in the Netherlands. Protesting farmers have
boycotted the rules for some time. The accounts are intended to control the flow of nutrients
that pollute ground water as well as the emission of ammonia from manure. The farmers claim
that the rules drive up their costs, which harms their international competitiveness.
Most environmental problems have international aspects. This is most cleaz for global pollution
problems, such as the enhanced greenhouse effect. But also seemingly local pollution problems,
such as ammonia emissions from pig breeding, may have an international dimension. Consider,
for example, polluting producers who use international competition as an argument to oppose
stricter environmental regulation. Or consider actual stricter environmental measures that
change the production costs of internationally trade products. These changes may affect the
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choices of producers of related goods in other countries and of consumers abroad.
The international dimension of environmental problems is an interesting subject of reseazch. It
is also a broad subject that has resulted in a large body of literature within the field of environ-
mental economics. The literature can be divided roughly into two parts. One part is concerned
with the most obvious international dimension of environmental problems, transboundary pol-
lution. There aze economic consequences if emissions from a polluter based in one country
cause environmental damage in another country, since thus the countries' welfare becomes
interdependent. The other part of the literature is concerned with the two-sided relationship
between international trade and the environment. First, trade affects economic growth and
economic growth, in turn, affects the emissions of pollutants. Thus trade policy influences the
state of the environment in the countries involved. The other side of the relationship between
trade and the environment is that environmental policy affects demand and supply functions
and therefore the position of a country in the international market.
This thesis analyses mainly this latter side of the relationship: the effect of several environ-
mental policy instruments on international trade. Only a specific type of trade is considered,
namely trade by lazget producers that act strategically on an international market. That type
of trade may be considered as international competition between producers based in different
countries. The phrase, `a country's position in the international mazket,' then gets the more
specific meaning of the competitiveness of the producers concerned. Furthertnore, the thesis
considers only environmental policy directed at environmental problems that azise from the
use ofpolluting inputs in production processes. Pollution from the consumption of final goods
and pollution from transport, as well as policies to diminish the related environmental damage,
aze not considered here.
When producers aze large enough to inftuence market prices, strategic behaviour can be
expected. The vazious players on the market are aware of each other's behaviour and try
to influence that of the other players. Trade between a few large agents differs from trade
between a lazge number of small agents, because of this type of strategic behaviour. When
governments take interest in the competitiveness of their home firms, they also become players
in this game.
With the increasing openness of economies to trade, governments aze hesitant to increase the
costs of domestic producers too much in comparison with producers in other countries. That
tendency may lead to a too lax environmental policy from a welfaze point of view. The sequel
of this introductory chapter (section 2) explains under what conditions a government may deem
it to be a rational strategy to distort its environmental policy in this way.
The thesis considers a country's environmental policy towazds polluting producers that have
international rivals. It compazes environmental policy instruments, namely emission standards
and emission taxes. International rivalry between producers takes the form of oligopolistic
competition in the output mazket of these producers. Chapters 2 and 3 compare taxes and
standards, when the regulator wants to attain a given environmental target and prefers high
1`Large' is used in the sense that the market shares of these producers aze large enough, so that they can
influence market prices.
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firm profits. A third instrument, emission permits, is considered in a separate chapter (chapter
4). Chapter 6 compares the distortions in taxes and standazds, when the regulator balances
environmental damage and firm profits. The consequences of these distortions for investment in
emission reduction technology aze the subject of chapter 7. As a second theme, transboundary
pollution (chapter 5) and the interaction between transboundary pollution and trade (chapters
6 and 7) are analysed.
In all chapters, the firm's investment is explicitly considered to be a process that takes place over
time. This distinguishes the analyses in the thesis from most other literature on environmental
policy and international rivalry. Since capital accumulation is modelled as a dynamic process,
it is possible to make a distinction between different strategies that a firm may use to decide on
its investmen[ rate. It is assumed that capital stocks increase gradually as a result of investment
and decrease through depreciation. Different investment strategies have implications for the
possibilities which the firm has to commit to certain actions through its capital stock. In turn,
a firm's commitment affects how environmental policy impacts firm behaviour in equilibrium.
The next section (section 2) describes the results that have been found in the strategic trade
literature under the assumption of a once-and-for-all decision on capital. Section 3 then
focuses on the dynamic interactions that can be studied ifdifferential game models are applied.
Differential game models are shortly introduced and two types of decision strategies are
described. Three interactions are distinguished: interactions between governments, between
firms, and between firms and governments. Some results in the literature that analyses these
interactions by dynamic game models are summarized. Neither of these sections is meant to
be an exhaustive review of current literature. Rather, they aze meant to place the analysis of
the thesis into context.
2 ~ade and environmental policy
Although not unhampered, economic cooperation between the countries in the European Union
increases. Already this has resulted in a substantial reduction of intra-European trade barciers.
Explicit trade policies aze forbidden2 within the European Union. On aglobal scale, agreements
made in the World Trade Organization (WTO)3 and its predecessor, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have also reduced trade barriers.4 Furthermore, economic
interdependence among nations increases. Over the period 1973-1995, the estimated value of
ZIn 1968, the then six countries of the EEC completed a customs union and abolished intemal tariffs. The
completion by the 15 EU countries of the single mazket in 1993 also reduced non-tariff-barriers such as customs
con[rol and differences in technical requirements. ( See, for example, Urwin, 1995.)
3At the end of July 1996, 123 countries and territories were members of the W1n, which accounted for more
than 90 percent of world trade (W"In, 1996).
9In the Uruguay Round of the GATT, the developed countries made average trade-weighted tariff cuts of 40
percent on industrial products. As a result, for developed mazkets as a group, the tariff average is scheduled to be
reduced from 6.3 to 3.8 percent (W'f0, 1996).
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merchandise exports rose from 575 billion dollars to 4900 billion dollars (WTO, 1996).
When trade barriers decrease, both through deliberate trade liberalization and through techno-
logical developments that decrease transport costs, the ability for countries to independently
determine their policies on numerous areas may diminish. With growing economic interde-
pendence, policy competition may also grow.s International policy competition may be valued
positively, when it increases the efficiency of national governments. But it may also be per-
ceived as a danger to national welfare. Direct trade policies might be replaced with distortions
in other policies that are tailored to improve the competitiveness of domestic industries. High
production costs, for example due to a more stringent fiscal policy, may be perceived to set
home fit~rrls at a disadvantage compared to foreign competitors. That may lead to reductions
in costly social systems and environmental policies. In the extreme, the competition among
countries could destroy their social systems in a`race to the bo[tom.'
This danger ofdownward competition could also hold for environmental policy: Environmental
policy measures that aze directed to producers may imply an increase in their production costs.
Some environmentalists therefore claim that international competition results in downward
distortions of environmental policy. For them, it is a reason to oppose further reduction of
trade barriers. Opponents of stricter environmental regulation use similar arguments to support
their case. According to them, stricter environmental policy is unwanted, because it harms
the competitiveness of home firms. The result of stricter regulation would be that foreign
competitors based in countries with laxer regulation drive home firms out of the market (see
Rauscher 1997, for a more extensive description of the arguments used by both groups).
The stress on international rivalry that underlies both lines of reasoning is disputed by Krugman
(1996). He calls it `Pop internationalism' and argues that countries do not compete in the
same way that companies compete. Trade should not be perceived as a zero-sum game,
but, rather, offers mutual gains to the countries who trade. When foreign firms are able to
successfully compete with home firms, that implies that home consumers can buy cheaper
products. Moreover, an increase in the income of foreign consumers implies a larger market to
sell home products. Furthermore, Krugman mentions that the prosperity in a country is much
more determined by internal factors than by competition from foreign countries with different
cost structures. If important enough, competition from foreign countries could reduce export
opportunities and lead to substitution of goods produced at home by imports. But according to
Krugman, imports and exports are relatively unimportant determinants of national welfare. It
should be noted that this last remark was made regarding the United States. For that country,
international trade is only about lOqo of GDP (Krugman, 1996). Hence, changes in export or
import have relatively small effects. That is completely different for open economies like the
Netherlands. In the Netherlands, trade is around SOqo of GDP.6 It seems, then, better to apply
this last remazk in Krugman's analysis to Europe as a whole, so that export and import to and
Scf. Vanheukelen, 1993, who states that the possibility for the EU countries to pursue own priorities in policy
decreases, both as a consequence of restrictions from EU law and as a consequence of increased mobility of
production factors.
6In 1996, imports had a value of 46oIo of GDP, while exporis were SO~o of GDP. (Source: CBS, Maandstatistiek
van de internationale handel December 1996, electronic update June 1997 and Nationale rekeningen 1996,
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from Europe are considered relatively unimportant determinants of its welfare compared to
intra-European economic activities. The more important observation is, however, that general
equilibrium effects matter and that countries do not compete in the same way as companies.
Hence, also for individual countries within Europe that observation should be kept in mind if
questions of international rivalry are considered.
The thesis focuses on models that are set up such that international rivalry matters. The functions
that aze applied to represent the government's objectives contain the profits of domestic firms.
Moreover, the models are ofapartial equilibrium nature and neglect general equilibrium effects
and consumer surplus. That is done deliberately, since such a structure makes it possible to
sort out the mechanisms that are at stake in a relatively simple context. To draw conclusions
regarding policy in real economies, however, different models are needed, ones that pay due
attention to general equilibrium effects.
The next sections review literature on the distortion of environmental policy for trade strategic
reasons. First (in section 2.1) comes a brief discussion of trade under perfect competition.
There follows a description ofmodels of trade under imperfect competition (in sections 2.3 and
2.3), and thereafter (in sections 2.4 and 2.5) a discussion of the role of environmental policy in
such a model of trade.
2.1 ~-ade under perfect competition
Since trade under perfect competition is not the subject of this thesis, this section is relatively
short and far from complete. For overviews that also include an analysis of issues related to
trade and environment under the assumption of perfect competition, see, for instance, Rauscher
(1997, chapters 3 to 5) and Ulph (1994). In this section only comparative advantage as an
explanation of trade between countries is considered. The type of trade analysed is that in final
goods between countries that differ in factor endowments. The section aims to summarize the
reasons for distortions in environmental policy for an open economy with perfect competition.
Distortions in environmental policy have two sources: the possibility for the government to
affect its country's terms of trade, and transboundary pollution.
The theory of comparative advantage dates back to Ricardo. According to this theory, trade
between nations azises from differences in relative productivity. When countries specialize in
the production of goods in which they have a relative comparative advantage, that is beneficial
for the world as a whole, because efficiency increases. In such a world, any trade restrictions
lead to sub-optimal solutions from a global point of view. If a country is not large enough to
influence world market prices, it is also optimal for this individual country to set zero tariffs.
Only if a country is lazge enough,' so that it can influence world market prices, it is optimal
for it to set nonzero taziffs. It can improve its terms of trade when it imposes export tariffs and
import duties.
Pollution from production may be considered as the use of the production factor environment.
electronic update August 1997.)
'Large is defined in the sense that it is producing or consuming a large part of global production.
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Along that line of thought, environmental quality should be incorporated as an additional
production factor into models ofcomparative advantage. For example, Pethig (1976) formulates
variants of the factor-price equalization and compazative advantage theorem for a two-sector,
two-country model with local pollution. Provided that countries apply environmental policy
to restrict total pollution to a maximum level, it can be said that they have more of the
factor environment, if they tolerate more pollution (have laxer environmental policy goals).
High pollution tolerance may have two reasons. Either the country has low preferences for
a clean environment, or its ecological system can assimilate much pollution without lasting
damage to the environment. Countries that have a relative abundance of the environmental
production factor should then specialize in production that is `environmentally intensive.' This
leads to the claim that it is welfaze improving from a global point of view if some countries
specialize in `dirty' industries. However, as pointed out by Pethig, when countries do not
apply environmental policy, while they should from a welfare point of view, these countries
may lose welfare as a result of opening up to trade. That happens when they specialize in
`dirty' production and their environments deteriorate seriously. To conclude, the theorem of
compazative advantage and the factor-price equalization theorem may be reformulated for the
production factor environment. But, that can only be done under the assumption that the supply
of this production factor is defined in accordance with a country's preferences.
Other references to analyses of trade and environmental policy under the assumption of perfect
competition aze, among others: Copeland (1994), Krutilla (1991) and Markusen (1975a and
1975b). Copeland considers small changes from a given second-best initial situation in envi-
ronmental taxes and standards, and trade tariffs and quotas. This study examines what changes
are welfare improving for a country that cannot influence mazket prices. He finds that results
can be quite different for quantity or price policies. Krutilla analyses environmental policy,
given trade policy, for a country that can influence mazket prices. This country should incor-
porate terms-of-trade effects when it decides on its optimal environmental policy. A first-best
optimum is obtained if the country can adjust both tariffs and environmental taxes. If tariffs are
given, then a second-best environmental tax must be computed. The first-best environmental
tax must be adjusted to include terms-of-trade effects and tariff-revenue effects. The latter
effect assumes that trade taxes are given and nonzero and works in a direction opposite to the
terms-of-trade effect. For a country that is a net exporter, taxes should be higher to improve
terms of trade. For a country that is a net importer, environmenta] taxes should be lower to
improve terms of trade. Finally, Mazkusen's two papers deal with the case of transboundary
pollution. Markusen (1975a) derives optimal tariffs and production taxes for a small open
economy. Since pollution is a function of production of one specific good, the production tax
on this good has the role of a pollution tax. The optima] non-cooperative equilibrium involves
zero tariffs and a positive pollution tax, which is, however, not high enough to internalize the
full external costs of emissions. A cooperative equilibrium can improve on this and will be
characterized by higher pollution taxes. The first-best optimum for the world as a whole has
zero taziffs and production taxes that internalize the full external costs of production. Markusen
ti 1975b) goes into more detail on the first- and second-best tax structure for a country that can
influence world prices and may choose its production and consumption taxes and its tariff
2'Ilrade and environmental policy 7
structure. Second-best tax structures follow if one or more of these instruments are not avail-
able. When tariffs and consumption taxes are absent, distortions in equilibrium production
taxes on the polluting good from domestic marginal external costs are due to a terms-of-trade
effect, an effect on foreign production of polluting goods and an indirect effect on domestic
production of changes in relative prices.
While these papers differ in focus and specific assumptions, all authors assume that producers
take prices as given.s In a model of comparative advantage, the environment is thus considered
as just a production factor, similar to labour or capital. It follows that for local pollution, under
perfect competition, when trade is motivated by comparative advantage, there is no reason for
governments in small open economies to distort their environmental policies for trade strategic
reasons. The reason for this is straightforwazd. It is not optimal for a small open economy
to introduce trade barriers through trade policy; consequently, neither is it optimal to distort
environmental policy by making it to act as a substitute for trade policy. Formally, this is shown
in Ulph (1994). He asserts that individual governments in a first-best equilibrium should set
environmental policy according to the (Pigouvian) rule that marginal social damage equals
marginal social costs. That is, the governments should fully internalize the externalities that
are a cause of environmental problems and not introduce any distortions in environmental
policy.
For a large country that can influence world market prices, the above conclusion that distortions
in environmental policy are suboptimal does not hold, as was shown, for example, by Krutilla
(1991). Such a country finds it optimal to set positive export taxes and import tariffs. Envi-
ronmental policy distortions can act as a second-best substitute for trade policies. Translated
to environmental policy, an export tax implies strict environmental policy for producers of the
goods exported by the country. If a country is a net importer of some good, then a downward
distortion in environmental policy (that is, a laxer environmental tax on domestic producers)
would benefit the country and substitute for an import tariff (see Krutilla, 1991 and Ulph,
1994). The regulator in a country which share in world trade is large enough to give it market
power, may thus have reasons to distort environmental policy (see also Markusen, 1975b, and
Rauscher, 1997, chapter 5).
The theory of comparative advantage is based on the assumption that production factors are
internationally immobile. It may be argued that for transboundary pollution, the environment
as a production factor does not satisfy this assumption. A country that pollutes its neighbouring
countries through its productive activities uses the environment of those neighbouring countries
as a production factor. In that way, the intensive use of the factor environment in one country
affects welfare in another country, because it diminishes the availability of this factor in the
other country. That esiablishes a direct link between countries. As a result, the environmental
policy ofone country affects welfare and henceenvironmental policy choices in other countries9
(cf. Mazkusen, 1975a). Note that this link is independent of trade. Even ifboth countries were
BNote that this does not imply that regulators take prices as given.
90ther factors of production may also violate the assumption of international immobility, which may have
similar consequences for welfare interdependence.
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Table 1: Models of environment and trade under perfect competition
Author pollution type trade model subject
Pethig (1976) local 2 sectors, 2 countries basic trade theorems
Copeland (1994) transboundary n sectors, small open 2"d best, trade 8c env.
economy policies
Krutilla (1991) transboundary 1 sector, large open ec. 1'`(2"d)best, trade á env.
policies
Markusen (1975a) [ransboundary n sectors, small open ec. 1" best, trade 8c env.
policies
Markusen (1975b) transboundary 2 sectors, 2 countries 1':- 8c 2ne-best, trade 8c env.
policies
Rauscher (1997) local á 2 goods, 2 factors, small 1's- á 2"d-best, gains from
transboundary 8c lazge open ec. trade, trade 8z env. policy
Ulph (1994) local Bc 1 sector, small á large 1't- 8c 2"a-best, trade 8z env.
transboundary open ec. policy
otherwise autarchic, transboundary pollution would form a link between their economies.
When damage is only local, a national government would find it optimal to set environmental
policy such that all external effects are internalized. When damage is transboundary, that
is no longer the case. National govemments have no immediate reason to take account of
environmental damage in other countries. Free-rider incentives cause governments to set
policies that are less strict than what is globally optimal and to neglect their influence on
depositions in the other country (see M~ler, 1989). Transboundary pollution is hence a reason
why environmental policies do not fully internalize the external effects of production, even in
small countries without market power.
To conclude this section on trade under perfect competition, table 1 summarizes the articles
that were described above. As long as perfect competition is maintained, in a non-cooperative
equilibrium a small country cannot do better than to set environmental policy such that en-
vironmental damage at home is fully internalized (see Ulph 1994). A country with market
power may want to distort environmental policy directed at pollution related to production.
Transboundary pollution is another reason for (downward) distortion, which is present also if
countries do not trade.
2.2 T~ade under imperfect competition
The theory of comparative advantage has difficulties in explaining intra-industry trade. Intra-
industry trade is the simultaneous export and import ofsimilar products. A large and increasing
share of trade consists of this type of trade. For instance, in 1990 the share of intra-industry
trade in total trade for Germany ranged from 32qo for fuels to 7óqo for chemicals.to Recent
loSource: Brakman and van Marrewijk, 1996, who cite Mazkusen et al., 1995.
2 Trade and environmental policy 9
theories of international trade, so called `new trade theory', explain intra-industry trade. The
literature contains different approaches, but most contributions characterize markets by im-
perfect competition. Overviews are given in Helpman and Krugman (1986) and Grossman
(1992).
One part of the literature on intra-industry trade applies the model ofproduction by monopolistic
competitors. Consumers prefer a wide variety of goods, either because each individual prefers
vaziety, or because consumers vary in their preferences. Firms specialize in the production
of one variant because of scale economies. Applied to trade, this model explains intra-
industry trade in differentiated products, that is, in variants of similaz products. Trade, namely,
enlazges the range of product-varieties available within each country. The model of trade
under monopolistic competition is a general-equilibrium model. References are, for example,
Helpman and Krugman (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1991). Verdier (1993) applies a
model with monopolistic competition to analyse matters of environmental policy in a closed
economy framework. Rauscher (1997, chapter 6) analyses environmental policy on pollution
related to production, to consumption and to transport in a model of trade under monopolistic
competition. He suggests that, since every producer of a variety has some monopoly power,
the government may use that power and distort environmental policy upward to improve the
countries' terms of trade.
A second strand of literature analyses oligopolistic competition. It studies the competition
between large firms on an interna[ional market. The competitors are assumed to be situated in
different countries and therefore possibly subject to different regulation. Due to the focus on the
behaviour of individual firms on markets, models are of a partial equilibrium nature. Even when
general equilibrium aspects are included, the analysis usually abstracts from income effects,
cross-substitution effects and factor-price effects, so that it is not fit to analyse economy-wide
effects.
As an answer to the question whether international rivalry may lead countries to distort their
nationally preferred environmental policies, this is a promising approach. In an international
oligopoly, rivalry between firms and strategic behaviour are to be expected. When the interests
of specific sectors are for one reason or the other important to a government, a view on trade as
international oligopolistic competition supports the adjustment of government policy directed
at these sectors. One example of an adjusted policy may be environmental policy. Section 2.4
considers the application of the strategic trade model for the analysis of environmental policy
in an international context. But first, the next section reviews the literature on strategic trade
in general.
2.3 ~ade policy competition and commitment
When international markets are characterized by perfect competition, national governments
have no apparent reason to worry about the `competitiveness' of domesticll firms. But in case
11 With the possibility of foreign ownership, the question is what firms should be referred to as domestic or
'home' firms. Here, for simplicity, it is assumed that home firms aze owned by inhabitants and are completely
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of oligopolistic international markets, producers earn nonzero profits. If ahome firm earns more
profits, more earnings flow to the home country. So with imperfect competition governments
have a motive (increased profits for the home firm) to care about the competitiveness of their
home firms. This motive is also called rent-shifting. Other motives are the value that a
government may attach to the existence of certain sectors in their country (such as an airplane-
building industry) and the tax revenues that are related to the profits earned by home firms.
Brander and Spencer show in a series of articles (Spencer and Brander (1983), Brander and
Spencer (1983, 1985)) that the rent-shifting motive causes nonzero tariffs to be optimal from
the point of view of individual governments. A cooperative solution with zero tariffs would be
better. But in the absence of cooperation, competitive behaviour between the countries results
in nonzero tariffs.
Spencer and Brander (1983) establishes the role of strategic interaction in a duopoly in which
firms invest first in RBzD and then in output. They show that in Cournot-Nash equilibrium firms
distort their RócD investment from the cost-minimizing level for stra[egic reasons. The reason
for this is that an investment in RBzD provides a quantity commitment to a firm in this setting.
The investment shifts out a firm's output reaction curve, because, in Brander and Spencer's
article, RBcD reduces variable costs. Given the choices of the competitor, a larger level of
RBzD therefore implies a larger equilibrium output. In other words, investment in RBzD is a
commitment to a higher level of output in Brander and Spencer's model. This possibility to
commit potentially improves the profit of the firm. If the other firm chooses RBcD according to
cost minimization, the first firm gains. But in Nash equilibrium, both firms distort their RBzD
and produce more output than they would do when only cost minimization motives determined
RBzD. As a result, the firms earn lower profits than what they could have earned if they had
chosen the cost-minimizing levels of RBcD. Consumers gain, because total equilibrium output
increases.
The simple two-stage duopoly game explains the role of commitment devices in strategic
interaction between firms. The possibility to precommit to some level of output or price can be
used by a firm to shift its reaction function. As a result, the outcome of the Nash equilibrium is
changed to its advantage. When, however, both players engage in such commitment, the result
need not be an improvement. If the firms would refrain from strategic interaction they are able
to reach a solution with higher total gains.
The importance of commitment was analysed before in a different context in the industrial
organization literature. Articles by Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980) were concerned with
the question how commitment could be applied by incumbents for entry detercence. The
mechanism is explained in Tirole (1988). He refers to commitment as the `ability to burn one's
bridges'. Certain actions in a preliminary stage restrict the action-set open to a player in the
following stage of the game. As a result, its reaction curve shifts and the equilibrium that
results is more favourable to this player.
As was described above, the commitment is undertaken by the players themselves. That is, a[
located in the country. In the conclusions (chapter 8), the consequences for the results of foreign ownership are
considered.
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an earlier stage in the game the players realize their own commitment through some binding
action. However, active government policy can also provide such commitments or add to them.
The reason for the government to be interested to provide its home firm with commitments is
the rent-shifting motive. Under imperfect competition with restricted entry, positive rents are
earned by producers and the government is interested in shifting a larger part of these rents to
home firms, through an improvement of their commitment. To analyse this motive in isolation,
Brander and Spencer (1983, 1985) apply a model with two firms, one in each country, and
with all consumers of the good located in third countries. If such a model is applied, the
governments of the two countries whose firms produce the good are only interested in high
firm profits. Note that this is a partial-equilibrium analysis: it neglects the effects of active
government policy on other sectors and on entry.
In Brander and Spencer (1985), the government directly provides output commitments to firms,
in the form of export subsidies. In Brander and Spencer (1983), the government gives RBzD
commitments through subsidies on RBcD, and RBzD then works as an output commitment. The
1985 paper also considers whether the analysis is robust for extension of the model with a
perfectly competitive `rest of the economy' sector and consumer preferences. In the resulting
model, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is characterized by positive export subsidies, like
in the partial-equilibrium model, but at ahigher level. That is so because the partial-equilibrium
model neglects consumer surplus. Since consumers gain from the increase in output that results
when the firms receive export subsidies, higher subsidies result if consumer surplus is included.
Apart from this extension, Brander and Spencer assume that the competitors sell all their goods
to consumers in a third market. This assumption makes it possible to neglect consumer surplus.
It is also important for the results that the market is integrated. That is, they assume that firms
sell their product on one world market and that they cannot sell parts of their output in specific
countries.
A related strand of literature is based on the different assumption that the consumers in each
of the two countries form separate submarkets. Demand functions may differ in each country
and the firms may price-discriminate between the two markets. These analyses explain the
cross-hauling of identical goods between two countries. This type of model is hence also called
a model of reciprocal demand. Markusen and Venables (1992) compare the implications for
trade policy of these two different assumptions about the world market. One of their results
may be roughly restated as follows: With sepazate submarkets, the effects of active trade policy
aze stronger, because in that case they only affect the market for which they are intended (cf.
Markusen and Venables, 1992).
Applications to environmental policy use both types of model. For example, Kennedy (1994)
is a reciprocal-demand type of model, whereas Ulph (1996b) is a Brander-Spencer type of
model. The difference between the two models might be mainly a difference in focus. The
reciprocal demand models usually include consumer surplus and focus on the welfare effects
of policy measures. In contrast, the analyses that assume an integrated wor(d market focus
more on the rivalry between firms and the effect of government policy upon that. When the
international rivalry between firms is the subject of research, the Brander-Spencer approach
seems to be the elementary model. However, it should be kept in mind that consumer surplus
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is neglected. A collection of both types of analyses can be found in the volumes edited by
Grossman (1992) and Krugman (1986). Brander (1995) is a systematic overview of oligopoly
models of international rivalry and the relevant literature. Empirical applications can be found
in Feenstra (1988) and in a review article by Richardson (1989).
An important conclusion from the strategic trade literature is that reasons for active trade policy
exist, even in a small open economy. These reasons exist when the firms in the country compete
with foreign rivals in an oligopolistic mazket. In that case, a government that uses the right
policy can obtain welfare gains. As the empirical applications show (cf. Feenstra (1988) and
Richardson (1989)), the size of these gains from active trade policy is unclear.
Two main points ofcritique on this type of model can be distinguished (see, for example, Dixit
and Grossman, 1986).
A first problem with models of oligopolistic competition is that they often neglect general-
equilibrium effects. 1'hough Brander and Spencer (1985), for example, include some general-
equilibrium effects, they still assume constant factor prices, no income effects and no substi-
tution effects. Other authors often concentrate completely on the oligopoly in question. If not
cazefully interpreted, these models easily lead to the `pop-internationalist' ideas disputed by
Krugman (1996). That is, ideas that confuse the competitiveness of individual sectors with that
of a whole country. It is easy to conclude from the analysis of a partial model that a particular
sector should receive export subsidies for rent-shifting reasons. But in a general-equilibrium
context, positive effects in one sector may be negligibly smal] or more than compensated by
negative spillover effects in other sectors.
An example of these negative general equilibrium effects is given in Dixit and Grossman (1986).
They show that when several oligopolies compete for a common resource, the favourable
treatment of one sector harms profits in other sectors. The reason is that the price of the
resource increases due to increased demand from the protected sector. This can be applied to
environment as a resource of production, as well. A distortion that implies a laxer policy for
one sector may imply that other sectors are subject to stricter environmental policies than they
otherwise would be. That may happen if the regulator tries to reach a given environmental
tazget and compensates for more pollution from the distorted sector by stricter regulation for
other sectors.
Another general equilibrium aspect that is often neglected is the possibility of entry. Most
analyses do not explicitly model entry. They take a small number of firms as given. In a
reciprocal demand model with free entry, Mazkusen and Venables (1992) show that equilibrium
profits for marginal firms12 firms are zero. In the model of Mazkusen and Venables all firms are
symmetric, so that equilibrium profits are zero for all firms. In that case, government policies
that would work as a rent-shifting device no longer have any rents to shift. In a model of
reciprocal demand, in which separate submazkets exist, the only effect of rent-shifting policies
is then to reduce consumer surplus, because they hinder competition from foreign firms.
A second, related, criticism concerns the practical applicability of these models. Results are
1zThe 'marginal firm' decides to entry as the n'h firm, while for the (n f 1)th firm, entry is not profi[able.
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sensitive to specific assumptions, such as the type of oligopolistic competition,13 the size of
the home market in comparison to the foreign market and the weights of firm profits, consumer
surplus and other items in the welfare function. Regulators that want to apply an activis[ trade
policy therefore need to know exactly what assumptions are relevant for the case which they
want to regulate.
Dixit (1984) analyses changes in the results when the assumption of one producer in each
country is altered. He considers the case in which domestic oligopolies compete with foreign
oligopolies. Under Cournot competition, an active trade policy then has the usual favourable
effects on competitiveness from enlarged output. But this should be balanced with an additional
effect: that home oligopolists produce more in total when each of them has larger output
commitments. That leads to overproduction, as seen from the point of view of a government
that values home-firm profits.
Eaton and Grossman (1986) use a conjectural variations model to show how results depend
on the type of oligopolistic competition. Under consistent conjectural variations, zero taziffs
are optimal. Positive tariffs are optimal under conjectural variations that imply Bertrand com-
petition, and negative tariffs are optimal under Cournot competition. Maggi (1996) analyses
an alternative model that explains different types of oligopolistic competition. He considers
a two-stage game, where firms first compete in capacities and then compete in prices. Rather
than assuming differences in conjectural variations for the last stage, his model explains dif-
ferences in type of competition from the commitment value of the capacity investments made
in the first stage. It is an extension of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), who explained Cournot
competition as the result ofcapacity investments with complete commitment, followed by price
competition. Maggi's model allows firms to produce above capacity at higher marginal costs.
Similaz to Eaton and Grossman, Maggi finds that optimal output subsidies (or taxes) vazy with
the type of competition. The stronger the commitment provided by capacity choices, the more
the outcome resembles Cournot competition, the higher the optimal output subsidy.
For all these reasons, a regulator is probably never able to gather enough information to set
correct trade policies. In the absence of such information, it is then better to apply zero taziffs.
However, Maggi's analysis gives an exception to this conclusion. Subsidies on capacity
investment are less sensitive than output subsidies to the type of competition. Even if the
government does not know the strength of commitments, a small subsidy is either neutral or
welfare improving.
A third point of criticism may be the prisoner dilemma that characterizes the equilibrium. That
calls for careful interpretation of the results. While, given unilateral action, an active trade
policy may improve the position of the country, the reaction of other countries implies that a
Nash equilibrium results which may well be inferior to an equilibrium with free trade. From
the existence of free-trade agreements (for example, the WTO and the EU) it seems that as far
as direct trade policy is concerned, countries have found ways out of this prisoner dilemma.
Given that direct trade policies, like tariffs, are banned14 under international free-trade agree-
13This refers to whether, for instance, firms compete in quantities or prices.
l4This is obviously an exaggeration of the current situation.
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ments, other policy instruments may serve as a substitute. To avoid suboptimal non-cooperative
equilibria for environmental policy and other areas where policy competition can be expected
(such as social security and fiscal policy), agreements similar to free-trade agreements would
be needed.
However, agreement to a cooperative equilibrium is much harder in these cases for a number
of reasons. First, for trade, it is clear that the cooperative equilibrium should be one of no
trade barriers. For environmental policy, where the benefits are uncertain and often difficult to
quantify, it is harder to determine what would be the cooperative equilibrium to agree upon.
Due to differences in preferences and endowments, such an equilibrium might also entail
different policies in different countries, which is second reason that makes agreements harder
and non-cooperative equilibria more probable. In the absence of agreements, any policy that
affects the production costs of a sector that competes internationally could in principle be
(mis)used for trade strategic reasons.
In a strategic-trade model with Cournot competition, the competitiveness of a firm improves if
its production costs are reduced. That may be done by lower environmental taxes, subsidies on
cost-reducing RBcD, export subsidies or any other policy that reduces costs. The opposite kind
of ineasures, that lead to cost increases, would improve a firm's competitiveness under Bertrand
competition. That may seem counterintuitive, but under Bertrand competition, commitment to
high prices helps the firm to extract additional rents from the consumers of its product. So, in
that case, consumers lose from the strategic distortion of policies for trade strategic goals.
Porter has quite another approach to competitiveness (see Porter and van der Linde, 1995).
He asserts that the competitiveness of firms may improve if their costs are increased in the
right way. Cost increases may force firms to improve their efficiency, which in the end
improves their competitiveness. This reasoning differs from the logic of strategic trade under
Bertrand competition. For now, consumers do not necessarily lose. Because firms improve
their efficiency, they might be able in the end to sell their product at the same oreven at a lower
price than before. In environmental economics, the hypotheses thrown up by Porter have lead
to many articles on this topic. Palmer, Oates and Portney (1994) give a critical discussion of
the applicability of Porter's hypothesis to environmental regulation.
2.4 Environmental policy competition
This section and the next survey some papers on environmental policy competition that aze
related to the themes discussed in the thesis. A more complete review of the literature that
analyses the possibility for distortions in environmental policy when firms are subject to
international rivalry can be found in Ulph (1994). This section starts with a summary of Barrett
(1994) to explain the general characteristics of a strategic trade model with environmental
policy.
Barrett considers a two-stage game where, in a first stage, governments decide on environmental
policy and, in a second stage, firms determine output and abatement The strictness of
environmental policy works as a commitment device, compazable to the export subsidies
in Brander and Spencer (1985). In this simple two-stage setting, downward distortions in
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environmental policy can be explained, contrary to models of trade and environmental policy
with perfect competition. The commitment effect of a downward distortion in environmental
policy helps the firm to bind its hands, which benefits them in competition with the other firm.
In subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, a firm's output decisions are influenced by the en-
vironmental policy at home and in the foreign country. Bazrett analyses the distortion for
trade-strategic reasons of an environmental standard. Such a standard implies a commitment
on the amount of polluting input used by the firm, or, alternatively on the abatement costs that
it has to make. A stricter standard implies that the firm can produce fewer goods at higher
costs. It has to reduce its use of the polluting input or increase its abatement activities. If the
standard is set less strictly, the home firm benefits. When the firms compete in a Nash-Cournot
game, a laxer environmental standard shifts out the firm's reaction function. That is, with less
strict standards, for any output from the competitor, the firm will supply more. As a result,
its equilibrium output and profits increase with a laxer environmental standard at home and a
stricter environmental standard in the competing firm's country. However, after the discussion
in section 2.3, it should not be a surprise that under Bertrand competition, the opposite results
are obtained. In that case, a stricter standard (and hence a commitment to higher costs) is a
competitive advantage that shifts the reaction function of the firm upward. Since the products
are assumed to be less-than-perfect substitutes, the loss in market share is more than com-
pensated by the higher price that can be asked from consumers. The equilibrium price and
profits are higher, the stricter the standard is at home and the laxer the standard is in the foreign
country.
Barrett concludes that his results are not robust, but case-specific. It cannot be maintained
that it is always bad for a firm's international competitiveness to increase the strictness of
environmental standards. This depends on the number of competing firms and on the type of
competition in the output market.
Conrad (1993) considers the Nash equilibrium in environmental taxes. He obtains results
comparable to Barrett's. When firms compete in a Cournot-Nash fashion, governments set
taxes at lower rates than they would do under perfect competition. Conrad (1995) finds that
when firms compete in Bertrand version, equilibrium taxes are higher than under perfect
competition.
These analyses show that, when governments do not cooperate on environmental policy, a
government that attaches value to home-firm profits as well as to a clean environment, distorts
its environmental policy from the Pigouvian level under oligopolistic competition. Just as
in the case of trade polícies, a prisoner dilemma exists. If the government refrains from
such distortions, while the government in the competing firm's country engages in them, the
first country is worse off. But it is better for both countries taken together if they both set
environmental policy at the Pigouvian level.
Ulph (1996b) adds a second stage to the game played by firms, in which they decide on RBcD
investments. The model that results is similaz to Brander and Spencer (1983), which analyses
RBzD subsidies. In Ulph's paper, governments choose the rate at which environmental taxes
should be set in equilibrium. They optimize over firm profits and environmental damage and
therefore distort their taxes from the Pigouvian level. A higher environmental tax implies
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higher costs to the firm (as in Conrad's analysis). Governments may want to distort taxes
downward to give their firms a commitment to a larger output, but have to pay for this in the
form of increased environmental damage.
Although the mechanism is similar, there is also a difference with the analysis in Brander
and Spencer. The RBcD subsidy decreases the costs of strategic investment, the firm's own
commitment device. In contrast, a distorted environmental tax is an alternative to strategic
investment. In Ulph (1996b) each firm has a production function with the polluting input and
capital as the only production factors. A lowerenvironmental tax means that the polluting input,
instead of investment in capital, becomes cheapec It then depends on the specific functions
and parameters of the model, whether in the distorted equilibrium (where output is higher, but
the alternative production factor cheaper) strategic investment is lower or higher than without
distortions. In Ulph's analysis, firms' excess investments are lower with distorted taxes than
they would be when the governments set their taxes at the Pigouvian level. In contrast, RBcD
subsidies increase the motivation to perform excess RBcD.
Firms already invest more than the cos[-minimizing amount in RBcD, because they use the
investments to commit to higher output. With distorted environmental taxes, an additional
commitment device is given to firms. This helps them to compete. For small distortions, the
increase in profits more than balances the decrease in environmental quality and hence, in a
Nash equilibrium, both countries distort their taxes (see Ulph, 1996b). Again, the countries
would be better off if they did not act strategically and chose Pigouvian taxes. The cooperative
equilibrium, where both countries and firms are assumed to cooperate, has Pigouvian taxes and
no excess investments.
Ulph (1992) is concerned with the choice of policy instrument for a government that takes
strategic interaction into account. This may seem to be a strange problem at first sight. Given
perfect information, there seems to be no reason why policy instruments differ. But with
strategic distortions of policy instruments due to imperfect competition in the output market,
the effects of environmental taxes and standards differ.
The two instruments lead to different commitment possibilities for firms and therefore influ-
ence firms' strategic behaviour. Ulph analyses a model in which firms invest in RBcD and face
Cournot competition in a world market for output. The government uses either environmental
taxes or environmental standards. These instruments are used to attain a given environmental
target. Since it is assumed that output is a function of only capital and the polluting input, it
follows that emission standards give firms a very strong output commitment. As a result, emis-
sion standards at home reduce the sensitivity of the home firm to foreign strategic investments.
That is not the case under emission taxes, where the output commitment is smaller. Since firms
have less incentive to perform excess investments under standards, and standards also result in
the same environmental target as taxes, the government prefers to use environmental standazds.
Under such standazds, the excess investment in RBcD is reduced most and that is exactly the
reason why it is the best choice of instrument for the government. Environmental policy
instruments provide firms with an alternative commitment device for excess RBzD investments.
Standazds work better in a Cournot oligopoly, because they give firms an output commitment,
whereas taxes give firms only a price commitment to one of their production factors. In the
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end, the equilibrium with environmental standards in both countries has higher profits for
both countries' firms than does the equilibrium with taxes15, because excess investments are
reduced.
The conclusion that standards are the Nash-equilibrium choice of policy instruments depends,
however, on the assumptions about the production function in Ulph (1992). In a later paper
(Ulph 1996a) that contains a model with a more general production function, Ulph shows that
taxes can also be the Nash-equilibrium choice of policy instruments. With more production
factors than capital and a polluting input, firms find that standazds do not make them completely
insensitive to strategic investments by their competitor. Then, environmental taxes may better
serve their interest.
Ulph and Ulph (1996) combines the choice ofpolicy instrument with the choice of policy level
in a four-stage game. In this analysis, firms have the choice to invest either in cost reduction or
in emission reduction. That leads to a variety of results. It turns out that the relation between
emission and investment in emission reduction is a crucial factor.
To conclude this section, in the literature it has been shown that international rivalry under
imperfect competition is a reason for distortions in environmental policy, given that trade
policies are ruled out. If countries would have a full range of trade policies at their disposal,
they could apply these to improve equilibrium profits for their home firms (as shown by Brander
and Spencer). When these are not available due to trade agreements, environmental policy
distortions are a second-best option. International rivalry then leads countries to distort their
environmental policies, as a substitute for tariffs and other trade policy.
When firms also use their own commitment devices and, for example, engage in strategic
investment, then distortion of environmental policy by the government reduces this strategic
behaviour because it offers firms alternative commitment possibilities. How much and in
what direction policy instruments are distorted depends, among other factors, on the type of
conjectural variations that firms have (for example, Cournot or Bertrand competition). Table
2 summarizes the papers that were discussed in this section. These represent only a few of the
large number of papers that have appeared on this subject. The effect of consumer surplus is
discussed in the next section, together with other additions and adjustments.
2.5 Additions and adjustments
Transboundary pollution may strengthen distortions in environmental policy for trade-strategic
reasons. Imagine a country that sets laxer standards to increase the profits of its home firm,
which is in Cournot competition with a foreign firm. With purely local pollution, any reduction
in the strictness of the standard results in an increase in environmental damage in the home
country. But when pollution is transboundary, part of the additional emissions from laxer
standards cause damage abroad rather than at home.
1sZhis holds true, even if firms receive a lump-sum compensation for the taxes that they pay. Note that for the
government before-tax profits aze relevant, since the government can redistribute the tax revenues as lump-sum
compensation.
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Table 2: Environmental policy in "third country" models of trade
Author type of model policy instrument competition number subject
Barrett (1994) 2 stages emission standazd Cournot n firms target choice
Bertrand
Conrad (1993) 2 stages emission taxes Cournot n firms target choice
Bertrand
Ulph (1996b) 3 stages emission taxes Cournot 2 firms tazget choice
Ulph (1992) 3 stages taxes and standards Coumot 2 firms instrument choice,
given target
Ulph (1996a) 3 stages taxes and standards Cournot 2 firms instrument choice,
given tazget
Ulph and Ulp 4 stages taxes and standards Cournot 2 firms target choice instru-
(1996) ment choice
Transboundary pollution also is an extra reason for governments to discourage foreign output.
Decreases in the use of a polluting input by foreign firms do not affect the home country's
environment in case of local pollution. With transboundary pollution, these decreases result
in less damage from abroad in the home country. In that case, it is in the interest of the home
country to discourage the foreign country to use polluting inputs. That could, for example,
be done by discouragement of foreign output that is produced with the help of this input. To
discourage foreign output, the home government could distort its environmental policy. Under
Cournot competition, a home environmental policy that is less strict implies that the home
firm increases its output. This diminishes the demand for output from the foreign firm. Laxer
environmental policies in the home country therefore lead to lower output by the foreign firm.
Hence, transboundary pollution and trade strategic considerations are interdependent reasons to
distort environmental policy from the level that is optimal from the point ofview of all countries
together. Rauscher (1997, chapter 6) extends Barrett's analysis to include transboundary
pollution and provides a clarifying discussion of strategic trade models with environmenta]
policy in general. He finds that transboundary pollution gives an additional distortionary
effect in environmental taxes, since lower domestic taxes decrease foreign output and therefore
foreign emissions tha[ cause damage at home. Some other papers that include transboundary
pollution are: Conrad (1993, 1995), Ulph and Ulph (1996), Ulph (1994), Katsoulacos et al.
(1996) and Kennedy (1994).
Effects on consumer welfare were also neglected in section 2.4. Implicitly ít was assumed
that all buyers of the product were located in a third country. Consumers favour increased
output and lower prices, in case of oligopolistic competition. Under Cournot competition, lax
environmental policy increases output (that is, decreases it less than a stricter policy would do).
A government that takes account of consumer surplus would set laxer environmental policy on
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oligopolistic producers. For the closed economy case, see Lee (1975).16 In the international
rivalry models discussed here, consumer surplus is included by Kennedy (1994) and Ulph
(1996a). With Cournot competition, the downward distortions in environmental policy are
reinforced when consumer surplus is included. With Bertrand competition, however, consumer
interests do not coincide with firm interests. The government should balance increased home-
firm profits with decreased consumer surpluses and increased environmental damage.
Different environmental policy instruments can be analysed. Most authors consider either
environmental taxes oremission standards. Sartzetakis and Constantatos (1995) study tradeable
emission permits. The difference between vazious instruments is that they provide commitment
in a different way.
There is another important difference between environmental policy instruments. This is
the difference in allocative efficiency, that is, in the resulting division of abatement efforts
and reduction costs over firms. The bad allocative efficiency of individual standards is an
important reason to prefer environmental taxes and other incentive-based instruments. Under
environmental standards, firms with high and low abatement costs may be forced to the
same emissions, which is not cost-effective. This is not the case under the more flexible
environmental taxes. With only one firm in each country,t' or with perfect information, so
that individually tailored standards are possible, standazds do not perform worse than taxes
on allocative efficiency. In most models discussed here, there is one firm in each country;
allocative efficiency can thus be neglected. Exceptions aze the analyses by Barrett (1994) and
Kennedy (1994), who also discuss an oligopoly with n firms in each country.
The contributions that were discussed until now model firms in a static and simplified way.
Investment is sometimes neglected. Other papers (Ulph, (1995, 1996b)) include investment in
new production processes, or investment in more environmental friendly production. These
investments also serve as commitment devices for firms that are in strategic competition.
While these papers pay attention to the possibility of investment, they assume immediate
adjustment of capital stocks. The two-stage model is extended with an additional stage, in
which fitms choose their capital stocks. No attention is paid to the inherently dynamic aspects
of investment. A capital stock usually lasts longer than only one period of production, so that
decisions on investment have long-run implications.
Furthermore, with more than one decision variable in a multistage model, it is just a matter of
choice which decision is assumed to be taken first. There is no logical order in government
policy choice and a firm's decisions on capital stocks. While it may be defended that firms
decide on output and consider policies as given to them, this is less obvious when they have
to make decisions on capital stocks. The assumption that policies can be reconsidered after
investments have been made is a plausible one. Ulph (1995) shows that the reversal of the order
of decisions can have important implications. He analyses a model in which environmental
policies aze determined after capital stocks have been chosen.
Part of the motivation for this thesis is to find a way to resolve the arbitrariness of multistage
16See also Buchanan (1969) for the optímal environmental tax on a monopolist.
17In that case, allocative efficiency within each country is reached per definition.
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models. With differential game models it is possible to make a distinction between stock
variables, which adjust only gradually, and flow variables, which adjust quickly. Furthermore,
assumptions about the order in decisions can be described in a structured way by different
decision strategies. The next section gces more into detail about this. It describes the basic
model that is used in the thesis and reviews related literature in the field of differential games.
3 Interactions in a dynamic model of strategic trade
This section presents the strategic trade model that is used in the [hesis. It distinguishes three
different kinds of strategic interaction that may exist: interaction between firms, interaction
between governments, and interaction between the firm and its government.








Figure 1 depicts the basic structure: Two firms in different countries compete with each other
on an international market and each firm causes pollution of the own and the foreign country's
environment. Thus, in each country, one specific sector is considered that is modelled as if it
consists of one firm that decides on investment in a capital stock and on output. The firms are
assumed to use an input that causes transboundary environmental pollution in the production
process.
Governmen[s decide on environmental policy imposed on the domestic firm, to reduce the
pollution, which is caused by emissions from both firms, since pollution is transboundary. The
transboundary character of pollution and interdependency on the market lead to links between
the actions and objectives of all four players. If a player is aware of a link, then it may try to
influence outcomes by strategic behaviour. The govemments interact with each other and with
the two firms. The two firms compete with each other on an intemational oligopolistic market
for output and interact with the regulators.
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The model is explicitly dynamic, that is, there is structural time dependence (cf. Friedman,
1989, p.19), because investments at some point in time t add to the accumulation of a capital
stock, whose value influences profits and welfare during the whole future. Hence current
pay-offs depend both on current and on past actions (on past investment decisions). Contrast
this with a model that has no structural time dependence where such a stock variable is absent.
That would be the case, for example, if firms would only decide on output and have no capital
stock. Then there is still a possibility of time dependence in decisions, ifplayers remember past
actions of each other, but the pay-offs at some point in time do not depend on past decisions,
they only depend on decisions at that time.
This structural time dependence through the accumulation of capital distinguishes the above
model from the models that were discussed in the previous section. The latter models can
be called `multistage games.' They make a distinction between different stages of decision
making, since players' decisions or actions may depend on actions of others, which then
implicitly are assumed to be taken at an earlier stage. Hence there is some (implicit) timing
of decisíons involved in these models. But, these models aze basically static, because all
decisions are taken once and for all. There is no variable comparable to our capital stock,
which accumulates over time; properly speaking, there is no time present in the model, only
several stages of decision making.
As will be explained later (in section 3.1), the absence of time in these models has implications
for the types of equilibria that can be analysed. A full dynamic game with structural time
dependency allows for a richer set of equilibria to be formulated than does a multistage model.
Some equilibria within that set have equivalents in the multistage setting. These equilibria can
be seen to involve decisions that are once and for all. But other equilibria have no equivalent
counterparts in a multistage model. To state the equivalence more precisely, the strategies
and equilibria must be defined, which will be done in section 3.1. First, the specific model
assumptions will be discussed somewhat further.
The model assumes there are two firms and two countries. This assumption is made purely
to keep the model tractable. A general model would have m countries and an oligopoly
consisting of m times n firms, with n firms in each country. For m countries with one firm
in each country, results would not change qualitatively, but strategic effects would be smaller.
The inverse demand function for output from the domestic firm would be a function of the
output of the firms in all m- 1 other countries rather than in one other country. That would
imply a smaller effect of mazginal changes in output of the firm in one country on the demand
for output of the firm in another country than would be the case for a duopoly. With n firms
in each country, another effect is added to the strategic trade effects. In that case, the home
government prefers domestic firms to collude, so that they compete as if they were one firm
with foreign firms. This effect works sometimes in a different direction than the effects that
will be analysed in the sequel (cf. Barrett, 1994). Hence, the assumption of two countries
with one firm in each country is a restrictive one, which makes strategic effects as strong as
possible. Results should be interpreted keeping that in mind.
An oligopoly model with a fixed number of firms earning nonzero profits implicitly assumes
that entry does not happen. A reason for the absence of entry could be that entry costs are
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so high that a potential entrant dces not find entry profitable. In chapters 2 and 3 production
functions are assumed to have increasing returns to scale which, if strong enough, could explain
the absence of entry.
Competition between the firms is modelled as Cournot competition. This is only one type of
oligopolistic competition that can be thought of. It should be kept in mind that results change
with alternative assumptions. The choice for Cournot competition may perhaps be justified by
the following remark, which is found in Helpman and Krugman (1986, p.85): `Even though the
assumption of Cournot behaviour is itself hard to justify, however, using this assumption often
seems to lead to intuitively plausible conclusions. The reason for this is probably that it implies
oligopolies that behave in a way intermediate between perfect competition and monopoly.'18
Consumer surplus is neglected. In the terminology of Brander (1995) a`third-market model'
is applied. That is, it is assumed that a lazge part of the consumers of the products of the
two firms aze located in a third country. Given Cournot competition, consumers in the two
countries are interested in an increase in output (and hence in laxer environmental policies), so
that the inclusion of consumer surplus would not much change the results.
The next section (section 3.1) defines decision strategies and equilibria in differential games.
Section 3.2 is devoted to matters of time consistency. The three sections that follow (sections
3.3, 3.4 and 3.5) each shortly discuss dynamic-game literature related to one of the three
types of interaction that can be distinguished in the basic model: interaction between firms,
interaction between governments and interaction between a firm and a government.
3.1 Differential games, strategies and time paths
This thesis applies differential-game models. An important chazacteristic of differential game
models is the presence of state variables and therefore structural time dependency. The model
is called a differential game, because the development of the state variables is modelled as a
system ofdifferential equations. Similar models in discrete time, which model the development
of the state variables as a system of difference equations, are called difference-game models.
In a differential game model, a player decides on intertemporal paths for the decision variables
under his control. These decision variables and the decision variables controlled by other
players determine the development over time of other variables, the state variables. Each
player maximizes an objective function, which in its most general form is a function of the
decision variables and the state vaziables at all points in time. With differential game models
it is possible to describe the interactions between firms and governments in a structured way.19
Other dynamic games with or without structural time dependency can of course be formulated,
for instance the difference-game models that were mentioned above. In this thesis, only
18Another justification for the use of Cournot competition is found in Kreps and Scheinkmann (1983), who
derive Cournot competition as the result of a game of capacity competition followed by Bertrand price competition.
However, that interpretation cannot be applied direcdy to the dynamic games analysed here, with investment in
productive or abatement capital followed by output choices.
19For the formal definition ofa differential game, see Ba~az and Olsder, 1995, p230.
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differential game models aze analysed.
The papers mentioned in section 2.3 to 2.5 have in common that they apply multistage games
(most are two- or three-stage games, with governments acting in the first stage and firms in
the second and third stages). That implies that decisions are assumed to take place in a fixed
order and once and for all. Consequently, interactions aze limited to take place in one direction
only. For example, in most analyses, government decisions influence firm decisions, but not
vice versa. An exception is the paper by Ulph (1995), who considers a setting in which first
firms decide on investment, then governments decide on policy, and finally firms decide on
output. These models are static in the sense that all decisions are made once and for all and
that time plays no explicit role. But different stages of decision making are distinguished and
in that sense they have some implicit dynamics. One decision is assumed to be taken before
the other. This distinction of different stages explains the term multistage games. Since the
stages in a multistage game take place sequentially, the game can also be seen as a difference
game (see, for a formal definition, Ba,sar and Olsder (1995, p.225)), if the state variables are
properly defined.
For multistage games, several types of equilibrium can be formulated, dependent upon whether
players take into account that subsequent decisions depend on past actions. If players do not
act strategically (that is, if they do not take into account the effect of their decisions on
subsequent decisions), then the resulting equilibria are the same as the equilibria if all players
act simultaneously. If players act strategically and take the order of decisions into account,
then it is appropriate to consider only subgame-perfect equilibria. These equilibria are found
by going backward through the stages, using a line of reasoning analogous to Bellman's
optimality principle. At a certain stage, for these equilibria, only future pay-offs resulting
from an equilibrium strategy in the following stages are relevant. A definition of the concept
of subgame perfection, which is due to Selten, can be found in Friedman (1989, p.81). This
equilibrium concept is usually applied in multistage games.
Returning to differential game models, to describe the interactions in such a game, first a
distinction is made between state and control variables. State variables cannot be controlled
directly by the players. Rather, they adjust gradually as a result of the values of the control
vaziables. One application, which is used frequently in this thesis, is to consider a firm's capital
stock as a state variable that adjusts gradually according to the firm's rate of investment.
Second, the decision strategies applied by the players have to be considered. The chazacteristics
of the decision strategy determine to what degree the actions of a player can be influenced by
other players. Consider, for instance, running a race. The state of this game at some moment
during the race is defined to be the position of the participating runners. This state adjusts
through the speed of the runners, their control variables. A runner may choose to have the
strategy: `Run as fast as I can all the time.' Such a player's decision is not affected by any
decision of the other players and neither by the state of the game. Note that the player's pay-off
may be affected by the other players' decisions, though. For example, if the other players
deliberately stay behind her, the result is probably different from a race in which the other
players also use the strategy to run as fast as they can. Another strategy that could be chosen by
a runner is this: `Try to run at second position always.' The decision of this player, her speed, is
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then affected by the decisions of the other players insofar as they are reflected in their relative
positions. That is, this strategy is state-dependent. When the runner with this strategy is in a
first position, she must slow down. When she is in a fourth position, she should accelerate.
Formally, decision strategies are defined through the `information sets' that players use to
determine their decisions. The strategy ` run as fast as you can' dces not need any information
on the state of the system during the game. When such information is not available, as it would
be in the hypothetical situation in which runners run in visually sepazated lanes, it is only
possible to apply this type of s[rategy. With the presence of information, strategies that use
the information are also possible. For example, the strategy `run at second position' requires
continuous information on the state of the system, namely on the position of the players. But
only the current state is important; past positions of players are irrelevant.
Assume that the initial value of the state variables is given to the players. Then, the strategy
where a player uses no information on the state variables, is called an open-loop strategy.
Under such a strategy, the player chooses the time path of decisions at the stazt of the game and
sticks to these no matter what happens. The actions of a player at some point in time depend
on time only, for a given initial situation. A formal definition of an open-loop information
structure is given in Ba~ar and Olsder (1995, p.231): Denote by ~;(t), the information set of
player i at time t; then, an open-loop information structure implies that ~;(t) - xo, the initial
value of the state variables, b't. The feedback strategy is defined as a strategy, in which the
decisions of a player depend only on time and the cunent state of the system. The information
structure of a player is called a feedback information pattern if it consists of the current state.
(see Ba,sar and Olsder, 1995, p.231). Formally, the feedback information structure implies that
~;(t) -~(t), b't, where ~(t) denotes the value of the state variables at time t.
If players apply feedback strategies, they react indirectly to each other's past decisions during
the game, because they condition their decisions on the state of the system. In that case, a
player has to take into account how her decisions influence the state of the system and hence
future decisions ofthe other players.
Many other, more complicated strategies can be considered. For example, strategies in which
the runner adjusts her speed according to the speed of some specific other runner might be
thought of, or strategies that depend on all past positions of players, on the weather conditions
or on the distance yet to run. Since for differential games, strategies are always defined as
functions of state variables and time, not all these strategies fit into the formal framework of
differential games. This thesis considers just the two types of strategies that were defined
above, open-loop and feedback strategies. Since games with several players and decision
variables are analysed, these two simple strategies already make it possible to analyse a variety
of possible equilibria, with different assumptions about the strategies that are used for each
decision vaziable. Furthermore, equilibria in these two types of strategies are analytically
tractable, because powerful optimization techniques such as Pontryagin's maximum principle
and dynamic programming can be applied.
It is important in the subsequent chapters to realize that an open-loop and a feedback strategy
have different implications for players' commitments. When a player follows an open-loop
strategy for a certain decision variable, it implies that she has a commitment to the equilibrium
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time path of the variable. She will always follow the equilibrium time path. Changes in the state
of the system will not affect her decisions. If a player commits herself to a certain feedback
strategy, ry(~(t)), her commitment is different. That player has no commitment to some time
path of actions, for when the state of the system, ~(t), changes, decisions concerning a variable
whose value is contingent on that state change as well. In a feedback Nash or feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium, which will be defined below,20 commitment is again different. From
the definition of these equilibria it follows that there can be no commitment to either a strategy
or a time path of actions. For in such an equilibrium, players reoptimize their decisions at any
point in time. The value of the state variables at some point in time is, however, given to the
players. So it could be said that the players are committed to these values of the state variables
at some point in time, since they can only be changed gradually and not ad hoc. It can be
expected that equilibria for different (combinations of) strategies have different implications
for commitment and therefore for strategic behaviour and equilibrium solutions. To come back
to the race example, the runner that runs as fast as she can has high commitment to do that, and
nothing else. The runner that goes for a second position has no commitment to some speed,
but does have a high commitment to the second position. A second competitor that overtakes
her can expect that the runner will accelerate.
Given that strategies ( that is, information structures) are defined and an equilibrium concept is
chosen, equilibria can be formulated. In the thesis, four equilibria are considered. The open-
loop Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in open-loop strategies. Its formal definition is
given in Ba,sar and Olsder (1995, theorem 6.11, p.318). The feedback Nash equilibrium is
defined as the N-tuple of strategies (for a game with N players), for which value functions exist
that satisfy properly stated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations for each player. The formal
statement of these conditions is given in Ba~ar and Olsder (1995, theorem 6.16, p.328).21
The third equilibrium used in the thesis is the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, where the
leader chooses an optimal open-loop strategy, given the equilibrium behaviour of the follower.
A formal definition can again be found in Ba~ar and Olsder (1995, p.410). The feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium, finally, is defined as a Stackelberg equilibrium at any point in time
t. The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies define value functions that must satisfy a
system of Hamilton- Jacobi-Bellman equations (see Ba~ar and Olsder, 1995, p.418).22 The
ZoThe terminology becomes a bit confusing here. A distinction should be made between feedback strategies
and feedback Nash- (or Stackelberg) equilibrium strategies. The former term refers to all strategies that depend on
the current value of the state and on [ime, but that need not be equilibrium strategies. The latter are the equilibrium
strategies in a feedback Nash equilibrium, which will be defined below.
Z1When the information structure is properly defined, this equilibrium is a special case of the wider class
of so-called closed-loop no-memory Nash equilibria. Since the derivation of these more general equilibria is
cumbersome, usually only feedback Nash equilibria are considered in applications. (See Ba~az and Olsder, 1995,
section 6.5.2.)
2ZJust as is the case for the Nash equilibrium, one might think of another type of equilibrium, called the
global Stackelberg equilibrium by Ba~az and Olsder. The definition of such an equilibrium in continuous time is,
however, not so straightforward. The follower should determine its reaction to strategies that may be functions
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Stackelberg leader is assumed to determine its actions before the follower at any point in time,
contingent on the value of the state variables at that time. Note that these state variables
change under the influence of the actions from both leader and follower. Hence, through the
development of the state variables, the follower may indirectly influence the behaviour of the
leader.
A third characteristic of differential game models is that they allow examination of not only
steady-state equilibria, but also equilibrium paths of players' decisions during the whole
period. In tertrts of the race example: A differential game model makes it possible to describe
the characteristics of the whole race. In contrast, a static model can model only the outcome
of the race. Usually however, the explicit analysis of these equilibrium paths requires very
complex calculations.
After some technical questions in the next section, section 3.3 turns back to the basic model.
For each of the three types of interactions (between firms, between governments and between
firms and governments), a short discussion of related differential game literature is given.
3.2 Time consistency
This section addresses some technical aspects of differential games, that arise because equilib-
rium strategies in differential games aze time paths. The definitions in Basar and Olsder (1995)
are used.
A problem that needs to be considered is that an equilibrium solution at time to need not be
an equilibrium solution at time t,. That is, an equilibrium need not be time consistent. When
players use open-loop strategies, but they would be stopped at some point in time, told the state
at that time and asked to reconsider their strategies, they might like to change the time path
of their decision variable.23 In the running example, when the value of the state variables is
revealed at some point in time and a player learns that she is first, she may prefer to leave the
strategy: `run as fast as I can' and choose the strategy: `run at a speed that I can hold on to.'
An equilibrium path x(t) for a decision vaziable x is defined to be weakly time consistent if it
is an equilibrium path from the viewpoint of any arbitrary point in time t. Formally, consider
a dynamic game D, defined on the interval [0, T], with strategy space I' and solution concept
so1.24 Then, the following definition can be formulated:
of the development of the state variables, while the leader should optimize taking into account the reactions of
the follower that may include actions that influence the development of the state variables. For a more precise
explanation, see Ba~ar and Olsder (1995).
23As can be seen from this description, it is a bit strange to talk about time consistency in an open-loop
equilibrium, since such an equilibrium structure assumes an open-loop information pattern. Wi[h that information
pattern, players get no new information after the beginning of the game. An open-loop equilibrium is very
static in structure, since all decisions are `made' at time zero. Here, the [ime consistency of open-loop (Nash
or Stackelberg) equilibria is considered, nevertheless, in order to make some kind of comparison with feedback
(Nash or Stackelberg) equilibria.
24This could be, for example, [he (feedback or open-loop) Nash equilibrium, or the Stackelberg equilibrium.
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Definition 1.1 An N-tuple of policies y' E I', solving the dynamic game D(I ;[0,T]; sol) is
weakly time consistent if its truncation to the interval [s, T], y~, TI, solves the truncated game
D~s,TI, this being sofor all s E(0, T]. If a solution ry' E I' is not weakly time consistent, then
it is time inconsistent.
(quoted from Ba,sar and Olsder, 1995, p.256). This definition is not relevant for multistage
models, because the decision variables (that is the policies ry' E I') are not functions of time
for those models. In a dynamic game, when an equilibrium strategy is not time-consistent and
the players have no option to bind themselves to a time path of decisions, this implies that the
equilibrium is not a credible description of what happens at future time points. If the players
are able to re-optimize, they choose new equilibrium strategies, starting at that time point. It
is therefore more appropriate to apply feedback (Nash or Stackelberg) equilibrium concepts in
such a situation.
From the definition of a feedback Nash- and feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, it follows that
policies in these equilibria are weakly time consistent. The Nash equilibrium in open-loop
strategies is also a weakly time-consistent solution (see Basar and Olsder, 1995). Along the
equilibrium time path there will not be a point in time when a player, being told the value of the
state variables, and reconsidering her equilibrium strategy, wants to leave it. This does not hold
for the open- loop Stackelberg equilibrium solution. In general, the Stackelberg equilibrium in
open-loop strategies is not time consistent.
A stricter requirement is that of strong time consistency (Basar and Olsder, 1995, p.256). An
equilibrium strategy is defined to be strongly time consistent if, for any value of the state
variable that may occur (hence not only for values on the equilibrium path), the strategy is an
equilibrium strategy. Formally, for the dynamic game D(I'; [0, T]; sol),
Definition 1.2 An N-tuple of policies ry` E I' solving the dynamic game D(I'; [0, T]; sol) is
strongly time consistent if its truncation to the interval [s, T], ry~, TI, solves the truncated game
D~, TI, for every ,~lo,,l E I'lo,,l, this being sofor every s E(0, T].
(quoted from Ba~ar and Olsder, 1995, p.256). The feedback Nash and feedback Stackelberg
equilibria are strongly time consistent, because they were defined by dynamic programming.
As a consequence, equilibrium strategies in these equilibria define actions as functions of the
cunent value of the state variables and time. Equilibria in open-loop strategies will in general
not be strongly time consistent. In the open-loop Nash or open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium,
actions are defined as functions of time only and dynamic programming is not used to derive
the equilibrium. When, due to distortions, the state variables divert from the path they would
follow in the open-loop equilibrium, then it cannot in general be expected that the open-loop
equilibrium strategies are still optimal if players at some point in time learn the (distorted)
value of the state variables and can reconsider their strategies.
Analyses of multistage games often consider subgame-perfect equilibria. Subgame perfection
was shortly described in section 3.1. It is a concept from game-theory, which is in spirit
equal to strong time consistency. But strong time consistency is defined within the structure of
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differential ( and difference) games. In principle, a differe~ice game ( which is defined in discrete
time) could be written down in its extensive form and then subgame perfection could be applied
to this extensive form. For differential games, that is only possible in approximation.25 In
this thesis, strong and weak time consistency will be used for differential games and subgame
perfection formultistage games. If the decisions in previous stages are defined as state vaziables
in a difference game, then a strong time consistent equilibrium in that game is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the multistage game.
The differential games that are analysed in this thesis all have the same, almost au-
tonomous, structure. Let x(t) denote an rre-vector of state vaziables. And let u(t) -
(u'(t), ..., u'(t), ..., un(t)) denote a vector of control vaziables, where u'(t) is the r`-vector
of controls decided on by player i. Each player i has an objective function, J`(xo) -
fó e-r`go(x(t), u(t))dt and faces a set of constraints, divided into constraints that de-
scribe the development of the state variables, i( t) - g(x(t), u(t)), and other constraints,
h(x(t), u(t)) 1 0. The value of the game to player i at some time t, for state variables x(t), is
defined by J'(x(t)) - ft~ e-T`gó(x(t), u`(t))dt, where the u`(t) are the timepaths of decisions
that aze implied by equilibrium strategies. Note that time only enters explicitly in the objective
function in the form of an exponential discount factor, e-r`. This special structure allows for
a simplification of the equilibrium conditions. It implies that equilibrium solutions do not
depend on time explicitly. This simplification is used in the sequel without further notification.
However, there is one exception, in the Stackelberg equilibria analysed in chapters 6 and 7: If
governments apply open-loop strategies, then the objective function and constraints of firms
are of a different type. For example, consider a firm that is subject to some environmental tax,
r. If T(t) is the open-loop strategy applied by its government, this time function enters the
model, so that time enters explicitly in the firm's objective function and possibly also in its
constraints. Only if taxes aze constant for all t does that not occurr.
Furthermore, the models in this thesis have the common feature that the time horizon is taken
to be infinite. That has the implication that the value of the objective functíon as defined above
is well-defined only for equilibria that imply time paths of decisions and state vaziables, whose
limit, when time goes to infinity, exists and is not infinite. The simplification that time enters
the objective function explicitly only through the discount factor allows for such stationary
solutions. An infinite time horizon also has implications for the solution concepts that aze used
to derive equilibria. For open-loop (Nash or Stackelberg) equilibria, Pontryagin's Maximum
Principle is applied. With an infinite time horizon, this Principle takes a slightly different
form, which can be found, for instance, in Seierstad and Syds~ter ( 1987). For feedback (Nash
or Stackelberg) equilibria, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations are used. These equations
follow directly from dynamic programming. In discrete time, for each player i, they define the
value function, J'(xt), of the game at some time t as the sum of the equilibrium pay-offs at
that time and the discounted value of the game one time period further. Their continuous time
variant is found by taking the limit of this expression when the length of the time period gces
zSSee Fudenberg and Tirole, 1992, for more on this issue. ~eir concept of Markov perfection is practically
equivalent to strong time consistency.
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to zero. Then the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations take a recursive form, since the value
of the game at t and the value of the game at t~ e aze equal when e goes to zero. A functional
equation in the value function is found, which can be used to solve for the value function, if
the set-up of the game is tractable ( see also de Zeeuw, 1991).
3.3 Differential game models of oligopoly
The interaction between firms in oligopolistic competition has been analysed with dynamic
game models by a number of authors for the closed economy case. The most well-known type
of model is probably that of a repeated one-shot oligopoly game (see, for instance, Friedman,
1989). The firms decide on one variable, output or price, in a series of repetitions of the same
game. The circumstances under which they compete (for example, their production capacity)
remain constant over time. So they play the same game over and over again. Therefore, this is
an almost static model. There is no structural time dependency. The only dynamic aspect is
that decision strategies may depend on decisions in earlier games. Considering these decision
variables as state vaziables in a difference game in discrete time, makes it possible to apply
concepts like open-loop and closed-loop strategies. These models, however, are not discussed
here any further.
In the repeated game, past decisions may affect current decisions, but that is only due to
assumptions about players' behaviour. Pay-offs in games at different stages do not depend on
past decisions, but only on current decisions. In repeated game models of oligopoly there is
no state variable that introduces structural time dependency.
Structural time dependency is implied, for example, if a state variable that represents market
conditions (like the mazket price of the product) is included. It is then assumed that mazket
conditions do not change abruptly, but only gradually. For example, market prices are modelled
to be sticky and to adjust gradually to excess demand or supply. An oligopolist that determines
his optimal output should take into account this market price.
Models of oligopoly with the mazket price as a state variable aze Fershtman and Kamien (1987)
and Tsutsui and Mino (1990). Most analyses restrict themselves to linear feedback strategies.
That is, they consider only those feedback strategies in which the value of the control vaziables
is a lineaz function of the state variables. This thesis also restricts the analysis of feedback
strategies to linear strategies. Tsutsui and Mino (1990), however, derive equilibria in non-linear
feedback strategies. Their paper shows that a continuum of equilibria in feedback strategies
may exist, although the non-linear strategies are quite complicated.
When mazket prices are taken as the state variable, a firm's capital stock is usually considered
to be given. Other dynamic oligopoly models include investment and take capital stocks as
the state vaziables. Because each firm has its own capital stock, there will be as many state
variables as players. When a duopoly is considered, that will imply two state vaziables. Papers
that analyse this type ofoligopoly games are Fershtman and de Zeeuw (1992), Flaherty (1980),
Fudenberg and Tirole (1992, chapter 13), Reynolds (1987) and Stimming (1997). A difficult
aspect of these models is that with two firms there are two state variables (firm one's capital
stock and firm two's capital stock) and even more with more firms. Games with a relatively
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simple structure, namely lineaz-quadratic games, already require rather complex calculations
to determine equilibrium feedback investment strategies.
A feedback (Nash- or Stackelberg-) equilibrium is often a more complicated equilibrium than
the open-loop equilibrium, because it enables equilibrium strategies in which firms adjust their
investment to their competitor's capital stock. The investment decisions of one firm take into
account that an enlarged capital stock may lead to increased (or decreased) investments from
the competitor. Such interactions could lead to an `investment race,' if an increased capital
stock leads to larger competing investments. Alternatively, they could lead to a game where
firms try to keep competing capital stocks low by extra investment, if an increased capital stock
leads to smaller competing investments. It depends on the specific parameters of the profit
function, whether firms in equilibrium invest more or less in reaction to a higher competing
capital stock. In Fershtman and de Zeeuw (1992) and in Reynolds (1987), these parameters
are such that higher competing capital stocks lead to lower investment. In chapter 3 a sufficient
condition is derived under which a higher competing capital stock leads to lower investment.
These papers, as well as chapter 3 of this thesis, consider symmetric equilibria. Flaherty (1980)
is an example of a paper that, though in a somewhat different model with open-loop investment
strategies, examines asymmetric equilibria. It derives under what conditions stable asymmetric
equilibria may exist. From the result of Tutsui and Mino (1990) and Flaherty (1980), it follows
that the equilibria that are analysed in the thesis need not be the only equilibria existing in the
game.
3.4 Dynamic models of environmental policy interaction between gov-
ernments
Transboundary pollution is a source of interaction among the two governments in the basic
structure (see figure 1). A special feature of environmental resources, compared to other
factors of production, is that without regulation their use is free. In the absence of international
agreements, a country that has its environment s polluted by foreign producers is not able
to levy emission taxes on those producers or apply other environmental policy instruments.
Moreover, it is hard to restrict `migration' of environmental resources over the border. Often
the substances that cross the border are diffuse and the relationship between sender and receiver
is unclear.
Therefore, transboundazy pollution problems require international cooperation. In a cooper-
ative equilibrium, countries agree to adjust their environmental policy. A large literature has
emerged that analyses why it is so hazd to obtain an agreement. The central question in this
literature is how bazgaining solutions can be reached that improve on the sub-optimal Nash
non-cooperative equilibrium. In that equilibrium, each government takes account of only the
damage in its home country. As a result, environmental policies are distorted downward from
the point of view of the world as a whole.
To concentrate on this issue, countries aze usually modelled in an abstract way, with govern-
ments as the only decision makers. A distinction can be made between analyses that treat
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pollution as a flow problem and those that are concerned with environmental damage related
to accumulating pollution. An overview of both kind of analyses is given in Missfeldt (1996).
This section restricts attention to a few papers that use a dynamic model to analyse interactions
between governments when environmental damage is due to accumulated pollution. Ifdamage
is due to the accumulation of pollu[ion, dynamic models offer a more realistic description of the
decisions problems that are at stake. References that analyse models of transboundary pollution
with damage from stock pollution are Hoel (1992), Dockner and Van Long (1993), Kaitala,
Pohjola and Tahvonen (1992) and van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992). These articles confirm
the conclusion from static games of transboundary pollution (for example, M~ler 1989) that
multinational cooperation improves on the non-cooperative outcome. The dynamic structure
adds an incentive for distortion of individual strategies from the cooperative equilibrium (see,
for example, van der Plceg and de Zeeuw, 1992). The distortion from the global optimum is
not, as in static games, due only to countries' neglect of damage across their borders. A related
distortion occurs since countries want to shift costs of pollution reduction to other countries.
If the state of the environment influences the decisions of the other country, a bad environment
may stimulate foreign countries to higher abatement. That may lead countries to set a too lax
policy, because efforts of the others offset this partially. In equilibrium, then, all countries set
laxer policies than they would otherwise. To analyse this effect, a model should contain ways
in which the state of the environment may influence decisions. That happens, for, example
when feedback decision strategies are considered.
Without side payments, a cooperative solution is often hard to implement. For when the
countries are sufficiently asymmetric, it is no sure thing, that all countries gain from an
agreement. And even if all countries gain, the incentive to free ride on the cooperative
behaviour of others makes a cooperative equilibrium difficult to sustain. To find equilibria
that improve on the non-cooperative outcome and that can be implemented and sustained is
not an easy task. Dynamic games (repeated games and differential games) make it possible to
consider more complex strategies, which may be helpful in finding such equilibria.26
Chapter 5 in this thesis is concerned with global warming. It analyses a game between
governments on emission reduction and assumes that environmental damage is caused by
stock pollution. For reasons of tractability, the other chapters abstract from accumulation of
pollution and assume that the government has a damage function to value damage related to
flow emissions. Instead, these chapters focus on investment and have capital stocks as state
variables in the game.
3.5 Dynamic models of the interaction between governments and pol-
luters
The first chapters in this thesis (chapters 2, 3 and 4) assume that the government has a
predetermined and constant emission target. If the government applies an emission tax, it is
assumed that it chooses this tax such that the emission target is exactly met. However, the
Z6See for repeated games the discussion in Barrett (1996). For differential games, see chapter 4 in Cesaz (1994).
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firm is assumed not to act strategically with respect to this tax. That is, by assumption, the
firm just takes the standazd or the tax as given; no strategic interaction occurs between the firm
and the government. In chapters 5, 6 and 7 this assumption is changed. Chapter 5 considers
the decisions of a social planner, who determines the rate of emission through its decisions on
the use of fossil fuels and the hazvest rate of forests. In chapters 6 and 7, the government is
assumed to be a Stackelberg leader. When it sets environmental policy according to an open-
loop strategy, this implies that the firm cannot act strategically with respect to environmental
policy. However, when the government is assumed to set environmental policy levels according
to a feedback strategy, equilibrium environmental policy levels depend on the firm's capital
stock and on the capital stock of the competi[or. Since the firm realizes this, it adjusts its
investment to take into account what happens to environmental policy when it increases its
capital stock.
A third type of interaction [o be considered, is, thus, the interaction between the firm and its
regulator. A few papers that apply differential games to analyse this relationship will now be
shortly discussed. Karp and Livernois (1994) is a differential game analysis that considers
firms who react to given tax adjustment rules. The tax adjusts until some predetermined
environmental tazget is reached. When firms anticipate on tax adjustments, they overreact to
prevent future increases in the tax. Biglaiser, Horowitz and Quiggin (1995) assume lineaz
damage functions and compare mazketable permits and emission taxes in a closed economy
model of a firm that interacts with a regulator. They derive a Stackelberg equilibrium in
open-loop strategies, which need not be time consistent. In their closed economy framework,
with constant mazginal damage, the Pigouvian tax is constant. Therefore it is not sensitive to
strategic interaction. In contrast, marketable permits are distorted due to interaction between the
firm and the government. The amount of permits issued depends on the amount of investment
undertaken by the firm in equilibrium.
Principal-agent interactions are an important type of interaction between the firm and its
regulator. But these interactions are absent in the analysis contained in this thesis, by assumption
of complete information. The regulator's uncertainty about the firm's abatement cost function
and about its emissions could lead to these principal-agent interactions. The firm would have an
incentive to overstate its costs to prevent stringent regulation. When the regulator has complete
information about the firm, these interactions are no longer relevant.
Another assumption is that the firm has complete information about the government. Inter-
actions related to uncertainty about future policy are therefore also neglected. See Cadot and
Sinclair-Desgagné (1995) for a dynamic analysis that addresses this question.
This section concludes the description of the three types of interaction that can be distinguished.




Chapters 2 and 3 restrict attention to the interaction between firms in different countries that
aze subject to environmental regulation. The government has a fixed emission target and
firms cannot affect their regulator. But the regulator tries to choose the environmental policy
instrument that will maximize the profits of the home firm.
In chapter 2, firms are assumed to follow open-loop investment strategies and feedback output
strategies. Governments have fixed constant emission targets and set their policy such that,
given the state of the system, this target will be met. The chapter compazes the effect on
investments of emission taxes and standazds. For environmental taxes, a given target implies
that governments have to compute the correct tax rate in order to meet the environmental tazget.
This tax rate thus depends on firm's capital stocks. However, firms aze assumed to neglect
the effect of their capital stocks on the equilibrium tax rate. For environmental standards,
governments simply set the standazd at the predetermined target.
Firms decide on the level of their inputs, given environmental policy. They use investments
to build up a capital stock which, together with energy input, produces output. Strategic
interactions between firms occur, because decisions on investments and energy use are taken
consecutively. A firm's equilibrium investment strategy differs if its competitor is subject to
an environmental standard or to an environmental tax. The same commitment effects that
occurred in Ulph (1992) play again a role. The results in Ulph's multistage game analysis are
comparable to the steady-state results in a differential game with feedback output strategies
and open-loop investment strategies.
The results of chapter 2 lead to the question what happens when firms use feedback investment
strategies. Chapter 3 is therefore again concerned with the interaction between two firms in a
similar setting. But now the firms aze assumed to follow feedback investment strategies. The
game in investment that results when equilibrium output strategies are inserted is a differential
game with lineaz dynamics, but a non-quadratic objective function. Analytically, it is hard to
find an equilibrium to this game. Therefore, the equilibrium steady state is approximated with
the help of an algorithm, which finds the steady state of the second-order Taylor approximation
to the objective function.
It is found that, under feedback investment strategies, results can be the reverse from the
conclusions that were obtained under open-loop investment strategies. This is due to the
additional interactions that are added when feedback rather than open-loop investment strategies
are applied.
These two chapters neglect possible transboundary aspects of pollution. The emission tazget
is considered to be given and environmental damage is not an explicit part of the objective
function. The policy instruments considered are emission taxes and emission standards.
Chapter 4 attempts to extend the analysis to emission permits. It thus develops a model of the
behaviour of a firm that may invest in emission reduction and is faced with a government that
issues emission permits. These emission permits may be either banked or traded, so that the
firm has to decide both on its rate of investment and on the management of its permit holdings.
Chapter 5 turns to the interaction between governments when pollution is transboundary.
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Specifically, this chapter considers the problem of global wazming. It investigates whether
equilibria change when the dynamics of cazbon sequestration and emission by forests are
explicitly included. This is relevant when one of the countries owns a lazge amount of carbon
absorbing forests. The chapter analyses a model in which emissions from fossil fuel and from
the use of hazvested wood add to the stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Growing
forests act as a sink for greenhouse gases, since they consume C02 in the growth.
The analysis concerns the possible conflicts and the potential cooperative gains in a two-
player setting. This chapter abstracts completely from firms. As a consequence, there aze
no investment or output decisions to be made by individual firms or environmental policy
decisions to be made by governments. Instead, the country is modelled as driven by a welfare
maximizing social planner that chooses both emission rates and rates of forest harvest.
Chapters 6 and 7, attempting to combine these two aspects and include the third type of
interaction, analyse a model that contains both interactions between firms, interactions between
governments and interactions between the firm and its government. With transboundary
pollution, governments that do not cooperate neglect the foreign effects of the emissions from
their producers. Chapter 6 analyses government policies in equilibrium for three different
scenarios. These three scenazions are: cooperation between firms and between governments,
cooperation between governments but competition between firms, and competition between
firms and governments.
Chapter 7, focusing on the effect of strategic distortions in environmental policy on the dynamic
efficiency ofenvironmental policy instruments, analyses firms' incentives to invest in emission-
reducing technology under emission taxes and emission standards. Governments balance trade
interests with environmental concerns. If they impose the strict policy they prefer from an
environmental point of view, they might harm home firms and decrease their profits. It is
assumed that governments do not want this, since they have a preference for high profits to be
earned at home. This leads to downward distortions in environmental policy. These downwazd
distortions, however, may reduce the incentive to invest in emission reduction technology. To
analyse this, chapter 7 compares equilibria with and without distortions. Firms base their
decisions to invest on expected future policy. Due to the distortions in environmental policy,
it is not a priori clear which type of instrument, taxes or standards, gives the best incentive
to invest in emission-reducing technologies (that is, the incentive that is closest to the social
optimum). Environmental taxes are shown to be sometimes less dynamically efficient than
standazds.
Finally, chapter 8 summazizes the results.
Chapter 2
Standards versus taxes in a dynamic
duopoly model of trade;
Open-Loop investment strategies
This chapter discusses environmental policy instruments in a differential game model of intemational
trade. Themodel describes a duopoly, where each competitor is situated in a different country. Emission
taxes or standards are set by a fully informed regulator in such a way that a predetermined target is
reached. Firms decide on the level of their inputs, given environmental policy. Investments are used to
build up a capital stock which together with a polluting input produces outpu[. Strategic interactions
can occur if decisions on investments and on the polluting input are taken consecutively.
In such a setting emission taxes and standards are compared. A firm reacts differently if its competitor
is subject to a standard than if it is subject to a tax. This is due to the reduction in flexibility implied
by standards. In a duopoly structure this reduction in flexibility tums out to be to the advantage of the
firms involved, because it reduces strategic overinvestments. The chapter discusses equilibria for the
duopoly, where firms use open-loop investment strategies and use feedback strategies for their choice
of the polluting input.
1 Introduction
Flexibility is an important reason to advocate economic environmental policy instruments like
emission taxes. More than under traditional command and control measures, polluters can
choose to what degree and in which way they decrease their pollution. Consequently, the
regulator may reach a high allocative efficiency, even with inadequate infot7rtation about the
cost structure of the polluting firms.
In case of imperfect competition, however, flexibility has also another effect, because in such
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markets commitment plays an important role (see for instance Tirole, 1988). In some cases
it is advantageous for a firm in oligopoly to be able to `burn its bridges'. The ability to bind
itself to certain actions gives the firm a relatively strong position towards a competitor. More
flexibility by its nature decreases the possibilities to commit.
Since an incentive for rent shifting exists in a situation of imperfect competition, governments
may be interested in pursuing trade policies to increase the commitment possibilities for `their'
firms. Brander and Spencer (1983, 1985) analyse the multistage games which result when both
governments and firms act strategically. It is often claimed (and disputed) that environmental
policy might be (mis)used as a substitute for trade policy when the latter is prohibited in free
trade agreements. Contributtions that discuss this in the context of strategic international trade
were reviewed in chapter 1. Most of these papers are, in contrast with the chapter below,
concerned with the level of the tax or standard applied, that is with environmental policy target
setting.
In this chapter, it is assumed that the target of environmental policy is fixed beforehand to focus
on a second aspect of environmental policy. When environmental policy instruments differ
in the degree of commitment they confer to firms, it is of interest to single out the following
question: How do environmental policy instruments differ in their effects on international
trade when governments aze interested in rent shifting and trade is characterized by imperfect
competition? Ulph (1992) analyses a model of trade under imperfect competition in which
the tazget of environmental policy is given. When governments apply standards rather than
taxes, he finds that the reasons for firms to engage in strategic behaviour are decreased, because
standazds commit their competitors to certain choices. This commitment reduces [he influence
of strategic actions on the competitor, which actually benefits the firms.
Ulph (1992) and other papers on environmental policy and strategic trade' have in common
that they model multistage games. Hence every decision taken is once and for all. It could
be interesting to elaborate this to a fully dynamic setting for two reasons. Firstly a multistage
model requires assumptions about the order in which decisions are taken. In a differential
game model this order is modelled more naturally by making a distinction between state and
control variables. Secondly, not only steady-state equilibria, which are comparable to the
Nash equilibria in the multistage games, can be studied, but also equilibrium paths of players'
decisions during the whole period. This implies [hat players can react to each other's past
decisions during the game. Due to the fixed order of decisions and their once and for all
character, in multistage models this is only possible to a certain degree: Firms can adjust
output to the investment decisions taken by their competitor, but they cannot adjust decisions
in reaction to the other firm's outputs. In a dynamic game environment, the impact of various
assumptions about the way in which players react to each other's past decisions can be analysed.
This chapter contains an extension of Ulph's (1992) model to a fully dynamic one. The
analysis focuses on the compazison of the effects of environmental policy instruments on firms.
We abstract from target setting by assuming that the goal of environmental policy is fixed
beforehand. A differential game model is presented with two firms that trade over an infinite
1 These are reviewed in chapter l.
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planning period. The firms may apply either open-loop or feedback decision strategies2.
Since firms have to decide on more than one variable, a mix of open-loop and feedback
strategies is also possible. In the model presented in this chapter, firms apply such a mixed
strategy. They have two decision variables: investments and the use of a polluting input, which,
as an example, will often be referced to as energy in the sequel. It is assumed that the solution
strategy of firms is such that they plan investment for a long period at the initial time and
stick to these plans, but decide on their use of the polluting input, for instance energy, at each
moment of time t, after investment has taken place. This mixed strategy is the most simple
formulation that enables the study of the mechanisms described in Ulph (1992) in a dynamic
game framework. We choose to stay close to Ulph's model in order to analyse the effects of a
shift to a dynamic game framework as such. Chapter 3 then extends the analysis to feedback
investment strategies.
Which assumption is the best to make from an economic viewpoint, depends on the specific
investment and type of production that are considered. As an example ofopen-loop investment
strategies and feedback strategies for the decision on the use of a polluting input as a reasonable
assumption, think of investment as the purchase of certain production equipment. For low
enough rates of discount and depreciation this decision can be modelled as taken at the start
of the game. Think of the decision on energy use as the decision regarding how many hours
to run the equipment per day, which is decided upon each day, depending on the situation at
hand.
The model assumptions in this chapter resemble those of Ulph in so far as it is again assumed that
energy use is decided upon after investment has taken place. They differ, however, because
capital stock is used as a means of production during more than one period and therefore
investment decisions have implications for the whole future.
Section 2 below gives a differential game model of two competing firms. In section 3 equi-
librium strategies for the firms are discussed. Conclusions are drawn in section 4, which also
gives some directions for further research.
2 A duopoly model
The model describes a duopoly where each competitor is situated in a different country3 and
faces the environmental policy of that country. The decision makers are firms and regulators.
The regulator in each country has a fixed environmental target é'(t) for all times t and prefers
high profits for its home firm. Emissions are assumed to have local effects only'. Firms
and countries are connected through the common market for outputs. Each firm is a profit
maximizer. Throughout the whole chapter perfect foresight is assumed.
2See section 1.3.1 for a definition of these strategies.
3With equal environmental policy instruments in each country, the results on firm behaviour also apply to a
duopoly in one country.
'Transboundary pollution is included in the analysis in chapters 6 and 7.
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Environmental policy consists either of a tax or a standazd on the use of the polluting input,
denoted by e'(t). It is assumed that emissions are directly related to the use of this input, which
could be for example energy. This implies that an emission tax or standazd is equivalent to an
energy tax or standard. The regulator sets the level of the tax or the standard beforehand. Taxes,
r`, are set such that, for all t, e'(t) - é'(t). The regulator is assumed to have full information
on the firm so that it can accomplish this. Standazds are simply equal to é`(t). Firms take the
environmental policy levels as given. Under these assumptions, taxes and standards result in
the same energy use.
Each firm i maximizes its discounted stream of profits fó e-rtII`(t)dt, where r is a constant
rate of discount. Let R` denote revenues, x' denote domestic and x~ foreign output, p` the
price of energy, I` investments and C(I') costs of investments. Then in case of a tax, firm i's
profits, II'(t), are given by:
n`(t) - R`(x`(t)~ x'(t)) -(P~(t) ~ T~(t))e'(t) - C(1`(t))
and in case of a standard, by:
II'(t) - R`(x'(t),x'(t)) - p`(t)e'(t) -C(1`(t)).
(1)
(2)
Here e`(t) must be smaller than or equal to é'(t). It will be assumed that revenues, R',
are concave in outputs (so that aá C 0), and furthermore satisfy: aa'á , c 0, á~ - 0 and
aR G 0. Output is a function of the two production factors energy and capital, x` - x` (e`, Ií' ).
It is assumed that the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale with áé; ) 0,
ax~ a~x~ aZZ~ a'x~ a2z'
áx~ ~ fi' a~ ~ 0' ax c 0. From increasing returns to scale it follows that a~ ax;~ ~
( aa áx~ )z. Furthermore ax?áe~ ~ 0 is assumed. This means that more capital increases the
marginal productivity of energy. Firms decide on energy use and investments. Output is then
determined from the capital stock and energy use through the production function above.
The costs of investment, C(I'), include adjustment costs and acquisition costs. The cost
function is assumed to be increasing and convex: C'(I') 7 0, C"(I') , 0. Zero investment
involves no costs: C(0) - 0. Investments add to the capital stock according to the standazd
equation for capital accumulation:
it`(t) - I`(t) - ó'If'(t), (3)
where b' is the constant rate of depreciation.
Summarizing, the duopoly is modelled as the following differential game.
A. In case of taxes in both countries:
t~,óa~o Jo~ e-rt ~Rt(x`(t), x'(t)) -(Pe(t) } T`
(t))ei(t) - C(I'(t))l dt (4)
s.t. K`(t) - I`(t) - b`K'(t) (5)
B. In case of standards in both countries:
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max ~~ e-rr{R`(x'(t), x'(t)) - pe(t)e'(t) - C(I`(t))}dt (6)
I'~O,e'~0 0
s.t. lí'(t) - I`(t) - b'If`(t) (7)
et(t) C e`(t) (g)
C. In case of a standard in country i and a tax in country j the differential game is a combination
ofAandB.
3 Equilibrium strategies
In order to characterize equilibria for these games, the information structure and the strategies
chosen by the players need to be specified. Complete information for all players is assumed.
We will assume firms' strategies to be such that they plan investment for a longer period
and stick to these plans, but decide on their energy use at time t, after investment has taken
place. In their investment plans firms will take into account the reaction of the competitor
to their capital stock via its use of energy. In short, firms are assumed to follow open-loop
strategies for investment and feedback strategies for energy use. In section 3.1 below, Nash
equilibrium strategies for energy use are derived and in section 3.2 Nash equilibrium strategies
for investment are considered.
3.1 Equilibrium strategies of energy use
Since energy use does not appear in the system dynamics, choices of a certain level of energy
have no effect on future periods. Therefore it is possible to solve for e` (t ) at each time separately
as a function of K`(t), lí~(t), T'(t) and r~(t) (or é'(t) and é~(t)). Assuming that each firm
takes the energy input of the other firm as given, the first-order conditions for an optimal choice
of et(t) and e2(t) can be formulated. These are the usual equilibrium conditions on marginal
benefits and marginal costs. When it is assumed that in equilibrium, both firms apply positive
amounts of energy, [hese equilibrium conditions ares:
A. In case of taxes in both countries:
aRi axi -,ri ~~e
ax' ae' ' 2 - 1, 2. (9)
B. In case of standards in both countries:
aRt axt ~ e
ax' ae' - p (10)
SHere and in the sequel, time, t, is often suppressed to shorten notation.
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e`(t) C é`(t) (1 1)
ax: axt( -- - p`)(é' - e`) - 0, i - 1,2.
8x' 8e'
(12)
C. In case of a standard in country i and a tax in country j, for country i equations (10) to (12)
must be satisfied while for country j equation (9) applies.
Condition (9) states that the marginal benefit of a unit of energy (the increase in revenues due
to the extra output produced with one more unit of energy) must equal the marginal costs of
such an extra unit (the price of energy plus the emission tax). In case of standards it may be
impossible for the firm to set marginal revenues equal to marginal costs. If the standard is
binding, the only requirement is that marginal revenues are at least as high as marginal costs.
In other words, it is not optimal for the firm to decrease its energy use below the standard.
From (9) or (10) it follows that in the equilibrium áR; ~ 0. This is reasonable since it is never
optimal for a firm to increase its output if marginal revenues are negative. Given that áR; ) 0
it is eas to see that the second order conditions, a~ ( a~~ )z ~ aR~ a~ ~ 0, are satisfied bothY aT, áe~ áT~ ae~
in case of taxes and in case of standards.
For each eZ (or e') there is a unique e1R (or e2R) which satisfies the first order conditions,
because the lefthand side of (9) and (10) is decreasing in e'. Points (e', e2) where the reaction
curves e1R(e2) and e2R(e' ) cross, are Nash equilibria. It is assumed that the amount of energy
which firm i woulduse in a situation ofmonopoly, e'R(0), is lower than the amount necessary to
drive firmj out of the market (e` with e~R(e') - 0) and vice versa. This assures an intersection
of the reaction curves in the interior. A sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a Nash
equilibrium is:
a2R' 82R2 azR' 82R2
Óx12 áx22 ~ 8x18x28x'8x2
. (13)
That is, the own effects on marginal revenues must dominate the cross effects. T'his familiar
condition in duopoly models is sufficient to ensure that the Gale-Nikaido theorem can be
applied to derive uniqueness of the equilibrium (Brander and Spencer, 1983). The reaction
curves are drawn in figure 1 below.
From (9) and (10) to (12) the Nash equilibrium levels of energy use result in:
e`"'(Ki, K~;T',T~), e'N(If', If~; é', é~), or e`N(lí', K~; é', T'). Note that these functions
are not necessarily smooth; they have kinks when e'N - é`(t) (see figure 1).
The partial derivatives áhN and áh; follow from implicit differentiation of the first order
conditions. The formulas are given in appendix A. The signs of these partial derivatives are of
use in what follows and are therefore given below for the cases A, B and C.
For case A, the case of taxes in both countries, ahN C 0, while the sign of ákN is undetermined.
This derivative splits into two parts; the first part is positive and the second part is negative. An
increase in K` increases the marginal revenue of e` and therefore e`~N is expected to rise. This
is captured in the first part of áK . But due to the substitutability of e` and K`, an increase in
K` also allows the same output to be produced with less e`. This leads to a decrease in e`N.
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Figure 1: Reaction curves for choice of energy. (Notation: ..... - taxes in both countries, -





The second part of áh;' consists of this latter effect. It is not clear beforehand which effect
dominates. To get some idea about the sign of ah.`; consider the following two situations.
First, let firm i be a small, growing firm with Ií ` small initially. Then áR; will be high and
presumably the first effect of increased marginal revenues will dominate. The partial derivative
will be positive in this case. In the second situation, firm i is assumed to be near its `top' level
of output and áR; is so low that the second effect of substitution dominates and the partial
derivative is smaller than zero.
For case B, with standards in both countries, the signs depend on whether the s[andard is
binding or not. Three possibilities exist. First, if country i's standard binds, ákN - 0 and
áx~ - 0. Second, if country i's standard dces not bind, but country j's standard binds, áK, c 0
and the sign of áK, is undetermined. Third, if in both countries the standard does not bind,
áit~ C 0 and the sign of áK is undetermined analogous to the case of taxes.
For case C, with a standard in country i and a tax in country j, the partial derivatives are zero
if i's standard binds, áK, - 0 and áh", - 0. If i's standard does not bind, áh", C 0 and the
sign of áK is undetermined. For country j, ah, C 0 and áh, can have both signs. This case
is analogous to case B with a nonbinding standard in country j.
In case of a binding standard in a country, the relevant partial derivatives are zero because it
is simply forbidden for the firm in that country to increase its use of energy, while decreasing
energy use is suboptimal from (10).
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3.2 Equilibrium investment strategies
Investment strategies are considered to be long term decisions in this chapter. Firms plan
their investments at the start (t - 0) and stick to these plans during the whole game. In their
investment plans, they will take into account the effect of capital on energy use. Below, the
first-order conditions for a Nash equilibrium of such inves[ment strategies are derived.
The differential game can be rewritten, substituting for e` and e~ their previously derived Nash
equilibrium values:
A. In case of taxes in both countries:
max~~ e-rt{Ri(~'(t), ~'(t)) - (~e(t) ~ T`(t))e;"(t) - C(1'(t))}dt (14)~.~t, o
s.t. K'(t) - 1`(t) - ó'h'(t), (15)
B. In case of standards in both countries:
maxh e-~t{R'(x`(t),x'(t)) - p`(t)ei1`'(t) - C(I'(t))}dt (16)
r~ ~o 0
s.t. K'(t) - I`(t) - 8`IC`(t), (17)
For case C, with a standard in country i and a tax in country j, the game is an obvious
combination of A and B.
We will assume that the objective function ((14) or (16)) as a function of lí ` and Ii~ satisfies




Here D` denotes the second order derivative of the objective function to own capital, ah and
E' denotes the cross derivative of the objective function to own and foreign capital, ah ~áti ~~
The complete expressions for D' and E' are given in appendix B. Condítions (18) and (19)
mean that the marginal profitability of own capital decreases when either own or foreign capital
increases. Condition (20) means that own effects dominate cross effects. This is an analogue
to assumption (13) made in section 3.1. These conditions imply a certain degree of concavity
of the objective functions.
óFor the case of binding standazds the conditions need not be assumed, since they follow from earlier
assumptions on R' and x'.
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First-order conditions for an open-loop strategy can be derived, given the competitor's invest-
ment path, I~(t), and capital stock, lí~(t).
~` C C'(I`); I ' ? 0; I `~C~(I') -~`] - 0 (21)
-(r f ó`)~' -
aR' a~` - aR` ax~ ae~N
a~s aií i a~~ ae~ aIí i (22)
lí`-I'-ó'Ií` (23)
If country j uses standards and the standards are binding, the last term in (22) disappears,
because then áK is zero. This is the reason for the difference between taxes and standards
that occurs in this model. Standards constrain the choice set open to firms more than taxes. If
the standard is binding for firmj, it will choose to use é~ units of energy and small changes in
the capital stock of firm i do not influence this choice, simply because firm j cannot go beyond
the standard. With taxes, firm j is more flexible in its energy use and it will react to the level of
firm i's capital stock. Therefore, firm i's investment strategy will depend on the environmental
policy applied in the competitor's country.
Conditions (21) to (23) can be rewritten, substituting for ~' and a' in (22):
1 aRt a~t aR~ a~~ ae~N
r-~ó` C' I` -- C"(It) ~( )() a~i aiít- áx~ ae~ aIíi]
Ií' - I ` - ó' Ií' .
(24)
(25)
Note that only the first equation is influenced by h"~, T 1 and r2 (or é', é2). Consider first the
characteristics of the steady state (Ií `, I`, ê'). Then Íí` and Í' must satisfy:
i` - ê`Íí ` (26)
t,; aRt a~` aR` a~~ ae~N
(r f ó)C (I )-
a~ti alí~ ~ a~~ ae~ aIíi. (27)
For given lí~, r' and r' (or é' and é'), the steady state is defined by (26) and (27). A necessary
condition for such a steady state to exist is that taxes or standards converge towazds a constant
value in the limit. Otherwise firms have to adapt their capital stocks to changing policies and
a steady state cannot exist. The regularity conditions ( 18) and ( 20) are sufficient for a unique
steady state to exist. From equations (26) and (27) it follows that with binding standards in
country j, the steady-state capital stock in country i is lower than if taxes are applied in country
j. This results from áR áe, á~N ) 0' in case of taxes, while the expression equals zero in case
of binding standards.
~From the assumptions it follows that áR, G 0, á~, 1 0 and in case of taxes in country j, áKN G 0.
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The first-order conditions for an optimal path of investment, (21) and (22), can be rewritten
to give a condition on I'(t) (see also Kort (1994)). Integrating (22) an expression for ~`(t) is
obtained. Using (21) results in:
C~(1'(t)) ~~ e-(rfa~)(e-t1~8R'
á~` ~ 8R' óx~ áe' ~ds.
- Jt óxi 8Ií' 8x~ 8e~ óIí'
(28)
This condition holds along the equilibrium path, for i-1,2 and for all t. It says that the net
present value of marginal investments equals zero, or in other words that mazginal expenses
of investment equal their discounted marginal benefits. These marginal benefits consist of
two parts: direct extra revenues from increased output and indirect revenues, because firm j
decreases its energy use and hence its output if firm i's capital stock increases. The indirect
effect is what Ulph (1992) calls the strategic effect. Firms reason that they may gain market
shaze by investment, because investment implies a higher capital stock, which commits them
to high output in the coming periods and in this manner decreases the output profitability of
the competitor. However the competitor reasons in the same way and although total output
increases, the relative market shares do not change. Both total investment and output will be
higher. The Nash equilibrium with strategic behaviour is then worse from the point of view of
the two firms together than the Nash equilibrium that results if the firms do not act strategically.
Total energy use is not affected by the firms' strategic behaviour, because environmental policy
is always set such that the environmental tazget is met.
A path, lí `N I'N where for i-1,2, it holds that:
c~(Itrv(t)) j~ e-(rfa~)( e-t,~aR~ a~~ ~ 8R' 8x~ áe' ~ds (29)
- Jt 8~' 8Ií' áx~ áe~ 8Ií i
Ií'N - I'N - 6' lí `N , (30)
is a Nash equilibrium in open-loop investment strategies. Both firms maximize their profits,
given the strategy of their competitor and environmental policy. All investment decisions aze
taken at t- 0. After this time firms just follow their equilibrium investment paths. We will
assume that such a Nash equilibrium exists. Given the regularity conditions (18) to (20) it
can be shown that the system ( 21) to (23) satisfies global asymptotic stability of bounded
solutions ( See appendix B.). Hence, Nash-equilibrium paths will converge to the steady
state. The strategic effects cause both firms to invest at a higher than optimal rate along the
Nash-equilibrium time path. That can again be concluded from the positive sign of the term
aR~ az~ ae~" Firms could obtain the same mazket shares with lower investments during theax~ ad aK' '
whole period if they did not try to influence each other's output ( through energy use). When
taxes aze applied for environmental policy in both countries the equilibrium conditions aze as
above. In case of binding standards in both countries, the indirect effect equals zero, since
firms do not change their e` for marginal changes in Ií~. In that case, condition (29) reads
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It can be seen that if strategic effects are absent, the firm's capital stock is lower along the
whole investment path than it would be with strategic effects.
For comparison, an equivalent to the equilibrium condition ( 29) is derived if the firms cooperate.
An optimal investment plan results from the solution of an optimal control problem with the
objective function fó e-ri[II`(t) -}. II~(t)]dt. Following similar steps as before it is found that
along an optimal investment path:
C~( j;c(t)) -~~ e-(rtó~)(s-r)[8R' áx' ~ aR~ 8~' ]ds. (32)
: c7xi álí i 8~3 8K~
Now the marginal benefits of investment also include the effect of extra output on the revenues
of the competitor, whereas the strategic effects are absent. It is no longer the aim of either firm
to gain market share at the cost of the other. In case of cooperation, investments are lower than
in the Nash equilibrium, since aR; áh', C 0 and áR~ áe~ ái~N ~ 0. Comparison of (29), (31)
and (32) shows that standards indxuce firms to get closer to the cooperative solution than taxes.
Under standards, less revenue can be obtained from strategic overinvestments, since both firms
are committed to obeying the standards.
Summarizing, Ulph's conclusions are confirmed for an equilibrium with open-loop investment
strategies in a dynamic duopoly model. Both along the investment path and in the steady state,
firms have a lower capital stock in case of binding standards in both countries, than in case of
taxes. This works out favourably for the firms, because they refrain from mutually harmful
strategic investments.
So far investments have only been compared for the cases A and B, with the same environmental
policy instrument in both countries. But a convergent Nash equilibrium also exists in case of a
combination of taxes in country i and standards in country j or vice versa. The environmental
policy in country j determines which net present value expression is relevant to the firm in
country i.
Now it will be considered which instruments the regulators choose. Regulators were assumed
to be interested in firm profits for their home firm. The same environmental target, é', is met
whether taxes or standards are applied as an instrument of environmental policy. Tax revenues
flow to the regulator and can be redistributed. Hence to the regulator only profits net of taxes
are of interest. If the number of home consumers is small enough compared to all consumers
in the world, consumer surplus can be neglected. Given that taxes and standards result in the
same environmental policy goal, which instrument will be preferred by the regulators of the
two countries? To answer this question, compare the value of
- f~J e-rt[R~(x;
o ' ) - C(I')]dt (33)
in the equilibria which result for various combinations of instruments in the two countries. We
distinguish ~r'A ~'s .~'c(t, s) and n`c(s, t). In case C(taxes in one country and standards in
the other) the first symbol in parentheses denotes the instrument applied by country i, while the
second denotes the instrument in country j. In case A both countries apply taxes and in case
B both countries apply standards. Note with respect to case C, that when the government in
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the foreign country is applying a tax, applying a standard is a dominant strategy for the home
country's governmen[. The reason is that the firm that is subject to standards may influence
the behaviour of its competitor (subject to taxes), while its own energy use is bounded from
above by the standard. Thus the following order of profits net of taxes can be expected:
~r`C(t, s~ G ~`A G~`B G~'c~s, t~
It is not surprising that this again confirms the results in Ulph (1992). When taxes are used in
country j, the government in country i prefers to apply standards. When standards are used in
country j, the government in country i also prefers standards. It can be concluded that case B,
where both regulators apply standards is the Nash equilibrium in the choice of instruments.
4 Conclusions
In a duopoly model of trade, with fixed environmental targets, emission taxes and standards
do not lead to the same outcomes. Allocative efficiency plays no role in the duopoly structure,
with one polluter in each country, so this is not the reason for the differences. It turns out that
in this model an emission standard cures part of the inefficiencies which are due to a duopoly
market structure. Strategic motives lead to investments which are inefficient from the point of
view of the firms. From a social point of view the investments are also inefficient, if firm profits
dominate the social objectives, given that the environmental target is reached. Hence, other
things being equal, it is a Nash equilibrium if both countries choose standards as an instrument
of environmental policy. However it must be kept in mind that these results depend on the
specific structure of the model.
An important difference between taxes and standards as instruments of environmental policy
is their allocative efficiency. Taxes result in a more efficient distribution of abatement efforts
over polluters. In the model discussed above, allocative efficiency does not play a role because
there is only one polluter in each country. It would be interesting to consider whether and under
what circumstances the advantages of standards in coping with inefficient market structures
outweigh their allocative inefficiencies.
The actual differences in profits may be quite small, because the strategic effects are second
order effects. This can be seen from the formulas in appendix A. Differences in profits
can be high when the market is very competitive, that is when a small decrease in the other
firm's output leads to a strong increase in the market price, and when energy cannot be easily
substituted, that is when firms must decrease their production if they choose to buy less energy.
Strategic investments occur in this model, because firms make short-term decisions on energy
input based on the existing capital stocks. Firms increase investment, in order to decrease the
profitability of energy inputs for the competitor. However, the competitor behaves similarly.
A noncooperative equilibrium results, with too high investments for both firms. If they could
agree to refrain from strategic investment or even to determine energy and investment in
cooperation, the firms could lower their investments.
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The environmental policy instruments, taxes and standards, have different implications for
strategic investments. Standards for emissions which are related to energy use and hence imply
energy standards reduce the range of options open to firms. If the competitor has to comply
with a standard, in equilibrium, it will not adjust to small changes in the capital stock. This
decreases the motives for strategic investment in the home country. Emission taxes do not
change firms' flexibility and the motives for strategic investment remain. As a result, both in
the steady state and in the transition to the steady state, investment is lower when standards are
applied. This is consistent with the results established by Ulph (1992) for a multistage version
of the model.
Investment out of strategic motives only occurs when decisions on energy use depend on the
capital stocks. If firms would apply open-loop strategies both for investment and for energy
use, everything would be decided at the initial time, t- 0, and strategic interaction during the
process would disappear. In this chapter, firms apply feedback strategies for their energy use
and open-loop strategies for investment. Strategies which have both investment and energy
use dependent on the capital stocks are also worth consideration. This implies that firms are
assumed to be more flexible in their investment decisions than before. Under that assumption
firms can adjust their investment to past decisions of their rivals. A model with feedback
investment strategies is analysed in chapter 3.
With feedback investment, the competitor's investments are directly influenced by the home
firm's capital stock, Ií'. This introduces extra strategic effects compared to open-loop invest-
ment. It is hard to conjecture as to how own capital stocks affect foreign investments. It seems
that two counteracting effects are present. A higher capital stock at home reduces the revenues
of the competitor and hence the profitability of its output and investments. But, a higher own
capital stock might also lead the competitor to react with an increase in its own capital stock
to defend its marketshare, which leads to an `investment race'. Due to this ambiguity we need
to actually compute feedback-equilibria to find the sign of a~N
It would be interesting to add transboundary pollution to the model. Differential game models
with transboundary pollution in which governments choose their tazget level of environmental
policy have been analysed (for example Kaitala et al., 1992; van der Plceg and de Zeeuw,
1992). Noncooperative strategies result in a higher than optimal level of pollution, because
each government neglects the effects of its emissions on foreign countries. What happens when
transboundary pollution is added to the model above? To analyse this we have to change the
assumptions of fixed environmental targets and introduce an explicit objective function for the
government. It must make a trade-off between pollution, rents from trade and inefficiencies
due to strategic firm behaviour. Chapters 6 and 7 try to answer this question and analyse a
model with strategic trade and transboundary pollution.
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A Partial derivatives of equilibrium emissions
This appendix gives the complete expressions for the partial derivatives mentioned in section 3.1.
A. With taxes in both countries:
Óe'N
8It'
ax' ax' ax~ 2 azR' azR~ azR' azR~ azR' aR~ azx~
áe' áK' ~~ áe, ) ~ ax'ax~ ax' ax, - a~ axi~ )- ax'~ áx, a~~
azR' ax' y aR' azx' azR, ax, y afU azx, azW azR' ax~ 2 ax' Z-
~ a~~7e' ) } óx' ae~2 ) ~ ax~z ~ áez )~ ax, ae,z ) - ax'ax~ ax'ax, ~ áe, )~ je, )
a2x' aR'~a~~ax~)2 } aR~ a~)
ae'ax' áx' ax~ áe~ ax~ ae,
azR' ax~ 2 aR' azx' azFU ax, aR~ azx~ azlU azR' ax, ax~




azR' aR~ ax' a2x~ ax~ ax~ azx~ )
ax'ax~ áxz áe'~aelaK~ áe~ - áK~ ae,~
azR~ ax' aR' azx' azfU ax~ aRa azx, azR7 azR' ax, ax'
( a-~~~e, )2 } gx, a~)~ a~~ áe~ )2 } áx, a~) - ax'ax, ax'ax, ~ áe~ )2~ áe' )2
B. With standards in both countries:
8e`N c3e`N
If both standazds bind,
aIí"t - 0; áhj-
0, for i-1,2
If in i the standard does not bind and in j the standard binds,
azR' ax' ax~ aR~ azx~
ae'N ai~~ ác' 8K' } 8x' ae'aK'
álí"' -- a~R' ax' s aR~ a~x' ;a~~ áe' ) ~ áx' a~
ae'nr azR' ax' axz
ax'ax~ áe' ai~~
8Kj -- a~R~ ax' 2 aR~ a~x. ,a~~ áe' ) } áx' aé;z
aejN aejN
while aKi - 0; ~h,j- 0.
If in both countries the standards do not bind, the partial derivatives are equal to those in A.
C. With a standard in i and a tax in j:
aeiN aeiN




while the partial derivatives for j are given by (A.3) and (A.4) with the symbols i and j interchanged. If




This appendix gives the complete expressions for the derivatives used in the regularity conditions (18)
to (20) in section 3.2 and derives a stability result. The D` in the regularity conditions are second-order




aR' a2x' a2R' ax` 2 aR' a2x` ae`N a2R` ax` ax' ae'N
áxt aK~2 } a~t2 ( áKti )} áx~ aesaK~ aK~ ~ axi2 aKi áei aKi }
a2R` ax` axi aeiN aR` axi a2ei~" aR' a2x~ ae~N 2
2ax'axi áK' aei aK' } axi aei aK'2 } axi aeiz ( aÍá'' )}
azR' ax' 2 ae~N 2 a2R' ax~ ae~N ax' ae`N
axi2 ( aei )( aK' )} ax'axi aei aK' ae' ak"' ~
The E' are second-order cross derivatives of profits with respect to capital:
d2II'
E~ - dKidK' -
a2R' ax` axi a2R` ax' ax~ ae~N azR' ax' ax` ae`N
ax~axi áKt aKi } axtaxi áK~ aei aÍíi ~ a~tiz áKt óe' í3Ki }
aR' ax~ a2e~N aR` a2x~ ae~N ae~N aR' a2x~ ae'N
axi aei aKiaK } axi--- } - }' aeiz aK' ahi ax~ aeiaKi ak"'
a2R' ax~ axi aeiN a2R' ax~ ae~N ae~N a2R' axi ax` ae~N ae`N2
axi2 aKi aei aK' } axi2 ( aei ) aK' aKi } ax'axi áei ae' aK' aKi .
(B.1)
(B.2)
In the following, conditions for global asymptotic stability ( GAS) of the system (21) to (23) will be
derived. Consider the system of four differential equations, which must hold when both firms satisfy
the first-order conditions ( 21) to (23). When equation (21) is used to substitute for I' in equation (23)
this is a system in the variables (K~, al, K2, ~2):
Ki - C~-i(~i) - bik-i
1 1 i- aRl axl aRl ax2 ae2N~-(r f b)~ axl áKl - áxz ae2 aK~
K~ - C'-i(a~) - b~K2.
a2 -(T f b2)~2 -
aR2 ax2 - aR2 axl ae1N
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Sufficient conditions for this system to have a unique stationary point (Ii 1, ~1, K2, ~2) are the regularity
conditions ( 18) and ( 20). Given that the system has a unique stationary point, conditions ( 18) and (19)
are sufficient to have GAS. This follows from application of lemma 6.1 in Haurie and Leitmann (1984).
Chapter 3
Standards versus taxes in a dynamic
duopoly model of trade: Feedback
investment strategies.
This chapter discusses environmental policy instruments in a differential game model of intemational
trade. The model describes a duopoly with each competitor situated in a different country. Emission
taxes or standards are set by a fully informed regulator in such a way that a predetermined target is
reached. Firms decide on the level of their inputs, given environmental policy. Investments are used
to build up a capital stock which together with a polluting input produces output. Firms use feedback
strategies for investment and therefore react on decisions of their competitor.
A firm reacts differently if its competitor is subject to an environmental standard than if it is subject to
an environmental tax. As it was shown in the previous chapter, under open-loop investment strategies
and feedback strategies for the polluting input, environmental taxes always give rise to more investment
for strategic reasons than standards. This confirms results of multistage models of the same problem.
The new result in this chapter is that under feedback investment strategies the reverse can occur.
1 Introduction
The characteristics of government policy influence the flexibility of a firm. If government
policy is implemented by rigid prescriptions, it is a commitment for the firm. If, on the
contrary, the government bases its policy on incentives, firms are more flexible so that they
have less commitments. Brander and Spencer (1983) analysed the differences between trade
policies when trade can be characterized as an international oligopoly. If governments want
high profits for their home firms, they may want to provide home firms with commitment via
their trade policy. If trade policies are not available, for example in case of international free
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trade agreements, environmental policy may be used as a substitute for an activist trade policy.
Environmental policy instruments namely affect the international competitiveness of firms. It
was found that environmental standards are unambiguously `better' than taxes, in a multistage
model of international rivalry where allocative efficiency can be neglected (Ulph, 1992). Ulph's
analysis was extended to a fully dynamic model in the previous chapter. It was found that
with open-loop investment strategies, the result carries over, that is, under standazds, firms gain
commitment, so that they earn more profits, while regulators reach the same environmental
tazget.
This chapter shows that the conclusion depends on the type of investment strategy applied
by firms. The analysis in chapter 2 is extended to feedback investment strategies. It will be
shown that the result that standards are `better' than taxes is ambiguous and depends on the
type of investment strategy applied by the firm. To be more precise, for open-loop investment
strategies the results from multistage modelling are confirmed, but for feedback investment
strategies it is ambiguous whether standards or taxes are `better'.
In a multistage model, investment decisions aze taken once and for all. The implicit assumption
that is implied by this type of investment decisions is that they cannot adjust, which means
that they offer commitment to firms. In order to relax this assumption, the richer framework of
differential games is needed. In that framework, different types of decision strategies can be
distinguished.
Feedback strategies lead to more strategic interaction, which drives the firms to higher invest-
ment with lower profits. Under taxes this effect is mitigated due to the substitution between the
polluting input and capital. That does not occur under standards, because in that case firms aze
at a corner solution for their use of the polluting input and do not substitute between that input
and capital. Therefore, the use of standazds reduces over-investments, which improves profits,
as was found before, but it also increases over-investments, which reduces profits, since the
mitigating effect is absent. The net effect can go both ways.
Section 2 presents amodel of international rivalry as a differential game between two competing
firms, each one situated in a different country. It is a short summary of the model, that was
introduced in chapter 2. Section 3 derives the equilibrium to this model under feedback
investment strategies. A comparison of the equilibrium under taxes and standards gives the
main result of the chapter. The economic explanation for this result is provided at the end of
this section. In section 4 we discuss choices of parameter values and how results depend on
these values. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
2 An international duopoly model
The model applied in this chapter is the same as in the previous chapter. Therefore, this section
only gives a quick reference of the model and the symbols used. A full description can be
found in section 2.2.
Define the following list of symbols:
2 An international duopoly model
x`(t) - output of firm i
P(t) - investment
e'(t) - use of energy (the polluting input)
R'(x',x~) - revenues
C(I') - investment costs
II'(x',x~) - firm profits
K`(t) - capital stock
6` - rate ofdepreciation
pe(t) - price of energy
r`(t) - environmental tax
e(t) - environmental standard
r - discount rate.
The duopoly is modelled as the following differential game':
A. In case of taxes in both countries
~
max ~ e-rc~R`(~`, x') -(Pe ~ T')e` - C(It)~dtI'~O,e'10 0
s.t. Íf` - I` - ó`K'
B. In case of standards in both countries
~
max f e-'c[R'(~`, x') - p`e' - C(I`)]dt
I'~O,e'~0 0








C. In case of a standard in country i and a tax in country j the differential game is a combination
of A and B.
l tf not confusing, time, t, is suppressed to shorten notation
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3 Equilibrium conditions and economic interpretation
3.1 Equilibrium strategies of energy use
Since energy use does not appear in the system dynamics, choices of a certain level of energy
have no effect on future periods. Therefore it is possible to solve for the ei at each time
sepazately as a function of Ií i, K~, Ti and r~ (or éi and é~). Assuming that each firm takes the
energy input of the other firm as given, the first-order conditions for an optimal choice of e'
and e2 can be formulated. These are the usual equilibrium conditions on mazginal benefits and
marginal costs:
A. In case of taxes in both countries
aRi axi - ,r i e
ax' aei } p '
B. In case of standards in both countries









C. In case of a standard in country i and a tax in country j, for country i equations (7) to (9)
must be satisfied while for country j equation (6) applies.
An analysis of the Nash-equilibrium strategies of energy usP, eiN (lí i, Ií~), implied by these
conditions is given in chapter 2(section 3.1). If the two firms cooperate to maximize joint
profits, the first-order conditions for energy use in case of taxes in both countries aze:
aRi axi aR~ axi
f -r'~pe, i-I,2.
axi aei axi aei
(10)
Compare this condition to condition (6). With cooperation, effects on foreign profits are
included in the marginal benefits. Analogously, in case of standards, first-order conditions
for cooperation are modifications of (7) to (9). The resulting optimal levels of energy use are
denoted by ei~ (Ki, lí~ ).
3.2 Equilibrium strategies of investment
In this model, firms are in a dynamic environment where they have to make decisions over
a longer period of time. Different strategies can be distinguished. If firms apply open-loop
strategies, they do not react on current state variables. Open-loop investment strategies are a
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function of time only, I`oL(t). Ifplayers apply feedback strategies, they react indirectly to each
other's past decisions, as far as these are reflected in the current value of the state vaziables (K1
and Ií z). Therefore, each firm must take into account how its decisions will influence the state
of the system and hence future decisions of the competitor. Feedback investment strategies are
a function of time and the capital stocks, I'FB(t K1 Ií z)
It is not cleaz ex ante how firms will react to a higher competing capital stock, that is whether
the derivative ah,B is positive or negative. The effect of the competitor's capital stock on
investment can be negative for the reason that a higher capital stock of the competitor implies
that the competitor produces more output. This decreases the profitability of output and
investment to the home firm. The effect can be positive, though, for the reason that a higher
competing capital stock induces the firm to increase its investments to keep its market shaze.
The equilibrium under environmental taxes and standards with open-loop investment strategies
was analysed in the previous chapter. To compute an equilibrium of feedback strategies for
the general formulation of the differential game in section 2 is difficult. But it is possible to
approximate the steady-state capital stock in the feedback equilibrium for explicit functional
forms. Therefore consider the following scenario:
- Prices of output follow from market equilibrium on a world market with a linear inverse
demand curve, p - po - x' - ax~. The parameter a, 0 C a C 1, denotes the
degree of substitutability between the products. Gross revenues, R', are given by
R' - Px` - Pox' - ( x`)z - ax'x~.
- Technology is characterized by the Cobb-Douglas production function x' - e'Ií'p.
- Investment costs aze quadratic, C(I') - 2cI'z.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the two countries are symmetric, that is, they are assumed to
have equal rates ofdepreciation and discount, b and r, equal production functions and the same,
constant, targets of environmental policy, é. Energy prices, pe, are assumed to be constant.
The technology was assumed to be increasing returns to scalez, so that p 1 2. Marginal
productivity of capital is decreasing, so that ~3 c 1. It is straightforward to check that these
functional forms satisfy the assumptions made in section 2.2.
With these functional forms the expression for the Nash equilibrium value of energy use in
section 3.1 in case of taxes in both countries becomes:
e'N(K' ff') -
Pól~izp(2(pe f T~) f( 2 - a)Ii~zQ)z
(4(P` ~- T' ~- j{i2p)(Í7e -f r~ -I- IíizR) -
azKizpK~zp)z ~





s.t. K` - I` - bK' i- 1, 2 (13)
ZSee the assumptions made in section 2.2.
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where
II' Ií ` K'
-~oK`za(2(pe -~ T~) -f (2 - a)líiz~)z(pe } r' } K;zQ) - 1 cI'z. 14(
)-(4(pe -f T' f K~2p)(P` f r~ ~ Ií~zQ) - azlíizPli
j2p)z 2 ( )
In case of standards in both countries, e` - é' and
II`(K`, lí') - Po é'lí'p - é'K`zp - a é' é~li `~lí'Q - p`é' - 2cl'z. (15)
The derivative of marginal profits to foreign capital, denoted by II;~, is negative for both policy
instruments and for all values of capital and energy use. The derivative of marginal profits to
own capital, II;;, is assumed to be negative. For standards, this requires po to be large enough,
for taxes it requires an upper limit on ( pe ~ T) . It can be derived that the second-order derivative
of profits to foreign capital, II~~, is always positive under standards. Under taxes, II~~ ~ 0
requires again that (pe f T) is not too large. In the sequel it is assumed that this is the case.
The objective functions are approximated with revenue functions that are linear-quadratic in
(K`, lí~). For these objective functions, we suppose that this gives a reasonable approximation
to the feedback steady-state solu[ion. The approximation is found by application of the
following algorithm:
step 1) Choose a starting point, (Ko, Ko).
step 2) Compute a second-order Taylor approximation of the objective function in the neigh-
bourhood of this starting point.
step 3) Determine the steady-state capital stocks for this approximation analytically.
step 4) Take the resulting steady state as the new starting point and return to step 2. Repeat
the algorithm until the new steady state is close enough to the old one.
When convergence occurs, this is at the point (K', Ií `) which is the steady-state capital stock
for the Taylor approximation of the objective function around that same point, (K`, Ií'). In
appendix A, step 2 and 3 of this algorithm are elaborated.
With the above algorithm, we can compute linear equilibrium investment strategies,
I(K`, Ií~)- Pl K` -{- P3K~ f P4, and steady-state capital stocks, Íí , under taxes and s-
tandards, for a given target of environmental policy, é. These strategies are approximations to
the feedback equilibrium strategies in a neighbourhood of (Ií `, K').
The sign of P3 is interesting, because it determines the type of strategic interaction in case of
feedback investment strategies. If P3 ) 0 a firm reacts to a higher capital stock of its competitor
with higher investments. If P3 C 0 the reverse is the case. The following proposition shows
that the only possibly stable solution has a negative P3 under a certain condition on the second-
order derivatives of (14), respectively ( 15). Furthermore a sufficient condition for this solution
to be stable is given. These conditions can be shown to hold for reasonable values of the
parameters both for taxes and for standards. The proof of the proposition is given in appendix
B.
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Proposition 3.1 For
II~~ C 4 (2b f r)~c -}- 2IIi~ - H`r, (16)
one or more solutions exist. Only one solution can be stable andfor this solution P3 C 0. If,
in addition,
II;~ G m,in[-Zr2c,-4fJ, (17)
then this solution is indeed stable.
In other words, under the conditions of the proposition, a unique stable feedback equilibrium
steady-state capital stock, (lí', lí'), exists for the approximated objective function and the
corresponding equilibrium investment strategy has P3 c 0. Under taxes, both conditions in the
proposition are satisfied, for all Q, given the other pazameter values used. Under standards, the
conditions in the proposition are satisfied for most parameter values. However, it may happen
that II~? 1 4(26 f r)2c f 2II;~ - II;;. In that case, multiple stable equilibria may exist and there
is a coordination problem on the choice of equilibrium strategies. For ~ and é low enough,
however, this case can be excluded (see appendix C). Therefore, for both taxes and standards
the effect of foreign capital on own investments, aahB - P3, is negative around the steady
state, if the parameter values are not extreme.
Given the decreasing mazginal productivity of capital it is to be expected that the derivative of
investment with respect to own capital, aahB - Pl, is negative. This is indeed true for realistic
values of b, r and c, which is formally derived in appendix D. For -unreasonably- large values
of the parameters mentioned, it is possible to find a positive Pl, due to indirect effects of capital
on equilibrium emissions.
Taxes and standards are to be compared in the feedback equilibrium steady state. Figure 1
shows steady-state capital stocks and firm profits for both policy instruments as a function
of the environmental target. Before-tax profits are also shown, to enable a good comparison
of taxes and standazds. Of course, after-tax profits are always substantially lowered by the
tax-payment. From a welfare perspective, it is better to compare before-tax profits with profits
under standards.
Remember that in this model, due to rivalry between firms, investment is too high, so that the
higher the capital stock, the lower profits. Looking at the example, it is clearly not ttue that
taxes always result in higher capital stocks than standazds. On the contrary, for most parameter
values, standards result in higher capital stocks. That is due to the investments that are carried
out for strategic reasons. As a consequence profits are lazger under taxes for most pazameter
values, even when after-tax profits are considered. The value of p is an important parameter in
this respect, as well as the stringency of environmen[al policy. The laxer environmental policy,
the more likely it is that standards result in higher steady-state capital stocks and lower profits
than taxes3.
3Provided that a unique stable equilibrium exists.
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Figure 1: Capital stocks and profits as a function of the environmental target. (Parametervalues:
Q- 0.7, c- 2, b- 0.10, r - 0.08, pe - 1, a- 1. Notation: ---- standards, --










To explain the effect of strategic behaviour on investment under environmental policy, we use
the so called net present value expressions. These expressions can be derived from forwazd
integration of first-order conditions. They give the properly discounted future stream of extra
profits due to an additional unit of capital at time t(See for instance Hartl and Kort, 1996).
First, consider the cooperative solution. From the point of view of the two firms as a cartel,
this is the optimal outcome. It is found as the solution to the following optimal-control model:
a
max f e-rt[II' -}- II']dt
1'~O,h~O 0
(18)
s.t. K' - I` - bIí `, for i- 1, 2 (19)
with e` - e'~~. From the first-order conditions a net present value expression can be derived,
which says that optimal investment is characterized by:
~ e-(T~bll,-tl aR' 8x' aR' 8x` ds - C' I` t- 0f [a~' arí~ } áxti aiíti] ( ( ))
The term in brackets gives the extra revenues at time s due to an additional unit ofcapital stock,
invested at time t. Future revenues aze discounted with rate r and corrected for depreciation at
rate b, since one unit of capital bought at time t reduces in value to e~r-al~s-`1 units at time s.
To obtain this unit, the firm must spend C'(1') at time t. In case of cooperation, the -negative-
effect of increased home capital on eaznings of the foreign firm is taken into account. All
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strategic interaction is absent, since the firms cooperate.
Second, consider equilibria in which the firms compete in a Cournot-Nash fashion. The net
present value expression for firms that choose investments according to an open-loop strategy
was derived in chapter 2:
~~ e-(rfb)(9-t)]aR` ax` ~ aR' ax~ ae~N]ds - C'(I`(t)) - 0 (21)
Jt axt aKi ax~ ae~ aIít
This expression contains the term, áR~ áe~ árcN ~ due to strategic interaction. Firms try to
influence energy and, hence, output decisions of their competitor with their capital stock.
If they manage to decrease foreign output, their own revenues increase ( áR~ c 0). Since
a.~~ ae~N ~ 0, when taxes aze a lied as an instrument of environmental olic this strate icáe~ áx~ PP P Y, g
effect leads to more investment. In case of environmental standards, however, áh.", - 0
because firms are on the boundary of a binding constraint. In that case the strategic effect is
absent and investments are lower.
Finally consider the net present value expression when firms use feedback investment strategies.
This requires first-order conditions for such an equilibrium, which can for instance be found
in Feichtinger and Hartl (1986, p.536). In our model this ]eads to:
C~(1') - F~" (22)
aR~ axi aRi ax~ ae~N a1~';t r } d ~; ~ ~ ,; -
~-( )~` -~áxti aií i áx~ áe~ aKà ~` arí ti]
a7~ aR` ax~ aRi ax~ ae~N~~ - r d `~ - t'- - -~- --
~-( ~)p P aIí~ ~ ax~ aií ~ ax~ ae~ alíi]
(23)
(24)
Here ~" denotes the shadow value of own capital to firm i. Its value is determined by condition
(23). This includes the term p'~ áh.', because of feedback reactions. The variable P`~ denotes
the shadow value of foreign capital to firm i. Condition (24) determines its value. Note that
these first-order conditions are not sufficient to actually compute candidate solutions, since in
general ax; and áK, are not known. Integrate forward and rearrange, to find the following net
present value expression:
Jc
~ -(r~ó)(,-t)~aR' ax' 8R` ax~ ae~N aI~e f-- ~ p.`'-]ds - C'(I`(t)) - 0 (25)
ax~ aIf i ax~ ae~ aIí i alí ti
with p" given by
t~ S r~ e-(rfa-k.', )(u-s) aR' ax' aR~ ax~ ae~N




In case of standards in both countries, both firms are at a corner solution for energy use.
Therefore, these formulas then become:
f~ e-(rtó)(s-t)~
a~~ aK~ ~~`'~ arfe ]ds - c'(r(t)) - o (2~)
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with ~`~ given by
~;;(S) - J~e-(rfó-áh;llu-s)~8R` 8x~ ~du
, 8x' 81C~
(28)
Compared to (21), an additional strategic effect exists that works through investment, ~'~ áK, .
This effect can be strong enough to outweigh the first strategic effect. From a comparison of
the net present value expressions follows immediately:
aR~ a2~ ae~" ;; an ;; anProposition 3.2 When á~~ áe~ át~~~ }~ (ta~)ak., C p (sta)~k., forall t, the strategic incen-
tive for investment is greater under standards than under taxes.
The term p'~ áh.', captures the indirect strategic effect. If firm i increases its investment, its
capital stock grows. This influences the investment by firm j immediately as expressed by áh', .
The shadow price p'~ denotes the valuation by firm i of such a change in firm j's investment.
Thus ~'' gives the valuation by firm i of an additional amount of capital owned by firm j. This
is given by the properly discounted flow of marginal decreases in firm i's revenues if firm j
owns an extra amount of capital (cf. (26) and (28)). Since firm i's revenues decrease when
competition from firm j increases, tc'~ will have a negative sign. If the derivative of h to K` is
negative, which we have shown to be true for reasonable parameter values (cf. proposition 3.1),
then the additional strategic effect is positive. This effect, ~`~ ah.'; , can be higher for standazds
than for taxes, since firms are less flexible in case of binding standards and do not substitute
energy for capital. To explain this, first note that with feedback investment strategies, given
that ák', c 0, a marginal increase in capital If` leads firmj to invest less and hence to decrease
its capital stock, It~. This in turn leads firm j to decrease its output. It depends on the sign of
ae'" whether j's use of energy also decreases. If substitution effects dominate, e~ increases. Inax~
case of standazds, substitution between production factors - that is, an increase in e' in reaction
to a decrease in K~ - will not occur, since the standard is an upper bound to e~. A decrease in
e~ will not happen since the firm is at a corner solution for its energy use. Hence, áK.N equals
zero. In case of taxes, on the contrary, the firm is flexible to adjust its use of energy in an
optimal way to the capital stocks. Substitution between energy and capital then partly cancels
the effect on output of an increased capital stock. That implies that the change in firmj's output
and hence the relevant strategic effect, p'~ áK, , can be greater with standards than with taxes,
provided substitution effects dominate marginal-productivity effects.
The proposition contradicts earlier conclusions by Ulph (1992). He derived that standards
always result in less strategic investments than taxes. Ulph used a multistage model. That
implied that his subgame-perfect equilibrium is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium with feedback
strategies for energy use, but open-loop strategies for investment, as represented by the net
present value expression (21). His model does not allow for strategic interaction between firms
in investment strategies. Only then the result holds that taxes always provide larger incentives
for investment than standards.
To conclude, it is not generally true that standazds moderate strategic overinvestment when firms
react on each others behaviour by adjustments in their investment plans. Although standazds
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commit firms to a certain use of energy input, they may drive firms to more investment than
taxes. In that case the use of standards as a commitment device does not work. Then, the use
of taxes as an environmental policy instrument is to be preferred when, next to environmental
targets, profits of domestic firms are an important objective to the government.
4 Comparative statics for parameter values
Figure 1 shows that standards may result in more strategic investment than taxes. As a conse-
quence, firm profits aze higher under taxes than under standazds. For some strict environmental
policy tazgets the reverse is true, however. This section discusses the values chosen for the
parameters that may influence this result. We show some comparative static results that indicate
how the difference between taxes and standazds changes with parameter values. The relation-
ship between the parameters of the model and the steady-state values of the capita] stock in the
feedback solution is complex. It involves the approximation algorithm and the computation
of the roots of a third degree polynomial in the third step of this approximation algorithm.
Therefore we cannot give simple expressions that link parameter values to the conditions in the
propositions. But numerical experimentation gives some clues about the direction of changes.
First consider the parameter Q in the production function. The literature on econometric
production functions provides empirical estimates of returns to scale in large energy-intensive
industries. These gave a range around 1.2 (Morrison, 1993, 1994, Ilmakunnas and Tórm~,
1994, Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1983). To satisfy the model assumptions, 2 c(~ c 1 must
hold. Given that the Cobb-Douglas coefficient of energy equals 2, returns to scale then vary
between 1 and 1.5. Compared to 1.2, this seems reasonable given the empirical literature.
Now consider the price of energy, pe. When prices are extremely high, they provide enough
incentives for firms to reduce energy use and environmental policy is superfluous. Therefore,
we took the relatively low value of 1 for this price. In reality, of course, energy prices are highly
volatile, but this is only a numerical example, meant to provide insight into the equilibrium
solution in case of feedback investment strategies.
Figure 2 depicts emissions as a function of ~3, when no environmental policy is applied and
pe has the value 1. It shows that for values of Q close to 1, even with this low value for pe,
the range of ineaningful' emission goals is limited. When p is high, energy is a relatively
unimportant production factor, and for lax environmental policy goals, environmental policy
is unnecessary. The higher the price of energy, pe, the sooner (in terms of increasing Q) this
will happen.
For ó, the rate of depreciation, we took the value 0.10. For r, the rate of discount we took
the value 0.08. Figure 3 shows the effect of different values for ó. If ó is higher, capital
depreciates faster. That implies that commitment with regard to future output provided by an
9In the sense that positive taxes and bindingemission standards are required to enforce these goals.
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additional unit of capital decreases. The consequence is a lower steady-state capital stock and
a smaller difference between standards and taxes. For ó high enough, the difference between
standards and taxes changes sign, because strategic interaction through commitment on energy
use dominates strategic interaction through commitment on investments. Then taxes result in
more strategic investment than standards. Increases in r have a similar effect. A higher rate
of discount implies that the future is less important relative to the present. Current costs of
investment then become important relative to future earnings. The steady-state capital stock
hence decreases. The dynamic aspects that cause a difference between environmental policy
instruments in strategic interaction through commitment on investment loose importance. As a
result, the difference between standards and taxes decreases and eventually changes sign, when
the static aspect of strategic interaction through commitment on energy use starts to dominate.
For c, that is a parameter for adjustment costs of investment, we took the value 2. The higher
c, the higher the costs of investment, and the lower therefore the steady-state stock of capital.
Changes in capital stock become more expensive, so that commitment through investment is
less attractive. Therefore the differences between standards and taxes decrease with c.
The parameter a, finally, denotes the interconnectedness of mazkets. If a - 0, firms do not
influence each others prices. In that case both firms are monopolists and strategic effects
disappear. Environmental taxes and standards then have equal effects on firms in the model
above. The higher ~, the more effect firms have on each others prices and the more important
strategic effects become. For a- 1 the outputs of the two firms are perfect substitutes. Figure
4 shows equilibrium capital stocks and profit rates for different values of a. The difference
between standards and taxes increases with a, because strategic effects gain importance. We
took a to be equal to 1 in the other figures.
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Figure 3: Effect on capital s[ock and profits of changes in b. (Parametervalues: Q- 0.7, c- 2,




The results in this section show again that it is not true that taxes always result in more
investment than standards for strategic reasons, and therefore in lower profits. The reverse,
that standards lead to more investment and lower profits is neither valid. Which environmental
policy instrument is `better', which means here that it results in the highest profits for a given
emission target, depends on the values of the parameters.
5 Conclusions
This chapter is concerned with international rivalry and environmental policy. In a multistage
framework Ulph (1992) found that environmental taxes lead to higher investment than stan-
dards. Firms that compete on an international market have an incentive to increase investments
to gain strategic advantage. But in equilibrium, competitors act similaz so that higher capital
stocks, more output and lower profits result. Therefore, ceteris paribus, governments prefer
standards rather than taxes, due to the reduction in strategic investment. This was confirmed
in the previous chapter in a differential-game framework with open-loop investment strategies.
The differences between environmental taxes and standards as regards their effect on strategic
behaviour aze due to their influence on the flexibility of firms. Standards reduce a firm's
flexibility in its choice of emissions, while taxes do not.
In this chapter, flexibility in investment behaviour is introduced. More specifically, we consider
feedback investment strategies. Under feedback investment strategies, firms have to take into
account that the competitor will react through its investment on marginal increases in capital
stocks. The effects of environmental standards and taxes on this type of strategic behaviour
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Figure 4: Effect on capital stock and profits of changes in ~. (Parametervalues: (~ - 0.7,
c- 2, ó- 0.10, r - 0.08, p` - 1. Notation: -- -- standards, -- taxes~before-tax profits,
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differ. It turns out that it cannot -as in the case of open-loop investment strategies- be stated
that taxes will always lead to more investments than standards. It is shown in the chapter
that if substitution effects between production factors are large enough, investment is lazger
under standards than under taxes. Ceteris pazibus, governments then prefer taxes rather than
standards as environmental policy instrument.
Note that in the current model, consumer surpluses are neglected. It is implicitly assumed
that firms sell a substantial part of their output to third countries. Ulph (1996a) and Kennedy
(1994) include consumer surplus in a multistage game. Since it is in the interest of consumers
that competition between the two firms results in more output, they favour larger investments.
Inclusion of consumer surplus would therefore require a different valuation of high capital
stocks. When consumer surplus is important, taxes may be preferred by the government to
standards, even while taxes lead to more investment than standards.
A differential game model of a duopoly describes the behaviour of firms that compete in
an international mazket. After equilibrium behaviour on energy choice has been inserted, a
capital accumulation game results. The two firms choose investment rates, to maximize their
objectives, given government policy and the strategy of the competitor. Feedback equilibria in
capital accumulation games aze derived in Reynolds (1987) and in Fershtman and de Zeeuw
(1992). The game in this paper is a bit different, because investment has indirect effects on
output through energy use. That implies that the objective function is not linear quadratic in
capital stocks like in the two papers mentioned above. But it is possible with the help of an
approximation algorithm to extend the method employed in Fershtman and de Zeeuw and to
find approximations to the steady state.
The indirect effects through energy choices and the approximation step imply that equilibrium
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investment depends in a complex way on domestic and foreign capital stocks. In particular,
the sign of the deriva[ive of equilibrium investment to foreign capital may be either negative
or positive. Conditions are given for stable equilibria that are characterized by a negative sign
of this derivative. Although these conditions capture the cases that are economically most
relevant, exceptional cases with positive derivatives are still possible.
Flaherty (1980) analyses a capital accumulation game with symmetric and asymmetric equilib-
ria. With the help of linear approximations, it is shown that the asymmetric equilibria are stable
and the symmetric equilibrium is not. Although in a different context, this shows that stable
asymmetric equilibria are certainly an option in this type of models. For tractability reasons,
our analysis has been restricted to symmetric equilibria for a symmetric model, in which both
countries apply the same type of environmental policy. Extensions to the asymmetric case
where one country applies taxes and the other standards is an option. However, we do not
expect that a(complex) analysis of the asymmetric case would change our conclusion with
respect to strategic behaviour.
A Details of the algorithm
In this appendix details are given about the 2nd and 3rd step of the algorithm in the main text.
Step 2
A second order Taylor approximatíon around a point (lío, lí o) of the objective function of the differential
game results in a profit function:
II' - 2Ii iQ Ii -}- qt Ií f qo - 2cl? (A.1)
where is a s mmetric matrix Q1 Q3 is a column vector is a scalar and K isQ ~ Y ~ ~~ 9 (4i~9z), 40
Q3 Q2
a column vector (h'1, Kz). The Q; denote the second derivatives of profits to capital, respectively
Q1 - II;,, Qz - IIii and Q3 - II;i. Furthermore,
qi - ni - KoQi - h~oQs
9z - II~ - IíoQs - h~oQz.
Step 3
For a linear-quadratic objective function, the analytical expression of the steady state can be computed.
A model with Qz - 0, Q1 --2, Q3 --1, q2 - 0 and ql - a~ 0, has been solved by Reynolds
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(1987) and by Fershtman and de Zeeuw (1992). Below, the approach of the latter paper is followed to
obtain a solution to the approximated game.
Consider the differential game with II' given by (A.1) as the objective function. This is a game with
a quadratic objective function, linear dynamics and two state variables. The dynamic-programming
approach is used to find a linear feedback Nash equilibrium. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
for the game are:
rV'(K`,K') -
max[-1 cI`2 f 1KtQK f qiK f qo f Vh,,(I' - óK') f Vh.,(I~ - 6K~)] (A.2)t~ 2 2
The optimal I' is given by I' - ~ Vti.,. A quadratic value function has the form:
V`-2KtPK-fPth~fpo (A.3)
with P a s mmetric matrix I Pl P3 J , a column-vectorY L P (Pa,Ps) and po a scalar. The partialPs 1'z
derivatives of the value function become:
ViC~ - Plh' ~- Pglí~ -~T)4 (A.4)
and
vR~~ -P3h `fPzK'fps
Hence the optimal investment strategy can be written:
I` - ~(PiK` f P3h'' f p4)
(A.5)
(A.6)
Because of symmetry, it suffices to consider the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of only one firm.
For the other firm the computations are analogous. Insert the optimal solution for investment, given by
(A.6), and the value function (A.3), with derivatives (A.4) and (A.5), into equation (A.2) and note that
it must hold for each K. Equations for the elements of P and p result if the ccefficients of the quadratic
expression in K are equated to zero:
Pi f 2P3 -( 2ó f r)cPl f Q~c - 0 (A.7)
P3 f 2P1P2 - (2b f r)cP2 f Q2c - 0 (A.8)
2P3P1 f P3P2 -( 2b f r)cP3 ~ Qgc - O (A.9)
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Pipa~-P3Pa~-Psps-c(ófr)paf9ic-0 (A.10)
Pspa f Pzp9 -~ PiPs - c(ó f r)Ps -~ qzc - 0 (A.I 1)
i~4 } 2p4p5 - iC(fo - 2Crp0 - 0 (A.12)
If the investments strategies (A.6) must also result in a stable capi[al growth path, two stability conditions
follow from solving for (13) for i-1,2 with (A.6):
Pl~-P3-ócCO (A.13)
Pl-P3-ócCO (A.14)
The first three equations, (A.7) to ( A.9), form an independent system ofequations in Pl, P2 and P3. These
equations define conic sections in the ( Pl , P3)-plane, respectively an ellipse, a parabola and a hyperbola.
This suggests to apply polar coordinates. Firs[ note that the ellipse has its centre at ( 2(2ó ~ r)c, 0), the
pazabola its top at ( 2(2ó f r)c -~, 0) and the hyperbola its centre at ( 2(2ó f r)c - zP2, 0). With
the transformation pl - Pl - 2(2ó -F r)c and p3 - f P3 the three equations simplify to:
1
2p3 f 2PZpi ~- Qac - 0
V Lp3i~1 f 2 V Lp3P2 f Q3C - ~
with





Equation (A.15) de6nes a circle with radius p and centre at the origin. The polaz coordinates R and ~
are introduced in the (p1, p3) plane (with origin ( 2(2á -}- r)c, 0) in the (Pl, P3) plane):
pl - R sin ~
p3 - R cos ~
so that in the original variables:
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1P3- 2fRcos~
with -II ~~ ~ II. The Pz axis is left unchanged.




Rewrite equation (A.16) to an expression for Pz, do the same with equation (A.17) and equate these
two:
-(2Q2c f 1~3) -(fQ3c f 2P1i~3)
4Pi - Ps
(A.24)
Now insert (A.23), (A.19) and (A.20) in (A.24). Divide by cos ~ and realize that ~ós~ - tan ~ and
that cosz ~- t~-1~. After multiplication with (1 -~- tanz ~) and division by -4fQ3c the following
equation results:
tan3 ~
f(-8pz f 2Qzc ) tanz ~ f tan ~~( 2Qzc
f Pz )- 0 (A.25)
-4fGisc -4fQsc
With the notation tan ~y- ~, u- ~, v-~ 4f, this can be rewritten as:
y3f(-ufv)yz-F-yf-(8u~-v)-0 (A.26)
This is a third degree polynomial. Its roots, yl, yz and y3 may be real or complex, dependent on the
values of u and v. The three roots are given by the formulas:
yl(u,v) - 3(u - v) f 2~cos( 3)
1
yz(u, v) - 3(u - v) f 2~cos(3-~ 23)
1 ~ 2II
ys(u, v) - 3(u - v) f 2~cos(3- 3)
1z z4- 3- 9u f 9(2uv - v)
u uz 11 v uv uz vz
r- 3( 9- 16) t 3( 3- 3- 9- 1)
where ~i is defined by
T










0 G zli ~ II (A.33)
Stable solutions for the feedback equilibrium are obtained from roots that after the appropriate
transforma[ionss result in Pi, Pz and P3 that satisfy the stability requiremen[s (A.13) and (A.14).
In polar coordinates these stability conditions read:
p[sin ~ f 2~ cos ~] G- 2rc
and
p[sin ~ - 2~ cos ~] G - 2rc.
(A.34)
(A.35)
These can only be satisfied simultaneously by -II G~ G 0. Therefore, the interval 0 G~ G II can be
excluded. The stability conditions (A.34) and (A.35) can be rewritten to:
2z zz
(1- 42)tanz~f~2)tan~-~2- 4c ~0
P Pz
2 2 2 2
(1 - 4pz ) tanz ~ - ~2) tan ~ -~ 2 - 4Pz ~ 0
(A.36)
(A.37)
Note that 4pz - rzcz ~ 0 Let bl, bz, respectively b3, bq denote the zeros of the two polynomials
in tan ~. It can be proved that bz 1- 2f and 63 G 2 f. Also, if ~ tan ~~ G 2~ then either
0 ~ sin 4?- 2f cos ~ and (A.34) cannot be satisfied or 2fcos ~ G sin ~ G 0 and (A.35) cannot
be satisfied. It follows that
tan ~ G bl or b4 G tan ~ (A.38)
is a necessary condition for stability. Only y; - tan ~ that satisfy condition (A.38) result in a siable
solution.
If there is only one such a real root, a corresponding unique feedback equilibrium results. If more roots
satisfy the stability requirements a situation of multiple equilibria occurs. Whether a unique root that
satisfies (A.38) exists, depends on the values of Qr, Qz and Q3 in the objective function.
In figure 5 the (Q1i Qz) plane is divided in 4 different regions defined by:
(1) Qi t Qz G 4(2b f r)zc -{- 2Q3
1
(2) Qi f Qz ~ 4( 2ó -~ r)zc - 2Qs
Stake m- arctan y; and compute Pl, Pz and P3 with the help of (A.21) and (A.22)
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Figure 5: Division of Q,, Qz-plane, for given Q3.
(3) 4(2ó f r)zc f 2Q3 G Q1 f Qz G 4(2ó f r)zc - 2Q3 and
4Q1 f Qz G(2ó f r)zc f 5Q3
(4) 4(2ó f r)zc f 2Q3 G Q1 -}~ Qz G 4(2ó f r)zc - 2Q3 and
4Qi f Qz ~(2ó f r)zc f 5Qs
In region ( 1), one real root of (A.26) that is larger than 2~ exists. Therefore, in this region there can
be at most one stable solution. There is none if yl G b4. In region (2), one real root with y; G - 2f
exists, while other roots are not stable. Hence in this region at most one stable root exists, but none if
yz 1 bl. In region ( 3) all roots satisfy bl C ~ y; ~ C b4 and therefore no stable solution exists. In region
(4), two roots with y; 1 2f exist. When these are both larger than 64 multiple stable equilibria exist.
For any unique root y that satisfies the stability criteria, we find Q~ - arctan(y), with -II G~ G 0.
Together with the value for p from equation (A.23), this results in values for Pl and P3. Equation (A.8),
or alternatively (A.9), gives Pz. Finally equations (A.10) to (A.12) determine p4, ps and po. From (A.6)
then follow equilibrium linear feedback investment strategies. The steady-state value of capital is found
as the solution to the system of equations ( 13) in the steady state:
iFB - -Í~
K - P1 f P3 - À c~
(A.39)
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The equilibrium path of capital becomes:
p, }P3-bc
K(t) - (h~o -
KFB)e ~ t} h.FB (A.40)
We have found an analytic solution to the problem for a Taylor approximation of the original objective
function around the point ( Ko, Iío). The equilibrium steady-state will be the new starting point ( Ko, h~o)
of the algorithm. This procedure is repeated until the resulting steady state is close enough to the starting
point.
B Proof of proposition 1
See figure 5 above and remember that Q1, Q2 and Q3 denote II;;, II~~ and II;~ in the point (Ií', K').
Also note that if the root of equation (A.26), y;, is positive (negative) then, from (A.22), P3 -
2p~ cos[arctan(y;)] is negative ( positive).
In appendix A it is shown that for region ( 1) in figure 5 at most one stable root of (A.26) exists. This
region can be split up in a part with Q2 C 0(region la) and one with Qz ~ 0(region lb). From the
assumptions made below equation ( 15), it follows that only the latter region is relevant for proposition
1. It will be shown that indeed in region ( lb) proposition i holds. That is, under the conditions in
the proposition yl 1 b4, so that yl satisfies the stability conditions and is positive. It follows that one
unique stable equilibrium exists.
Define Q2 - a( 4(2ó -~ r)2c f 2Q3) - aQl. Each point ( Q1, Q2) in the region (lb) can be determined
by a Q1 G 4(2ó f r)2c f 2Q3 and an a E[0, 1]. Look at the polynomial in y at the left-hand side of
(A.26). This has a local minimum at
m - 3v~-Q3[A ~- A2 - ZQ3] (B.1)
with A -(1 - 4a)(á(2b f r)2c - Q1) - 2aQ3, given the definition of Q2. The unique solution to
(A.26) in region ( 1) is lazger than 2 f(See appendix A). It mus[ be the largest root of the polynomial.
If the largest root is real, it must be lazger than the local minimum, m. That follows from (A.27), because
2 C cos( 3) G 1. If it can be proved that m satisfies the stability cri[erium, that is (see (A.38)) b4 G m,
then the unique solution is always stable.
The derivative of m with respect to Q r can be shown to be negative in the region concerned (region 1 b).
For fixed a, m therefore reaches its minimum value, m`, in region ( lb) for Q1 - á(2ó ~- r)ZC f 2Q3.
It is given by (B.l) with A--2Q3 and equals m' - 3~ } 3~.
The derivative of 64 with respect to Q1 can be shown to be positive in the region concetned. Hence, 64
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reaches its maximum value in (lb) for QI - 9(2ó f r)zc f 2Q3. It is given by
zz
ó4 - 2f f 8~rB } 4 B
6B -F Zrzcz
with B --4 rzcz - 2Q3. Note that for Q3 G- 8(2ó f r)zc, B~ 0.
(B.2)
To prove that 64 G m in region (1 b), it is sufficient to prove that 64 G rra'. This is equivalent to:
3r -24Q3c - 2rzcz G -8Q3 - 4rzc ~- 10(-rzc - 8Q3) (B.3)
Straightforward calculations show that this inequality is satisfied for 2Q3 G -rzc. This concludes the
proof of proposition 1.
C Exclusion of multiple equilibria under standards
From (15) follows that in an equilibrium ( Ií , h'), II;; - Q(,0 - 1)pof Iíp-z -~3(4~3 - 2~- aA -
a)ék'zp-z, II;; --aQ(Q - 1)é7í zp-z and II;; - -aQzéKzR-z. Add these together to see that
Po(1 - Q) ~- ~Ka[4Q f aQ - 2 - a] f a(Q - 1)f h'p - 2a,0f líp~ 0 (C.1)
is a sufficient condition for
II~; G 4(2ó f r)zc f 2II;; - II;;. (C.2)
Condition (C.1) is satisfied if 4~3 ~ 2(1 f a) or f k"R G -po 9p 1~ z~~. Since a G 1, a sufficient
condition for this is ~Kp G 4 po. This requires Q and é to be sufficiently small. If ( C.2) holds, region
(4) is excluded.
D Sign of PI
Use definition A.21 and set Pl G 0. It follows that this requires
i(2ó f r)c
~ tan~~ ~ z~~ (D.1)
ic
given that -II G~ G 0. If ó, r and c are small enough, so that Q1 G-2(2ó t r)zc, the right-hand
side of this inequality is smaller than z f. It follows that any stable solution (which by necessity is
characterized by ~ tan ~~ 1 2f) satisfies inequality ( D.1) and hence has a negative Pl.
Chapter 4
Emission permits and investment in
emission reduction
This chapter takes a first step towards the inclusion ofanother environmental policy instrument, transfer-
able permits, into the duopoly model described in the foregoing chapters. A firms' optimal investment
behaviour is analysed over time, when that firm is subject to a system of emission permits with given
end time. Firms may bank and trade their permits.
It is shown that firms invest in abatement in earlier periods, advancing compliance with future environ-
mental standards, when they are allowed intertemporal flexibility in the allocation of their emissions.
Therefore, granting firms individual flexibility in the form of `emissionsbanking' enhances the efficiency
of marketable permits and may result in substantial cost savings.
The firm by assumption faces a two step emission standard with strict requirements at the end of the
program. The firm's optimal trajectory under a pure banking program iscompared to optimal trajectories
under command-and-control andunder a system ofemission taxes. Finally, the dynamics of an emission
trading program are analysed, in which permi[s are available in a perfectly competitive market but do
not last forever.
1 Introduction
Environmental regulation through a system of transferable pollution permits implies that scar-
city on a well defined new good, namely the services of the environment, is created (Dales,
1968). The regulator establishes an overall standard and distributes emission permits among
firms. Firms need to have sufficient permits if they want to emit pollution into the environment.
The firms are allowed to trade their permits in a well-defined market. It has been demonstrated
that this instrument is a cost-effective strategy for addressing pollution problems within a static
once-and-for-all setting (Montgomery, 1972; Tietenberg, 1985; Baumol and Oates, 1988).
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Actual environmental policy designs take specific characteristics of the environmental problem
into account. That results in designs that may be different from theoretical models. The
specification of targets often takes the form of steps. For example, the European Union
requires its member countries to reduce sulphur emissions in three phases of five years each.
At the end of each phase, all countries should comply with an emission reduction based on
their baseline emissions of 1980.' Another example is the U.S. Acid Rain Program.2 This
program requires electric utilities to reduce their rate of emissions for several pollutants in
two reduction phases (1990-1995 and 1995-2000). An emission permits market within the
electricity industry should in principle increase a utility's flexibility in meeting the emission
standard. Since a large market was created and serious emission reductions were required, this
led to important expectations on the program. But a recent evaluation of the Acid Rain Program
shows negligible trade among firms (Burtraw, 1996). There is some trade in the market as
outsiders are buying permits. However, most firms are reluctant to sell the permits that they
do not yet need. The Lead in Gasoline Program3 included a stepwise reduction of standazds
as well. This program required refineries to gradually reduce, and finally eliminate, the lead
content in their gasoline production. The program allowed for the trade in reduction quotas
among refineries as well as for banking of quotas. Unused quotas could be saved during some
period and then be used to justify emissions in a later period.
From these examples, some characteristics stand out. First, global and local pollution targets
are often fixed in several more or less explicit phases of emission reduction requirements.
Second, regulators often require certain individual environmental standards to be met at some
future point in time. They create a period of adjustment for polluters, but they also want that
each individual polluter satisfies the requirements at the end of that period. Finally, real world
transferable permit systems often include the option to bank permits. Polluters aze allowed to
save current surplus allowances for their own future use or for future sale to other polluters.
Data on the emission permit market in Los Angeles (Foster and Hahn, 1995) show that banked
trades represent about 30qo of the total number of trades through 1990. Banked trades mean
that the seller of the permits has previously put his permits in a specially established permits
bank.
Due to the timing aspect, the banking of permits cannot be studied in a static model. It is
therefore interesting to consider dynamic models of a permit program, where banking can
be included in the model. Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) analyses the dynamic properties of a
market for permits within a discrete time model with finite horizon. They show that, under
perfect information and with both trading and banking allowed for, an efficient permit price
pattern exists. Moreover, without further restrictions, in equilibrium firms bank only if permit
prices rise at the rate of interest and marginal abatement costs stay constant over time. In
case perTnit prices rise less than the rate of interest, firms prefer to sell their permits and save
the revenues at a bank. A market equilibrium in which prices rise faster than the interest rate
cannot exist. Then all fitTrts would prefer to bank permits at an infinite rate. In case abatement
' See the Second (European) Sulphur Protocol (5SP), 1994.
ZSee for a description Kete, 1992 or Burtraw, 1996. See also the Clean Air Act Amendment (US, 1991).
3"Iitis program ran from 1983 to 1986. See EPA, 1985. See for a description Nussbaum, 1992.
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costs decrease over time, firms prefer to use permits and delay abatement. Cronshaw and
Kruse model abatement as a recurrent cost. Therefore, instead of investment in abatement
technology, the model assumes abatement techniques like input substitution, where vaziable
costs are the most important component.
Rubin (1996) is another model of a dynamic permit market. This paper allows for both
emissions banking and emissions borrowing. Rubin proves existence and efficiency ofa market
equilibrium in a continuous-time model. Like Cronshaw and Kruse, the model assumes that
abatement consists of recurrent costs, and does not allow for investment in emission-reduction
technology.
Investment in abatement technology under marketable permits is analysed in Kort (1996). This
paper compares the optimal behaviour of a firm under taxes and permits. The permits give
right to a given amount of emissions per time period and have infinite validity. That implies
that permit holdings should be interpreted as a kind ofcapital stock, which `produces' emission
rights. In line with this interpreta[ion, permits are assumed to depreciate, which implies that the
regulator gradually strengthens the environmental requirements. The `rental cost of a permit'
then equals the price of permits times the sum of interest and depreciation rate. This is what
the firm must pay for the right to emit a unit of emissions at some point in time. It is shown
that in steady-state equilibrium, a uniform tax on emissions is equivalent to a permit system
if permit prices are such that the tax equals the `rental costs of a permit'. In that case, to the
individual firm taxes and permits are equivalent. An infinite time horizon is considered and
there are no requirements on the firm's final abatement technology.
The combination of overall with individual emission standards, which characterizes for example
the Acid Rain Program, is an aspect that has not been explicitly addressed in the literature.
If permits are not valid forever, the regulator implicitly requires each firm to actually attain
some level of abatement at the end of the program, whatever the net position of the firm in the
permit market during the program. Hence, at the end of the program, each individual firm must
meet the standard. This raises the question what the potential cost savings are from a permit
mazket compazed to a fixed emission standard in such a case. Any cost savings from allocative
efficiency, which exploit abatement cost differences among firms, can be only temporal. At
the end of the program all firms should satisfy individual requirements, and no firm can always
choose to buy permits and refrain totally from investment in abatement. That means that at the
end of the program, potential allocative efficiency gains are not exploited. Cost savings may
result from differences between the firms in the preferred timing of their investment. If some
firms prefer to delay their investment, while others prefer early investment, then a temporal
allocative efficiency gain exists, which can be exploited if these firms can trade permits. The
individual reallocation ofemissions over time through banking may also result in cost savings.
In this chapter we focus on the role of a firm's investment planning under a flexible environ-
mental policy, that allows for the dynamic reallocation of emissions. The program has a finite
end time and at the end of the program the firm is required to satisfy an individual emission
standard. Finite time horizons come close to current environmental programs and introduce
interesting conditions in the specification of dynamic models for permits. The performance
and effectiveness of intertemporal trading are evaluated for a program that wants to achieve an
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emissions objective by each individual firm (a limit on its rate of emission) at the end time.
Whatever is the position of the firm during each period, it must comply with that objective in the
last year (when permits are not valid any more). This definition implies the combination of two
instruments, tradeable permits and an individual emission standard. The `step' implementation
of abatement targets is another characteristic of the model analysed in this chapter.
Summarizing, this chapter is motivated by three aspects of actual marketable permit markets,
namely step implementation of targets, finite validity of permits and individual end-time re-
quirements. Our aim is to evaluate the costs and benefits of the intertemporal distribution of
abatement targets. What happens to the overall emission standard and to firms' intertempo-
ral distribution of investment in abatement when intertemporal reallocation of emissions is
possible? To this purpose, we develop a model and evaluate the impact on a firm's optimal
investment behaviour of permit banking and trade. The dynamics of banking and emissions
trading are analysed when the firm faces a two-step emission standard. The model differs from
other dynamic permit models, because investment in emission reduction is explicitly modelled.
For banking policy, the optimal distribution of emissions over time is characterized from the
point of view of the individual firm. T'he firm must decide when to introduce abatement.
Suppose that the regulator has the sum of al] emissions during the whole period fó S(t)dt as
its objective, instead of S(t) for each t. For stock pollutants, such as greenhouse gases and
chlorofluorocarbons, that is a reasonable assumption. For this type of pollutants accumulated
emissions are important. The distribution of emissions over time matters less in terms of
environmental impact than the total amount of emissions during the whole period. In that case,
the regulator may choose to leave the allocation of emissions over time to the firms.'
For comparison, command-and-control regulation is considered, that requires the firm to satisfy
an individual standard at each moment in time. The command-and-control model is a deter-
ministic version of Hartl ( 1992), who analyses the investment behaviour ofa firm in a stochastic
environment, in which the introduction date of a stricter standard and the requirements of that
standard are uncertain. When the introduction date is the start of the second phase of the
program and the standard is set equal to the emission limit of the second phase, the outcome
can serve as an upper bound for the firm's investment costs under a banking system. A lower
bound is provided by a system that leaves the firm complete freedom to reach the end-point
requirement. Given convex investment costs, banking induces the firm to over-comply with
environmental standards in earlier periods, compared to command and control. Under banking,
the firm may thus spread its adjustment to future tighter policies more evenly over time.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the environmental policy scenario
and derives the conditions under which an individual firm finds banking advantageous. The
costs that a firm may save by individual intertemporal emission reallocation compared to
command and control are derived. We characterize the investment decisions of a firm that
4When other environmental problems are closely related to the pollutant, then this may result in undesirable
peak-loads. For instance, the use of fossil fuels not only causes emissions of COZ, which contributes to the
accumulation of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere, but also emissions of particles that cause other types of
environmental damage.
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has the flexibility to choose the time distribution of its emissions during the program and,
therefore, its investment in emissions abatement, provided that it has sufficient permits to
cover its emissions. Section 2.5 compares the firm's investment under permit banking with
its investment under emission taxes. A condition is presented for taxes to result in the same
optimal behaviour as permit banking. In section 3.1, we model investment under a pure
emission trading program. The time horizon of the program is finite and firms must satisfy
individual end-point requirements. Then in section 3.2 a system with banking and trading is
considered. For both variations, existence of a market equilibrium is derived. Finally section
4 concludes.
2 Banking as an intertemporal transfer of emissions
2.1 A formal model for permit banking
Consider a firm which is faced with a system of tradeable permits during the period [0, T]. The
firm is assumed to have minimization of abatement costs as an objective.s In order to focus
on time flexibility, it is assumed that the firm is allowed only to bank the permits: it can save
permits for its own later use, but it cannot trade its emission surplus with other polluters. This
deliberately limits the use of permits to capture only the effects of time flexibility. In the next
section the model is extended and includes trade in permits.
The permit program has the following characteristics: the regulator introduces a permit system
at time 0. A permit is defined as a license to emit some fixed amount of pollution at any time
during the program, say ~ tons of 502. The regulator announces to the firm that in the final
period T it has to comply with a specific ( stricter) emission standard Q(T). Hence, at some
point in time each firm must technically adapt to meet environmental requirements. Permit
banking allows the firm to adjust at its own speed.
The firm's production process causes emissions, E(t). Emissions can be decreased by invest-
ment in abatement capital. Let abatement capital be denoted by Ií , then emissions at time
t aze given by E(Ií (t)). It is assumed that a higher abatement capital stock results in lower
emissions, E' c 0, and that it is more costly in terms of capital to decrease emissions when
these are already low, E" 1 0. Given the regulation and the assumption of cost minimization,
the firm will try to minimize the amount of money which it has to spend on abatement. For
a certain standard P, we can invert E(.) to find Ií - E-1(Q), [he amount of capital which is
required to satisfy this standazd. This amount is denoted by k(P).
At time t - 0, the regulator announces what standard 2(t) will hold during the period [0, T]. The
standard becomes stricter over time, therefore Q(t ) is a decreasing function of time. Specifically
the following scheme is assumed:
C(t) - 2, t E [O,s] (1)
'Think of a public utility, for which it is not always appropriate to describe the objective to be profit
maximization.
78 Emission permits and investment in emission reduction
2(t) - Q2 t E (s,T] (2)
with Qi 1 P2
The firm is assumed to have enough abatement capital at time 0 to satisfy the standard 2(0) - el :
K(0) - k(Qi). (3)
After this period the emission standard is tightened to the final level. This way of standard
setting is almost equivalent to the Acid Rain Program (see for a description of this program
Kete (1992)). The announcement of the Acid Rain Program induced firms to anticipate the
first period standard. When the program started in 1995 most firms already complied with the
first period limit (Burtraw, 1996).
The firm can create permits and save these in a bank. The firm creates permits if it emits less
than the standard 2(t). It can bank these and use them later. The firm is allowed to emit more
than the standard if it has previously banked permits to cover the additional emissions. Banking
permits increases the stock of permits at the bank, A(t). This stock neither depreciates nor
earns interest.s
Most regulators aze vague about the continuation of the program after time T. For example, the
Acid Rain Program does not specify what wil] happen with existing permits or the standard after
the year 2005 (see Clean Air Act Amendment (US, 1991)). The Second (European) Sulphur
Protocol (SSP) specifies new international targets for 502, but leaves the implementation of
future stringent standards open (see SSP, 1994). In the Lead-in-gasoline program, the standard
e(T ) remained valid, while all previously banked permits lost their value (see Nussbaum,
1992). In our model, it is assumed that permits loose their validity when the program ends.
For abatement capital a lineaz scrap value function S(Ií )- vklí is introduced to reflect the
expectations of the firm on future regulations. When the firm expects stricter future regulation,
it attaches a positive scrap value to lí .
The amount of permits created and banked (or withdrawn from the bank and used) at some
time t, is given by the difference between actual emissions and the standazd. If the firm emits
more than the standard, it withdraws permits from the bank. If it emits less than the standard,
it adds permits to the bank account. The increase in the stock of banked permits is given by:
A(t) - P(t) - E(K(t)) (4)
The bank requires firms to hold a non-negative stock of permits, that is loans are not provided:
A(t) ~ 0




sIn the Emissions Trading Program (1981) in the United States, banked permits could depreciate according to
required environmental quality improvements in the areas implemented (Padron, 1991).
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Abatement capital can be accumulated according to a standard capital accumulation function:
Ií(t) - I(t) - blí (t) (7)
where b is the rate of depreciation and I(t ) is gross investment in abatement capital. If [he firm
invests it is subject to acquisition and adjustment costs. These costs are given by the investment
cost function C(I). It is assumed that C(0) - 0, C' ~ 0 and C" 1 0. The firm determines
its investment in abatement and the permíts it banks at each time t to minimize its discounted
stream of investment costs minus the scrap value at the final time T.
At time T, when the program ends, the firm is required to satisfy the standard without using
permits: E(Ií (T)) G Q(T) - P2. The permit system is introduced to allow the firm to choose
its own time path for accumulation of abatement capital and obeyance of a stricter standard,
P2. It is intermediate between a system with complete time flexibility, in which the firm is only
required to satisfy P2 at the final time T and a system with no time flexibility, in which
the firm must satisfy the standard P(t) at any time.
Summazizing, the firm has to solve the following constrained dynamic optimization problem:
minimize the present value of investment costs during the whole program minus the scrap value




subject to the following constraints,
A - P(t) - E(Ií )






When environmental policy is given by the scheme of standards (1) to (2), the standard
P(t) is discontinuous at s. This implies that the optimization problem dces not satisfy the
standard continuity requirements (cf. Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987, p.73). However, the
weaker regulazity conditions mentioned in the same volume are mei (note 5.1 I, Seierstad and
Sydsa;ter, 1987, p.348), so that the maximum principle can still be applied. The first-order
optimality conditions can be rewritten in the following form (see appendix A):
a, ~ c'(1) 1~ o r~c'(1) - a,~ - o (]s)
'Here and in the sequel time t is often suppressed to shorten notation.
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al - (r -{- b).~1
~z - E'(IC)
p - r~z - ~z
p~0 A)0 pA-O.
Furthermore the terminal conditions,
~,(T) ~ vh ; K(T) ~ k(Pz) ; (Ií (T) - k(Pz))(~i(T) - vh-) - p






must hold. Since it is an optimal control problem with a pure state constraint, jumps in ,~z
cannot be excluded. Equation (15) refers to optimal investment in abatement capital. Except
for corner solutions, the shadow value of an additional unit of abatement capital, ~1, must equal
marginal investment costs. The second equation, ( 16), links the shadow value of a permit at
the bank, ~z, to the firm's abatement. The more the firm has invested in abatement capital,
the costlier it is in terms of capital to reduce emissions even further (since E'(K) c 0) and,
hence, the higher the value of a permit at the bank. Equations (17) and (18) link the stock of
permits at the bank to its shadow value. If this shadow value is decreasing in real terms (so
r~z -~z 1 0), then from ( 18) it follows that A- 0, that is it is not optimal to hold a positive
stock of permits. If an optimal solution is characterized by positive amounts of permits at the
bank, the permits' shadow value must grow at exactly the interest rate.
Along an optimal path the shadow value of a permit at the bank will never grow at a rate higher
than the interest rate. This follows from ( 18). If the shadow price would grow faster, the
firm would want to bank an infinite number of permits, hence no optimal solution would exist.
A second chazacteristic of the shadow value of permits at the bank along optimal investment
paths, is given in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1 An additional permit at the bank is never valued negatively 6y the firm, or
formally,
az(t) ~ 0 `dt E [O,T].
Furthermore if ~z - 0 for some tl, then ~z - 0 for all t~ tl.
(21)
It is reasonable that the shadow value of a permit is nonnegative, since the firm can choose to
use the permit at any time. The proof to this proposition is as follows: Assume that ~z ) 0
dces not hold for all t, so that ~z(t1) C 0 for some t~ E[O, T]. Then, from equation (17) and
(18) it follows that ~z C 0 for all t) t,. This contradicts the terminal condition az (T ) ~ 0. To
prove the second part of the proposition, let az(tl) - 0 for some tl E[O, T]. Then, from (17)
~z(tl) --p G 0. It was just derived that .~z 1 0. Hence, ,~z(tl) - 0. The same reasoning
applies for all t 7 tl and results in ~z - 0 for all t ~ tl.
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From proposition 4.1 and equation (16) it follows that along an optimal path, the shadow value
of abatement capital grows at most at the rate (r f b). If the shadow value of would grow
faster, firms would prefer to borrow permits and delay investment. That would, given (16),
mean a negative shadow value for permits at the bank. This is excluded along an optimal path
by proposition 4.1 and is a logical consequence of the model set up, that excludes borrowing.
Without any further analysis of the model, it can be seen that this system of banking is always
advantageous to the firm compared to a command-and-control policy. Consider a firm that is
not allowed to bank permits, but is subject to a command-and-control standard: it has to satisfy
the standazd Q(t) at any moment. In terms of the permit system, the firm is not allowed to use
any permits. This is equivalent to adding the constraint
E(lí (t)) C Q(t) dt (22)
to the cost-minimization problem above. First-order conditions for this optimization problem
and its full formal specification are given in appendix B. Allowing for the use of permits
implies that the constraint (22) is removed from the firm's decision problem, who must then
solve the problem stated in (8) to (14). The optimal solution with permits will be at least as
good as the optimal solution under the command-and-control standard. It is very likely to be
better, implying cost savings, since the firm can smooth its investment.
2.2 Cost savings in a banking system
This section analyses the cost savings that can be obtained by the system of banking (8) to
(14) compared to a command-and-control system. That is, positive cost savings result if the
banking system performs better than the command-and-control standard. To analyse the cost
savings, first an upper and a lower bound to these cost savings are derived. For simplicity, it is
assumed in this section that capital above the minimum requirement at time T has no value, so
that vk - 0. The scenazio with vk ~ 0 is shortly addressed at the end of this section.
A natural lower limit to the cost savings is 0. When no cost savings are obtained, the permit
system performs no better than the command-and-control policy. In that case, the firm follows
its command-and-control trajectory (the solution to (8) to (14) and (22)), even if under the
permit system it dces not need to satisfy the constraint ( 22). Denote the optimal trajectory of
the capital stock for the command-and-control standard by K`a`(t) and optimal investment by
I~a~(t).
An upper limit to the cost savings that can be obtained by the firm is given by the cost savings
for a firm that is allowed to satisfy E(K(T )) C Q2 without any further requirements on permits,
rather than required to satisfy E(Ií (s)) c e2 (as it would be under the command-and-control
policy just described). This firm then has to solve the optimal control problem defined by
equations (8), (10), ( 13) and ( 14). It is a deterministic version of the problem discussed in
Hartl (1992). We denote the optimal trajectories for this optimal control problem by KF(t)
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and IF(t). First-order conditions can be simplified to the system (see Hartl, 1992):
I - C~~Í~ (r ~- ó) (23)
Ií - 1- óK; K(0) - k(Pl); K(T) - k(Pz) (24)
which can be solved for optimal investment, IF(t), with capital trajectory IíF(t). Bo[h
investment rate and capital stock increase over time along this optimal path. Compared to the
command-and-control policy, the cost savings to be obtained along this trajectory are given by:
IT e-Tt~,(I~a~)dt - fT e-rtC(IF)dt (25)
For C(I) - zciz, it can be derived that potential cost savings are larger, the larger is c, that
is the more convex are investment costs. To see this, compute the optimal investment paths
for C(I) - 2 clz and the value of the expression ( 25). It is shown in appendix C that for
C(I)- 2 clz, both optimal investment paths, I`a` and IF, are independent of c. It follows then
easily that the derivative ofexpression (25) with respect to c equals Z fó e-r` [(1`a~)z -(IF)z]dt
and is positive.
Returning to our model, let a firm follow the trajectory IF(t) and assume that it can obey
the permit requirements. That is, assume that the permits that can be saved under the lax
standard, Pl, which holds during the period ( 0, s], are sufficient to cover excess emissions in
the second period [s, T]. If these assumptions are true, then permit requirements are not a
binding constraint and it is feasible for the firm to choose IF with capital trajectory IíF also
in a permit-banking system. Moreover, this trajectory is an optimal solution. The trajectory
IíF(t) is optimal when permits are absent. If this path is still feasible with permits, because
permits at the bank are not a binding constraint in the period [s, T], then it is also optimal.
Formally, from A(T) ) 0 and the terminal conditions, it can be seen that ~z(T) - p- 0. If
that is used and inserted into the first-order conditions, they can be rewritten to the conditions
(23) and (24). A formal statement of the condition that enough permits should be saved in the
first period leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4.2 Let IF and IíF denote optimal investment and capital that result from (23)
and (24). Define
AF - 19[P, - E(KF)]dt f f T[Pz - E(KF)]dt (26)
When AF ~ 0, the firm can realize the maximal cost savings compared to a command-and-
control problem if it chooses the investment path IF(t) for a[l t.
Cost savings are then given by (25).
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2.3 Characterization of investment under banking
For a further characterization of investment under permits, it is useful to consider the two
periods [0, s] and [s, T] separately. The first-order conditions that must hold in both periods
allow for two potentially optimal paths, which we call (pl) and (p2) respectively and which
differ by the value of p. When p ~ 0, conditions (15) to (18), (9) and (10), define a path (pl)
given by: A(t) - 0, Á(t) - 0, lí(t) - k(2(t)), ií(t) - 0, I(t) - bk(~(t)), ~,(t) - C'(I(t)),
,~i(t) - 0, az(t) --'}ó ~' `.~z(t) - 0, and p(t) - r.~~(t). When p - 0, from (17) itE (x(s)) ~
follows that a2(t) - yeTi for some y~ 0. This path, (p2), is then defined by (15), (16), (9)
and (10), with az(t) - ~er`
The period [s, T]
During the period [s, T], for a given Ií (s) and A(s), the firm must invest enough to satisfy the
strict standard P2 before the end of the program while it is not allowed to use more permits than
it has available.
Since the rate of investment is not bounded by some maximum, all combinations of A(s) 1 0
and K(s) ~ 0 are feasible, that is they allow for a solution to the optimal contro] problem in
[s, T]. The set of feasible combinations of A(s) and Ií (s) can be divided in two sets. The first
set, (set 1), consists of combinations for which permits are a binding constraint, so that the firm
must adjust its investment in order not to use too much permits. The second set, (set2), contains
combinations for which A(s) is high enough, so that permits are not a binding constraint.
Define by Ií f(t; lí ( s)) the optimal path chosen by a firm not restricted by permits that must
satisfy K(T) ) lí(F2) and starts with Ií ( s) at time s.s For large enough A(s), the firm can
choose this path and have sufficient permits to cover its emissions until time T.
The boundary between the two sets is given by a function denoted Am(K(s)) -- fs [Q2 -
E(Ií~(t; lí (s)))]dt. All A(s) c Am(K(s)) belong to (setl) and all A(s) ? Am(Ií(s)) belong
to (set2). The higher lí ( s), the lower the minimum amount of permits needed for the firm to
choose its unrestricted path of investment, Ií~. Hence Am is decreasing in lí(s).
For A(s) in (setl), available permits are a real restriction to the firm in the second period. The
firm must adjust its investment rate, so that it needs less permits than it would have needed,
had it chosen Iíf (t; K(s)). It can be proved that along an optimal path, the firm follows (p2)
for a period [s, s, ) and then switches to (pl ) for the period [s1, T], where sl E(s, T] (see
appendix D). Denote the optimal trajectory of capital by lír(t; Ií (s)).
The period [0, s]
Now consider the first period, [0, s]. In this period, the firm has to invest to arrive at a given
Ií(s) and A(s) at time s. Again, the set ofpossible combinations A(s) and lí(s) can be divided
in two subsets. The first set, (set3), contains the combinations that require the finn to adjust its
investment rate to save enough permits. The second set, (set4), consists of combinations that
can be reached if the firm invests at a rate that is optimal to go from tí(0) to K(s), without
special consideration to save enough permits.
BThe path KF(t) is a special case of these paths, with a specific value for K(s).
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Denote by I(f (t; lí ( s)) the optimal path for a firm that has to satisfy lí(s) at time s, but
is not constrained by permits. Let the permits saved by this firm be given by An(K(s)) -
fó [21 - E(Ií f(t; IC(s)))]dt. Then ( set4) consists of combinations lí (s) and A(s) with A(s) c
A"(K(s)). In that case, A(s) is so low that a firm that invests according to IC~(t) saves enough
permits to satisfy A(s). The combinations in (set3) are defined by A(s) ] An(lí (s)).
In (set3) more permits than An(Ií (s)) are required and the firm must adjust its path to
Kp(t; Ií(s)). Along such a path, the firm starts with (pl ) for [0, s2) and switches to (p2) for
[s2i s], where sz E[0, s) (see appendix D). Along such a path, permits are a binding constraint,
so that ~2 is positive.
The whole period [0, T]
Combining the two periods, four possible cases exist:
a) 0 c A(s) c A"(K(s)) and 0 c A(s) c Arn(lí (s)); the firm can follow Ií~(t; lí(s)) in
[0, s], but has to adjust to líp(t; Ií (s)) in [s, T].
b) 0 c A(s} G An(K(s)) and A(s) 1 Am(lí(s)); the firm can choose K!(t; Ií(s)) in both
periods. This implies that the condition AF ) 0, is satisfied, so that we are back in the
case of proposition 4.2. -
c) A(s) ) An(K(s)) and 0 G A(s) G Am(K(s)); the firm must follow Iíp(t; lí (s)) in both
periods. -
d) A(s) ) A"(K(s)) and A(s) 1 Am(lí (s)); the firm follows Kp(t; K(s)) in [0, s] and
chooses K~(t; K(s)) in the second period [s, T].
An optimal solution is a cost minimizing combination of A(s) and K(s). Since excess permits
aze sub-optimal, only the boundaries of the sets in cases (a) and (d) are relevant. That is for (a),
only A(s) - An(K(s)) needs to be considered and for (d), only A(s) - Am(K(s)) contains
possibly a cost minimizing combination of A(s) and Ií (s). Similarly, for (b), the only point
of interest is A(s) - A~`(K(s)) - Am(K(s)). Other combinations mean that unnecessary
amounts ofpermits are banked. All the relevant points are part of the boundary of the set in (c).
Therefore, it is sufficient to consider (c) and its boundary. A cost-minimizing combination of
K(s) and A(s) must be found in this set. Hence, any optimal trajectory is characterized by Ií p
in both periods, provided that AF C 0. It follows that the optimal trajectory can be described
as: (pl) for [s, sz), (p2) for [s2i s] and for [s, si] and (pl) for (si, T].
We can compaze the optimal path under the permit policy described above to the investment
strategy when the firm faces a binding standard The optimal path under a command-and-
control policy, K`a`(t), is given by: Ií`a`(t) - lí1(t; Ií (s)) in [0, s], with Ií (s) - k(22)
and K`a`(t) - k(~z) in [s, T]. It requires an investment of I`a` - I~(t; k(2z)) in (O, s] and
I`a`(t) - ók(22) in [s, T]. This path is a feasible solution to the optimization problem (8)
and optimal for K(s) - k(Q2), but cleazly K(s) - k(PZ) is not the cost-minimizing choice of
K(s). From the large amount of permits left over at t- T it follows that the firm may choose
a lower K(s), which leads to a path closer to the cost minimizing path IíF(t) and still satisfy
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its permit requirements. This is not surprising; allowing the firm to bank permits improves its
ftexibility in planning its investment expenditures. Even in the highly simplified setting under
consideration, banking permits results in cost savings.
2.4 The influence of scrap values
All the above reasoning hold for the case vk - 0, in which it is optimal that E(K(T)) - B2.
Investment in more capital is suboptimal. If v~ is high, it may be expected that the firm will
continue to invest in abatement capital even if it satisfies the new stricter standard. Therefore, the
shape of the optimal path depends on the definition ofenvironmental policy after the program
has stopped. It is easy to derive that for the upper and lower boundary cases (that is, the
paths denoted by K`a` and KF), for the simple convex investment cost function C(I)- Zci2,
boundary values vk'`a` and vk'F exist, which determine the investment behaviour of the firm.
Only for scrap values higher than this boundary value, it is optimal for the firm to invest more
than what is sufficient to end with exactly k(P2). The optimal investment path is affected by
the value of vk then. For scrap values lower than this boundary value, the firm invests just
sufficiently to end with a capital stock of k(22). In that case, the optimal investment path is
independent of vk. Since the optimal investment path for permit banking lies somewhere in
between the paths 1`a` and IF, a boundary scrap value for this path will also be in between
the boundary scrap values for command-and-control and the upper boundary path. The details
for the behaviour of the firm in case of permit banking and positive scrap values, for the given
investment cost function and for more general cost functions, are left for further research.
2.5 An emission tax for a given time interval
It is in principle possible for a regulator with perfect information on firms' abatement costs
to set up a system of emission taxes that leads the firm to the same time path of investment
as it would choose under the permit program described above. The regulator has to compute
the optimal investment path and set a tax on emissions equal to the shadow value of banked
permits. In the case of a system of emission taxes, the firm has to pay a tax, r, for every
unit of emissions. Thus, it also pays explicitly for the emissions that aze below the standard.
This is in contrast with the system of permits just described, in which the firm only pays an
implicit opportunity cost. The optimization problem that the firm has to solve under taxes is
to minimize the discounted stream of abatement costs plus the emission tax minus the scrap
value of abatement capital (which represents the firm's expectations on policy developments
after T):
T
min ~ e-'~[7E(li) ~-C(I)]dt - [vkK(T)]e-'T (27)no 0
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subject to constraints ( 10), (13) and ( 14). Optimality conditions for the firm aze:
c~(r) ~ á, I~ 0 1[~, - C (1)] - o (ZS)
r - ~1 - (r f ó)~i
E'(Ií)
(29)
with the transversality conditions:
a~(T) ~ vk, E(~{(T)) ~ P(T); (a~(T) - vk)(E(h (T)) - P(T)) - 0 (30)
Assuming that an interior solution exists, these conditions are equivalent to those for an
optimum under the permit banking system, (15) to (20), when the tax is set such that
T(t) - ~z(t), (31)
where ~2 is the shadow value of permits from section 2.1. If the regulator sets taxes equal to
this rate, the investment path chosen by an optimizing firm subject to these taxes equals that
chosen by a firm subject to a system of permit banking as it was described in section 2. l.
It can be concluded that it is possible to anive at the same results with a tax as with a permit
system. But note that this requires the regulator to have perfec[ knowledge of the cost functions
of the firm. Whenever this is not the case it is impossible for the regulator to calculate the
correct level of taxes. Moreover, the tax must be adjusted every period to follow the optimal
path. For the permit system to reach the optimal path of investment, the regulator only needs
to determine the standards, 21 and P2. This difference in information requirements is a well
known difference between taxes and permits. See for example Baumol and Oates (1988), who
point to this difference for tradeable permits and emission taxes in a static model.
3 ~ade and banking
3.1 Market equilibrium for tradeable permits
In this section a program that allows only instantaneous trade in permits is considered and
banking is ignored. Trade assumes the existence of more than one firm. Denote individual
firms by i and assume there are N of them in the mazket. Assume that N is large, so that firms
take permit prices as given. A direct application of a system of tradeable permits in the model
from chapters 2 and 3 is not possible. That model should be adjusted to allow for more firms
in each country.
The possibility of trade in permits, like banking, allows firms some flexibility in the timing of
investments. This flexibility is large when firms in the permit market differ in initial capital
stock, investment costs or depreciation rate. For example, consider two firms that only differ
in their investment costs: A firm facing investment costs that are almost linear has incentives
to delay its investments. Until it has enough capacity to satisfy the standazd, the firm buys
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permits from a firm with more convex investment costs. The latter firm is interested in a smooth
investment path and consequently it sells permits in early periods to the first firm and buys
permits in later periods.
Consider a firm i that minimizes the discounted stream of abatement costs over the period
[0, T]. It is subject to an emission standard Q(t) during the entire period but it may exceed this
standard at some t if it buys sufficient permits from other firms. If the firm emits less than the
standard it saves some permits that can be sold in the same period at the permit market. The
mazket price of a permi[ is given by p(t). Let y`(t) be the amount of permits the firm buys or
sells at the market at time t. Then, y' is given by:
y'(t) ~ E(If'(t)) - Q(t), (32)
which is the difference between the firm's emission rate and the standazd, which we assume to
be the same for each firm. If y' 1 0, the firm emits more than the standard and is a net buyer of
permits and if y2 C 0, the firm is a net seller of permits. The firm invests in abatement capital
in order to decrease its emission rate, which increases revenues of permit sales, if the firm is a
net seller, or decreases the costs of permit purchases, if the firm is a net buyer. Since market
equilibria with excess supply cannot be excluded, it is possible that the firm is not able to sell
all the permits that it wants to sell, so that y`(t) ~ E(lí `(t)) - Q(t). Like in section 2, at the
end of the period it is required that
E(K`(T)) c 2(T). (33)
This implies here that y`(T) G 0. Since it has to hold for all firms in the market, y'(T) - 0
for all i, in market equilibrium. All firms must at least comply with the standard at the end of
the program, so there is no trade at time T, since no firm needs to buy permits. Cost savings
from this policy are derived only from temporary allocative efficiency. Complete allocative
efficiency would be reached if firms were allowed to maintain their net position in the permit
market beyond T.
It is assumed that permits are not valid after T. Note that the price of the permit at time T
reflects the scrap value of a permit in the final period. So, when permits are not expected to be
valid after T, p(T )- 0. Therefore, the final position on investment in abatement capital of the
firm will depend exclusively on its expectations of future tighter emission limits, that is on vk.
If the firm dces not expect these and vk - 0 for all i, it can be expected that K' (T )- k(2(T ))
and not lazger. In permit programs with finite time horizons, when permits explicitly expire
in the last period or when vague regulations induce firms to believe so, the incentive to invest
more than required by the standard vanishes if no future stricter regulations are expected.
Firms must pay their permit purchases if they are net buyers and receive some benefits if they
are net sellers. We consider the standard scheme specified by equations (1) and (2). The
optimal control problem to be solved by the firm becomes:
m,ó r jT e-rt[C'(It) ~ P(t)(E(K`) - 2(t))]dt - vklí`(T)e-rT } (34)
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subject to the following constrains:
K~ - I' - b'K` (35)
K`(0) - k(P, ) and E(lí `(T)) C P2 (36)
Note that here y' - E(K`) - P(t) has been inserted. For positive prices, y' - E(K') - P,
since it is never optimal for the firm to buy more permits than it needs, or sell less than it can,
if prices aze positive. Ify'(t) ) E(K`(t)) - P(t) for some t, the firm cannot sell all the permits
it wants to sell. This implies a market equilibrium with excess supply and zero prices, so that
the second term in the objec[ive function is zero and it is innocuous to have E(K') - P, rather
than y', in the objective functíon.
The main difference with the banking model is that firms must sell permits generated by excess
abatement at the prevailing price. This price is determined as a market equilibrium. For a
given mazket price, first-order conditions for the optimization problem above are derived in
appendix E. They can be rewritten to:
C'~(I') ~ a; I~ 0 I[a; - C`~(I')] - 0 (37)
P(t) -
- .1i(r -f b') (38)
E'(It')
with the transversality conditions:
~~(T) ? vk; E(1~`(T)) ~ Pz; (a~(T) - vk)(E(lí`(T)) - Pz) - o (39)
If an interior solution is assumed, then ~i - C'~(1'). Conditions (37) and (38) can be rewritten
to find a net present value expression for optimal investment in case of an interior solution:
~'~(1') - C'~(1'(T))e~rfa~l~~-T1- jT e~rfa~~~s-~l[-~(s)E'(If(s))]ds (40)Jt
In words, this condition says that at some time t, for given prices p( t) and future prices p(s), s E
[t,T], investment should be chosen such that the marginal costs of investment at time t (given
by C`~(I`(t))) compared to the properly discounted marginal costs of investment at the last
moment (given by C'~(I'(T))e~r}6'~~t-T~) differby the marginal cost savings from investment
now. These marginal cost savings aze the marginal payments for permits that can be sold,or need
not to be bought. These mazginal payments are given by f~T e~rfa'~~'-il[-p(s)E'(I((s))]ds,
which is positive, since additional investment at time t rather than at time T implies a higher
capital stock and hence lower emissions in the time interval [t, T].
A market equilibrium can be defined, using similaz definitions as in Rubin (1996), but adapting
them for investment and the individual requirements at time T. Assume that there are N firms
in the market and they take permit prices as given.
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Definition 4.1 A price function p"(t) and investment functions 1"(t) for i- 1, .., N form a
market equilibrium if they satisfv:
P'( t) is an optimal solutionforftrm i to the problem (34) to (36), given prices p' (t ); and
N N
~[E(Ií `"(t)) -~(t)J c 0; p`(t) 1 0; p'(t) ~[E(tí"(t)) - E(t)] - 0; `dt E[O, T]
;-i ~-~
It can be shown that such a mazket equilibrium exists. The proof of this, which is an adapted
version of the proof in Rubin ( 1996), is given in appendix E. Our model differs from Rubin's,
because it considers investment and requires individual firms to satisfy end-point requirements.
That implies that care should be taken to define the market equilibrium correctly, so that, in
contrast to Rubin, excess supply is possible. Equilibrium prices are zero in case of excess
supply. An equilibrium at zero prices with excess supply of permits could occur, for example,
if all firms are identical. Then in a market equilibrium all firms choose to follow the paths that
are optimal under the command-and-control policy, that is invest 1` - I`a`. This implies that
at t c s all firms have accumulated enough capital to satisfy the standard, so that all firms want
to sell and no firm wants to buy permits.
Since this program does not allow for banking of permits, all trade must take place instanta-
neously. Therefore, market equilibria with excess supply need not be confined to the case just
mentioned where all firms are equal. Due especially to the constraint ( 36), a market equilib-
rium with positive prices requires rather large differences among firms in investment costs or
depreciation rates. This constraint implies that all firms start with capital stock k(Pl ) and all
firms must accumulate at least k(QZ). For a firm i to be able to sell permits in the time period
[0, s] there must be another firm j for which it is optimal to have h c S~Ií~(t), that is to let
its capital stock decrease below its initial stock. For a firm i to be able to buy permits in the
time period [s, T], there must be another firm j that has a capital stock such that E( Ií~) c E2.
For this firm j it must be optimal to invest more than is required and sell the extra permits
that are created ( even if at the end of the program it can no longer sell its permits). If such a
firm j does not exist, the market equilibrium has no trade and zero prices. In that case, firms
must invest at rate I`~`a` and the permit program does not result in cost savings compared to a
command-and-control regulation.
3.2 Market equilibrium for permits that can be traded and banked
Adding banking to the model above, the individual firm has to solve the following optimal
control problem:
( T
min ( f e-rt[C'(1') ~ p(t)y'Jdt - vklí`(T)e-'T (4])
I~~o,y~ l o
subject to the constraints:
Ki - I` - b`IC' (42)
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A`-e(t)-E(K`)~y'
A' 1 0
K(0) - k(2,) and E(K(T)) C Pz
(43)
(45)
Here, again, y` ~ 0 implies that the firm buys permits, while y` c 0 implies that the firm sells
permits. The main difference with the previous model is that firms have the option to choose
between selling excess abatement at the prevailing price or banking it. Since the objective
function is linear in y`, it may for certain prices be optimal for the firm to buy or sell at infinite
amounts. Due to the end-point requirements, that will not be a market equilibrium: Buying
an infinite amount of permits would not reduce the need to invest in abatement to satisfy the
end-point requirements. The maximum amount of permits, ymat(t), that a firm would need
to buy at any time t is given by ymar(t) - f~T [E(K'(s)) -~(s)~ds. This amount could serve
to delay further investments until the end time, T, so that it is a natural upper bound for the
amount of permits bought by the firm. It is not hard to see that, given convex investment costs,
this ís not the optimal decision for the firm, even if p(t) - 0 for all future t. To find a lower
bound, y;,1tn(t) c 0, for the amount of permits bought or, in other words, an upper bound
for the amount of permits sold, note that firms cannot reduce their emissions below zero. A
minimum to y' is hence given by y;„;n - fó[E(K`(s)) - P(s)Jds 1-(Qis ~~2(T - s)): the
firm can at most sell all the permits that it has accumulated until time t.
The first-order conditions for the optimization problem above are derived in appendix F and
can be rewritten to:
C~'(I') ) a~ I` 1 0 I`[~i - C`~(1~)~ - 0 (46)
ym~n(t) if P(t) ~ ~z
yt - ymax(t) if p(t) C ~s
y'(t) if p(t) -~2 where y;,~,,,(t) ~ y'(t) ~ ymax(t)
~`, - ai - ai(r -~ b')
E'(Ift)
F~` - r~`s - ~2
p,'?~; A'?0; p'A'-0
with the transversality conditions:
a~(T) ? vk; E(K'(T)) ~ e~; (a~(T) - vk)(E(~t'(T)) - ez) - o
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It is assumed that when the firm is indifferent between banking or selling its permits, it chooses
to bank them.
If an interiorsolution is assumed, then ai - C`~(I') and ~2 - p(t). The latter implies that in an
equilibrium all firms value the permits that they have at the bank equally. Inserting ~z - p(t)
in equation (49), it can be seen that in market equilíbrium p` - rp(t) - p(t). If in the market
equilibrium, one firm j has a positive stock of permits at the bank, then p~ - 0. Then, mazket
equilibrium prices must rise at the interest rate and all firms are indifferent between banking
their permits or selling them at the permit market and banking the revenues from sales.
If mazket prices would rise at a rate higher than the interest rate, firms could speculate with
permits. They could buy a large amount of permits, bank them and sell them at a higher price
later. That cannot be a mazket equilibrium. It can be seen formally, from (49) and (50) with
~2 - p(t) inserted, that along individual optimal paths which are interior solutions, p` ) 0, so
that p(t) G rp(t) must hold. For prices that rise at a higher rate, it is for all firms an optimal
choice if they choose y` - y,`,~ax, which implies all firms demand permits. This cannot be a
mazket equilibrium because there is excess demand.
If equilibrium prices rise at a rate lower than the interest rate, firms are better off if they reduce
their banked permits, sell their permits at the market and save the revenues in a normal bank
account. Formally, from (49) and (50) it follows that p' ~ 0 if prices rise at a rate lower than
the interest rate, so that A' - 0. In a market equilibrium where prices rise at a low rate, no
firm has a positive stock of permits at the bank. Hence, in a market equilibrium where firms
bank permits, prices rise at the interest rate.
A mazket equilibrium can be defined as follows:
Definition4.2 A price function p'(t), investment functions I"(t) and permit trade vectors
y"(t), for i- 1, .., N form a market equilibrium if they satisfy:
(I"(t),y"(t)) is an optimal solution for ftrm i to the problem (41) to (45), given prices
p'(t) ~ 0; and
N
~ y"(t) - 0; `dt E [0, T] (53)
;-i
It can be shown that such a mazket equilibrium exists. The proof of this is given in appendix
F. Due to the assumption that firms bank if they are indifferent between banking and selling,
equilibria with excess supply can now be excluded. Firms can always bank the permits that
they create if they emit less than the standard.
Zero equilibrium prices can, however, not be excluded. If p(t') - 0 at some t- t`, then for
a firm i two possibilities exist: either ~2(t') ) 0, so that y` - ymal and firm i wants to buy
a large amount of permits, or aZ(t') - 0. The first option implies that p(t) - 0 cannot be
a market equilibrium. The second option implies, from an analogue to proposition 4.1, that
~2 - 0 for all future t. This firm is then indifferent whether it receives an additional permit or
not. Such an indifference implies that p(t) - 0 must hold for all future t. Hence, if in a market
equilibrium p(t') - 0 for some t- t` then p(t) - 0 for all t E[t',T].
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4 Conclusions
An optimal control model with finite time horizon was used to characterize firms' investment
in emission reduction under three permit systems: one in which firms can only bank permits,
one in which firms can only trade permits, and one in which they can both trade and bank. All
systems involve individual requirements at the end of the program. This implies that at the end
point, each firm must have invested in a larger stock of abatement capital, to have low enough
emissions to satisfy its individual requirement.
Environmental policy tazgets with adjustment periods were defined by the government. If
firms emit less than the standard at some point in time, they create an emission permit. Permit
systems that allow for more or less intertemporal flexibility have been compared. The first
system only allows firms to bank the permits they create for use by themselves at some later
point in time. The second system only allows firms to sell created permits immediately to
other firms and to buy permits if they need them. The third system combines these two and
allows for both banking and trade of permits. It was shown that even a simple banking policy
can result in cost savings for the firm compared to a command-and-control policy. These cost
savings result, because firms get more flexibility to choose optimal investment time paths.
We described the optimal trajectories of firms' investment when the banking policy allows the
firm to decide on its own intertemporal emissions distribution. Given convex investment cost
functions, and compared to a standazd command-and-control setting, the cost savings from
banking justify a firm's earlier investment in emission reduction. A Pigouvian tax could lead to
the same optimal investment paths of banking if that tax follows the `correct' time path. That
is the path defined by r- a2; the tax rate must equal the shadow value of a permit at the bank.
It requires perfect information on firms' abatement costs to set the correct tax rate over time.
In a pure permit market, where any excess or deficit of permits must be instantly cleared,
investment paths depend on the price path of the permits. Mazket equilibria with excess supply
and zero prices cannot be excluded. Due to the individual end-point requirements, all firms
have to invest in emission reduction at some point in time. Hence at the end of the program,
no firm is allowed to buy permits to cover its emissions and there is no demand for permits any
more. If both trade and banking are allowed, flexibility increases again and the permit market
always clears. But equilibria with zero permit prices aze still possible.
What can be said, considering these results, about the performance of the Acid Rain Program
for the electricity industry in the United States? That program establishes an emission-permit
market to achieve an overall emission standard and this standard is reduced in two phases.
Firms are allowed to bank or trade the permits that they create by emissions lower than the
standazd. The program is characterized by low trade volumes and low prices of permits in
the first phase (see also Burtraw, 1996). But the program has induced firms' abatement and
compliance with emission standards. Since firms anticipated the standard that would hold
during the first phase, they invested enough so that they would comply with that standazd in
time and would not need to buy permits.
The program is of course much more complex than the simple models that were analysed in
this chapter. But the model in section 3.2 may be used as an approximation. May be then,
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low trade volumes and low permit prices in the Acid Rain Program were compensated by
a successful banking policy. Since most firms had anticipated the emission standard of the
program established during the first phase, they did not need to buy permits in that first phase.
That implies low equilibrium prices and low volumes of trade. If prices remain low for some
time, our model indicates that firms prefer to bank the permits they create, rather than sell
them. There may also be other reasons why firms prefer to bank permits. For instance, they
expect that they need permits in the future and that prices will rise. Or firms may not trust the
functioning of the relatively new permit market and want to exclude the risk that they are not
able to find a seller when they need permits. That kind of reasons are not captured by the model.
Another omission in the model is that it ignores flow abatement, that is abatement through
for instance input substitution, which requires recurrent expenditures rather than investment in
technology. Burtraw (1996) points out that in the Acid Rain Program flow abatement through
the substitution of low for high sulphur coal has played an important role. It would therefore
be nice to expand the model with this additional abatement possibility.
If indeed firms banked large amounts of permits during the first phases of the program and use
these permits in the second phase, cost savings have been obtained even if trade was low, since
firms were allowed flexibility in the timing of their investment. So, even if for some reason
firms are hesitant to sell permits, and prefer to bank them, then a permit program with trade
and banking could result in cost savings compared to a command-and-control regulation, at
lower information costs than an emission tax would do.
In the analysis, it is assumed that the target of environmental policy, a maximum level ofemis-
sions at some future time point, is given. That implies that we focus on the cost effectiveness
of environmental policy. For an analysis of the social efficiency of environmental policy, we
would also need to consider the determination of the level of this target. For a discussion of
the difficulties involved in the latter and the implicit assumptions involved in the former, see
Mishan (1980).
The research in this chapter is only a first attempt to chazacterize the investment in emission
reduction by firms under various systems of permits with individual end-time requirements.
That implies that a couple of questions are left for further research. For instance, we would
like to analyse the effect of changes in the scrap value vk of the capital stock at the end of
the program for all three systems that were considered. It would also be interesting to extend
the analysis of equilibrium price paths for the program of trade and banking, to determine the
conditions for equilibria to be chazacterized by zero prices. This is interesting, since part of the
`failure' of the Acid Rain Program was considered to be the low price of permits in the mazket.
Another possible extension is the incorporation of permits in the model that was analysed in
chapters 2 and 3, to analyse permits in a model of strategic trade. The system that allows firms
to bank permits fits best within that model, since the strategic-trade model assumes one firm in
each country.
94 Emission permits and investment in emission reduction
A Optimality conditions for banking
Consider the optimization problem as given by equations (8) to (14). This is an optimal control problem
with [wo state variables, li and A, control variable, I, and a pure state constraint, equation (I 1). The
problem is to find the optimal pa[h of investment, which gives the optimal paths of capital and banked
permits.
To obtain the optimality conditions for the optimal control problem we apply Pontryagin's maximum
principle. Feichtinger and Hartl (1986) give a set of first-order conditions that can be applied for the
two in[ervals [0, s] and [s, T]. For each time interval, the Lagrangian is given by:
L--aoC(I) f ai(I - óK) f az(e(t) - E(h~)) f F~A (A.1)
Here ~o E R, ~o ~ 0, ~1(t) and ~z(t) aze two co-state variables and p(t) is a dynamic Lagrange
multipliec Necessary conditions for an optimal solution aze:
-aoC'(I) f al C 0; I~ 0; I(al - aoC'(I)) - 0
~i - ~i(r f b) f ~zE'(h~)
(A.2)
(A.3 )
~z - ~zr - l~ (A.4)
p ~ 0; ~A - 0 (A.5)
At points r of entry and exit of a boundary azc (which is a period of time where A(t) equals zero) and
at r- T, there may be a jump ~ in ~z and it must hold:
7I(T) 1 O A(r) i O 1I(T)A(T) - ~~2(T-) -~2(T}) } rI(T)
A last condition is that
(ao, a~(t), az(t)) ~(o, o, o) dt E[o, T]
For the period [0, s] the conditions above, (A.2) to ( A.7), must hold and additionally
K(0) - k(Ei); A(0) - 0





where this last condition defines that the optimal path must end at some given combination ofK(s) and
A(s).
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For the period [s, T] the conditions ( A.2) to (A.7) must hold and additionally:
h"(s) - h"s; A(s) - As
~i(T) ? ~ov~; E(k"(T)) 5 Pz; [~i(T) - ~ovk][E(1~ (T)) - PZ] - 0
az(T) ~ 0; A(T) ~ 0; a2(T)A(T) - 0




It can be proved that ao ~ 0: Assume that ao - 0. Then (A.11) and (A.12) can be rewritten to:
al(T) ? 0; E(K(T)) ~ Pzi ~i(T)[E(K(T))-P2] - 0 (A.13)
and
~z(T) ~ 0; A(T) ~ 0; a2(T)A(T) - 0 (A.14)
Four possibilities can be distinguished: First, K(T) ~ k(P2) and A(T) 1 0. This implies that
~1(T) - a2(T) - 0 which contradicts (A.7). Second, Ií (T) - k(PZ) and A(T) ~ 0. This implies that
~i(T) ~ 0 and .~z(T) - 0. Since (A.2) with ao - 0 implies that ai(t) G 0`dt, ai(T) - 0. This is
again in contradiction with (A.7). Third, Ií (T) - k(P2) and A(T) - 0. This implies that ~1(T) ~ 0
and ~2(T) ~ 0. Using (A.2) it follows that al(T) - 0. Hence, from (A.7), ~2(T) ~ 0 must hold. Use
(A.3) to see that this implies al(T) ~ 0. Then for small e, ~(T - e) ~ 0. This contradicts (A.2), which
states that ~1(t) C 0, if ~o - 0 is inserted. Finally, the case h(T) - k(PZ) and A(T) ) 0 is not a
feasible combination Ií (T ) and A(T ).
Summarizing, any possible combination of A(T ) and K(T ) contradicts the necessary conditions for an
optimum if ~o - 0 is assumed. It follows that ~o ~ 0.
If ~o ~ 0 is inserted in the first-order conditions, and conditions (A.3) and (A.4) are rearranged, then
the following necessary conditions that must hold for both periods can be written down:
a, ~ c'(r); r~ o; r(a, - c'(r)) - o (A.ls)
a,-a,(rfó) - az (A.16)E'(K)
~2-~2r-í~
~ ~ 0; A~ 0; tcA - 0
These are the conditions given in the main text.
(A.17)
(A.18)
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B The case of command and control
For a system of command and control standazds, that must be satisfied at each t, the cost minimization
problem faced by the firm is:
mió ( J e-rtC(I)dt - vkK(T)e-rT 1lo
subject to the following constraints,
K-I-ólí"
E(lí ) C P(t)
K(0) - k(Pi); E(K(T)) ~ Ps
Provided that ~o ~ 0,9 necessary conditions for an optimum are:
al C C'(I); I~ 0; I(at - C'(1)) - ~
ai - .~i(r ~- ó) -F- vE'(K)








Here v denotes the Lagrangian multiplier of the state constraint E(K) C P(t ). This state constraint is of
the first order. Therefore ( since the problem is regulaz and constraint qualification is satisfied) it follows
from Feichtinger and Hartl (1986) that jumps in at can be excluded. The transversality conditions are:
~i(T) ~ vk; E(h~(T)) s e2; I~i(T) - vk1IE(1i (T))- P21 - 0 (B.8)
C Optimal investment paths as a function of c
To compute the optimal investment paths, I`a` and IF , for C(I)- 2 cI2, the first-order conditions (23)
and (24) must be used. Since C'(I)- c7 and C"(I ) - c, these can be rewritten as:
I-I(rfó)
K-I-óK




9The proof is trivial and omitted.
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D Analysis of optimal investment paths for banking
In the main text it was derived that two possible optimal paths exist, (pl) and (p2). Path (pl) is defined
by p, ~ 0( and hence A(t) - 0) and path (p2) by p - 0. Any optimal trajectory is a sequence of these
two paths. In the period [0, s], if the path ( pl ) is the starting path, it implies that h(t) - k(Pl ). In the
period [s, T], A(t) - 0 along the path ( pl) implies that fi ( t) - k(Pz).
It follows that for the period [s,T] the first path must be (p2), for values of K(s) and A(s) that aze
possibly optimal. The last path in that time interval may be either ( pl) or ( p2). If the path (pl) is
followed, for some interval [t1,T], then K(t) - k(ez), A(t) - 0 and I(t) - 6k(P2). Before the switch
point tl, the firm follows path ( p2). If the path (p2) is followed in some time interval, ~(t) - 0 and
~2(t) - ryert for some nonnegative value of y.
It will be reasoned below that it is not optimal for the firm to switch from ( pl) to (p2) in the interval
[s, T]. It follows that an optimal trajectory for the interval [s, T] consists either of the sequence (p2)-(pl )
with a switch at time tl or consists only of (p2), which implies that tl - T.
If the firm switches from ( p2) to (pl), this implies that A(tl) - 0 and K(tl) - k(~2) hold at the
switching point. Furthermore, the firm has to change its investment rate, from a rate that is characterized
byal - (rf6)a1fyeTtE'(Ií)toarate7- bk(P2)thatischaracterizedbyal - (rf6)a1fa2E'(K) -
0. That may take place through a gradual decrease in investment. In that case, ~1 G 0 must hold for
t- tl - e. Since a2 may jump down at the time t- tl when A(t) - 0 s[arts to hold, al may jump up.
That is another way to get the change in investment rates. It follows tha[ at t- tl - e, ~1 G 0 must
hold.
To see that it is not optimal to switch from (pl) to (p2),
note that if the firm would switch from (pl) to ( p2) at some point in time t2, this is only possible if it has
already switched from (p2) to (pl ) at a t- tl before. That implies that for t~ t2, the firm inves[s more
than I - bk(PZ ), saves permits and its capital stock grows to values higher than k(P2 ). For vk - Q this
cannot be an optimal path.
For the period [0, s], along the optimal trajectory, the last path is not ( pl). If the last path were (pl)
then K(s) - k(Pl) and A(s) - 0. This combination of K(s) and A(s) is cleazly not optimal. The last
path in [0, s] is therefore (p2).
It may be optimal to have ( pi ) before (p2) for some time period in [0, s]. It is not optimal to follow the
sequence (p2)-(pl)-(p2). A switch to ( pl) at time tl E[0, s] namely, requires that K(tl) - k(Bl). It
would imply that the firm follows (p2) for some period [0, tl], during which it first increases its capital
stock and then decreases it. Given convex investment costs, that is not an optimal policy, because the
firm gains if it keeps its stock constant at k(Pl ) instead.
Hence along an optimal trajectory, in [0, s], the firm either follows ( p2) for all t or first starts with (pl)
and switches to (p2) at some time t2. Such a switch implies an increase in the ra[e of investment. That
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may take place gradually, so that al increases gradually. Or it may take place with a jump upward in
~1 from zero to positive values, due to a jump downward in a2 at the time t2, when A(t) - 0 ceases to
hold.
Taking the two intervals together, over the interval [O, T], the optimal path is given as a sequence
(pl)-(p2)-(pl), with switches at times tl and t2. It is possible that t2 - 0 or t1 - T, or both, in which
case one of the switches is absent and the optimal path is a sequence (p2)-(pl), (pl)-(p2) or (p2).
E First-order conditions for trade
The proofs in this and the following appendix are an adaption for our model of the proofs given in Rubin
(1996). The Hamiltonian, H', for the optimal control problem (34) to (36) is given by:
H' --C`(r') - p(t)(E(I~`) - P(t)) f ai(I' - bIf') (E.1)
First-order conditions as stated in (37) to (39) follow from application of the maximum principle. The
conditions are also sufficient, since the Hamiltonian is concave in (I`, li'). Furthermore, the existence
theorem 2.10 in Seierstad and Sydsa;ter (1987, p.137) applies, so that an optimal time path (Í'(t)) exists
for any given nonnegative price path p(t).
A market equilibrium then exists, if there exists a p(t) ~ 0 such that for the trajectories K'(t) that
belong to the individually optimal investment functions I`(t) for this price p(t), for all t:
N
~ E(K'(t)) ~ NP(t), with equality if p(t) ~ 0. (E.2)
t-i
This follows directly from the definition of a market equilibrium (definition 4.1), rewriting
~;~1[E(K"(t)) - P(t)] C 0 to ~N1 E(Ïf'(t)) G NP(t). It can be shown that such an equilibri-
um exists. To prove that, the overall cost-minimization problem is considered. This is the problem
faced by a social planner and can be formalized as an optimal control problem with a first-order pure
state constraint:
rT N
min J e-rt ~ C'(I'(t))dtI7o p t-1
s.t.K-I-óK
K(0) - k(Pi ); E(Ií (T )) C Pz
N







where I denotes the N-vector (h, ..., IN), K denotes the N-vector (K1,..., KN) and E(k"(T)) c 22
should be read as E(K`) G P2 b'i. IfK(t) is bounded from above, then a solution to this optimal control
problem exists, which can be shown by applying theorem 5.5 in Seierstad and Sydsater (1987, p.337).
It is assumed here that vk for all i. To have K(t) bounded, which is required by the theorem, it is
sufficient to assume that a maximum rate of investment exists, I;,,aT, for each i. If this rate is chosen
large enough it is never a binding constraint, due to convex investment costs.
The following first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient for a social optimum rate of investment
I(t), with optimal trajectory K(t), shadow prices a(t), and Lagrangian multiplier v(t):
C`~(I') ~ á'; I' ~ 0; I'[C'~(I') - a'] - ~ (E.7)
~ - (r f ó)~' ~- vE'(K') (E.8)
N N
v~ 0; ~ E(K`) ~ NP; v[~ E(K') - NP] - 0
;-i - ~-i
(E.9)
~`(T) ? 0; K`(T) ? k(P2); ~s(T)[h'(T) - ~(Ps)] - 0 (E.10)
These conditions are sufficient, since the Hamiltonian is concave in (I, lí ). By taking p`(t) - v(t), it
follows that a market equilibrium exists.
F First-order conditions for trade and banking
The Hamiltonian, H` for the optimal control problem (41) to (45) is given by:
H` --c`(1') - p(t)y' f a~(r` - óK`) -~ az(~(t) - E(K') f y`),




First-order conditions as stated in (46) to (52) follow from application of the maximum principle, for
optimal control problems with mixed cons[rain[s (for example given in theorem 4.1, p.276, Seierstad
and Sydsa;ter, 1987). The conditions are also sufficient, since the Hamiltonian, H' is concave in
(I' y' K' A'). Furthermore, the existence theorem 4.2 in Seierstad and Sydsater (1987, p.389)
applies, so that an optimal time path (I'(t), y'(t)) exists for any given nonnegative price path p(t).
A market equilibrium then exists, if there exists a p(t) such that for all t:
N




Carbon and forestry: A game theory
study of global climate change
This chapter analyses a transboundary pollution problem, where one player owns more possibilities to
regulate its emissions than the other player. Specifically, the chapter is concemed with the role of forests
in global warming. The use of fossil fuels causes greenhouse gas emissions and hence change the stock
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Forests are carbon pools that interact with the atmospheric
carbon pool. Growing forests act as a sink for greenhouse gases since they consume carbondioxide
in the growth. The use of harvested wood is a source of carbondioxide when the wood ultimately
decomposes or is bumt.
We introduce an asymmetric two player game, where one player is supposed to have a large existing
forest, while the other player has no forest. We set a first step to analyse the possible conflicts and
the potential cooperative gains between the two players. We analyse the social optimal rates of fossil
fuel use and forest harvest and the Nash equilibrium outcome, where each country only minds its
own net welfare. Equilibria when both countries ignore carbon sequestration by forests and carbon
emission by harvested wood are compared to the equilibria when these carbon flows are included in
their considerations.
1 Introduction
The use of fossil fuels in energy production emits cazbon dioxide (COZ) into the atmosphere.
Carbon dioxide is known to be one of the major greenhouse gases and to contribute to the
worldwide pollution problem, referred to as global climate change. Forest ecosystems are a
lazge stock of carbon. They contain about 45~10 of the total terrestrial carbon (Kellomfiki and
Karjalainen, 1996). The role of forests in the greenhouse gas dynamics is twofold. Forest
growth consumes COZ from the atmosphere. But the use of harvested wood will ultimately
cause greenhouse gas emissions.
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The role of forests in the carbon cycle has been analysed by a number of papers (see, for
example, the contributions in Apps and Price (1996); Wisniewski and Lugo (1992) and the
overview by Brown (IPCC-II, chapter 24, 1996)). From the various contributions, it appeazs
that much uncertainty still exists. Points of discussion are, for instance, the role of soil pools
of carbon and the fate of hazvested wood. The soil pool may be a source if decomposition
and emission into the atmosphere is lazge or it may be a sink if organic material is transferred
into long lasting soil pools. It also makes a difference to the net carbon sequestrationt result,
whether hazvested wood is tumed into newspapers, into construction wood or serves as a
substitute to fossil fuels. See for example Matthews (1996), who gives an overview of research
on carbon budgets and explains some of the different results by different assumptions regarding
the destination of hazvested wood.
The references above usually concentrate on physical carbon budgets. Other contributions
discuss the economic consequences when the role of forests in the carbon cycle is explicitly
taken into account in decisions concerning the management of forests. A good overview is
provided by Sedjo et al. (1995). The approach in the literature discussed there usually is
to incorporate climate considerations into forestry models. Other contributions are Tahvonen
(1995) and Backlund et al. (1996), who incorporate forest dynamics into a growth model with
climate change.
In 1990, the cooperating electricity producers in the Netherlands (SEP) set up a foundation
called Face, `Forests absorbing cazbon dioxide emission', which finances reforestation projects
in various countries.2 The objective of the electricity companies is to use the carbon that these
forests absorb in their growth to fulfil part of their carbondioxide emission reduction obligations.
The producers hence claim that not their gross emissions should be measured, but emissions
net of what they cover by reforestation.
Countries that possess a lazge azea of forests within their borders may make similar claims.
They may argue that the net emissions from their country should be considered and not the
gross emissions. When that is done and absorption by forests is accounted for, a country
like Finland might even be characterized by negative emissions, since accumulation of carbon
exceeds the emissions from fossil fuels by 25-SOqo (Kauppi and Tomppo, 1993). However,
Karjalainen and Kellom~lci, 1993 (cited in IPCC (1996)) give considerably smaller estimates.
According to their numbers, only 28qo of Finland's emissions is covered by sequestration.
Still, it is possible that these countries claim that as a result of this, they can reduce less fossil
fuel, contributing to a worldwide reduction in carbon emissions through the sequestration from
their forests.
This chapter was motivated by the claims mentioned above. A simple differential game model
of two countries is analysed, where one country has large forests and the other none. Within this
model we first check how the cooperative solution changes when forests and their absorption of
greenhouse gases are included in the optimization. That is, we compare cooperative solutions
t The absorption of cazbon from the atmosphere by growing forests that transform it into biomass is also called
carbon sequestration.
2Projects have been started in Ecuador, Malaysia, Czech republic and Uganda (van der Burg, 1994).
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for the gross emissions case with the net emissions case. Here `gross emissions' refer to
the solution when carbon dynamics of forests are ignored, while `net emissions' refer to the
solution where cazbon sequestration and the carbon emissions from forest harvest are included.
Second, it is analysed whether in a noncooperative setting, where each country determines its
own emissions and abatement efforts, net emissions make any difference. Since it analyses
two countries and their interactions, the chapter differs from contributions such as Tahvonen
(1995) and Backlund et al. (1996).
How lazge the potential of carbon abatement from forests is and especially how long it lasts is
subject to some discussion. A`healthy' forest may always act as a(small) net sink of carbon,
if the soil is a lasting sink of carbon (for this socalled `carbon-pump' hypothesis, see Kauppi
(1996)). Other authors, though, give little attention to this role of the soil and stress that
forests can only temporarily act as a sink for carbon (C) (see, for instance, Cline, 1992). The
IPCC-report (1996) mentions that `In addition to managing forest vegetation to conserve or
sequester carbon, there also is an opportunity to manage forest soils for the same purposes' and
refers to Johnson (1992), Lugo and Brown (1993) and Dixon et al. (1994). But the report also
stresses that `Sequestering C by storage management produces only a finite C sequestration
potential in vegetation and soils, beyond which little additional C can be accumulated.' (from
IPCC, 1996). The gain from enlargement of this temporary sink may be that it shifts the time
path of accumulating carbon to the future. In that way, enhanced sequestration by forests may
`buy time' to adjust to alternative ways to reduce carbon emissions, for instance by improved
energy saving technologies.
In the model below, we include a parameter Q to analyse the effect of these two different views.
If ~ is set equal to one, this reflects the view that forests are only a temporary sink of carbon.
If ~ is set larger than one, this implies that forests are assumed to be a permanent net sink
of cazbon. The larger ~i, the more important the role of carbon sequestration is. Given the
references cited above, it seems most reasonable that ~3 equals one or is very close to it.
It should be noted that the growth of forests adds to carbon abatement, not the volume of
forests as such. The hazvested forest also adds to atmospheric cazbon eventually. Forests that
are managed for production, are in a stationary state if all age classes until the age of harvest
are equally present. Then a constant harvest of the oldest trees is possible provided that the
harvested trees are replaced with young trees. If carbon sequestration is taken into account,
the forest management will adjust such that the forest contains more carbon. This implies a
longer rotation period (see, for instance, Sedjo et al., 1995). The average volume of the trees
in the forest increases. It is not clear, however, what happens to average growth. This may
increase or decrease. A trade off must be made between the cazbon released at harvest and the
carbon sequestered during growth.
The model in this chapter uses a simplified formalization of forest growth and the relations
between volume, growth and harvest rates. The simplifications that were made are explained
when the model is introduced in section 2. It is found that the global optimum allows for larger
rates of fossil fuel use compared to the gross emissions case, where carbon dynamics in forests
are neglected. Furthermore, for large initial values of the forest, in the global optimum forests
are adjusted such that forest volumes are higher and harvests are lower. That is, more carbon
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is stored in the forest and less is released from harvest, as well as sequestered through growth.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a game-theoretic model of the
problem. In section 3 the conditions for the cooperative solution are discussed for the case of
net emissions and for the case of gross emissions and these are compared. Section 4 considers
noncooperative equilibria. Section 5 concludes.
2 The game of forest and coal
2.1 The net emissions case
Let us first have a look at the dynamics of the different components of the resource system.
The dynamics of forestry growth aze represented by the function:
d~~dt - F(~) - h (1)
where x(t) is the stock of forests (volume of wood in the forest) at time t, F is the growth rate
of this stock, and h is the human harvest of forest products. The variables ~, h and F(~) are
measured in terms of cazbon content, so that F(a) denotes the increase in the cazbon stored
in the forest, ~ denotes the stock of cazbon stored in the forest pool and h denotes the carbon
contained in harvested products. It is assumed that 0 c h(t) c hmax for each t, where hmaT
is some upper boundary on the hazvest rate. The growth function, F(~), is concave in x,
with F(~) ~ 0 for x E [0, xm], F'(~) 1 0 for x C xh and F'(x) c 0 for x 1 ~h, where
x" E(0, ~m) is the volume where growth is at its maximum, F'(x") - 0.
This way to model forest growth abstracts from age classes. The changes in the volume of
carbon stored in forest stock aze modelled as a function of the present volume stored. This is a
rough simplification, since the distribution of trees of different ages, which is relevant for their
growth rate is not specified and rotation periods are abstracted away. Forestry literature usually
employs models where the rotation period is explicitly included (see Neher, 1990). The link
between the two types of model is given by the observation that an increase in the total stock of
cazbon stored in a forest requires a longer rotation period and a larger number of age classes.
The underlying assumption is that a given and fixed area of forest land is considered.3 This
land is equally divided over plots of different age classes. The oldest plot is harvested. It
is assumed that up to some maximum rotation period the carbon content of the stationazy
harvest4 increases with the rotation period, at a rate larger than the increase in carbon stored
by the total forested area (the total stock), while after that maximum, growth increases less
than the increase in the total stock. If then the total stock is the parameter at the horizontal
3See Wirl (1997) for an analysis of an optimal control model of forest growth that allows for changes in the
area of forested land, but ignores the dynamics of carbon in the atmosphere.
4The stationary harvest is the harvest of only the oldest plot, which in case of replantation leaves the forest in
a sta[ionary state. Note that an increase in the rotation period implies more and therefore smaller plots. Hence, if
the rotation period increases, a smaller area of larger trees is harvested.
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axis and harvest is the parameter at the vertical axis, a hump-shaped plot is obtained. In the
model, this plot is approximated through F(~). For the purposes in this chapter, this is auseful
simplification.
The observation in the introduction concerning countries with large existing forests that claim
that net emissions should count, would then point to a situation with relatively large initial
stocks. The other observation concerning (re-)forestation by countries with no initial forest
would point to a situation with small initial stocks.
The evolution over time of the stock ofgreenhouse gases in the atmosphere, Q, can be described
as
dQ~dt - -aQ - ~F(x) f h -1- e, (2)
where e, 0 C e, denotes the emissions of CO2 from the use of fossil fuels. The term -aQ
denotes the assimilation of greenhouse gases in other parts of the ecosystem, mainly oceans.
The term -~3F(x) denotes the amount of greenhouse gases assimilated by forest growth. If
~~ I then forests can be said to act as a net sink, sequestering more carbon than is released
if harvested at a sustainable rate, that is, at a rate h - F(~). Together, equations ( 1) and (2)
define a dynamic system that roughly describes part of the carbon cycle. Carbon is added to
this system by burning of fossil fuels, while it disappears from it by the ocean sink.
Let us next study the economic behaviour of the countries. Both countries must take the
dynamics of greenhouse gases into account in their decision making, thus turning the model
into a dynamic game. We assume [hat the countries do not like an increased stock of greenhouse
gases, because they fear that global climate change might harm ecological and economic
systems. The country with forest is referred to as the forest country, while the other country
will be called the coal country in the sequel.
Consider first the forest country. For a given stock of greenhouse gases it chooses its fossil
fuel use, e~, and forest harvest, h, to maximize, U~(e~) f R(h), its utility from energy use
and forestry, which is assumed to be separable in the two choice variables. The country
must thereby take into account the dynamics of forestry growth ( 1) and greenhouse gases (2).
Instantaneous welfare of this country is given by Uf -~ R- D~(Q), where Df (Q) denotes
damage due to the stock of greenhouse gases ( CO2) in the atmosphere. Damage increases at an
increasing rate, DJ~(Q) ) 0, and D~~~(Q) 1 0. Harvest of forests gives positive utility, since
the products are used for the production of consumption goods: R(h) ) 0, 0 G h G hmas.
Marginal utility is assumed to be positive for low rates of harvest, R'(0) ) 0, decreasing in h,
R"(h) G 0, and negative for large rates of harvest, R'(hma2) G 0. Furthermore it is assumed
that U~ is concave and increasing in ef , U~~(e~) ~ 0, U~~~(e~) C 0. The decision problem for
the forest country can now be presented as
max J~(e`, e~, h) - J ~ e-'t[Uf (ef )-}- R(h) - Df (Q)]dtOGhChmas,e~~o 0 (3)
s.t. ~ - F(x) - h (4)
-aQ - QF(~) f h-F e` -} ef (5)
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~(t) 1 0; x(0) - xo 1 0; (6)
Q(t) ? ~; Q(~) - Qo ~ 0; (~)
Here e` denotes energy use by the coal country.
Consider next the coal country. This country only considers the level of the use of fossil fuels
that will maximize its welfare. For simplicity, we abstract from the exhaustibility of fossil
fuels and assume that the coal country is able to buy unlimited amounts of them. The welfare
function of this country is given as U`(e`) - D`(Q). For C~` and D` assumptions analogous to
those on U~ and D~ are made, that is, U`'(e`) ~ 0, U`"(e`) c 0, D`'(Q) ) 0 and D`"(Q) 1 0.
Summarizing, the coal country solves the following infinite time optimízation problem:
~
max J`(e`, ef, h) - f e-r`[U`(e`) - D`(Q)] dte~ ~0 p
(8)
subject to (4) to (7). Note that although the growth of forests affects welfare of the coal country,
it cannot directly influence this, because the forests are not under its jurisdiction.
2.2 The gross emissions case
For comparison, consider a model where the role of forests in carbon dynamics is neglected.
Thus instead of (2), the following equation is used
Q--aQferfe` (9)
When equation (9) replaces ( 2) the countries' decision problems, (3) to (7) or (8) break down
into two separate problems. These concem the optimal use of two renewable resources, forest
and an atmosphere of good quality. The forest country hence has to optimize its use of forest,
by maximizing fó e-rt[R(h)]dt subject to (4) and (6)5 and to optimize its use of fossil fuels,
by maximizing fó e-rt[U~(ef )- D~(Q)]dt subject to (9) and ( 7)6 For the coal county, the
first decision problem, concerning the optimal use of forest is trivial, since it cannot influence
the use of forest. It must optimize on its use of fossil fuels by maximizing (8) subject to (9).
2.3 Example
The analysis will be illustrated by an example, that uses explicit functional forms. These
functional forms are chosen extremely simple, to focus on the interpretation of the results. The
SThis is the we11 known problem of the optimal harvest of a renewable resource. See for instance Feichtinger
and Hartl, 1986, p.499.
6This simple model contains the greenhouse problem in a very abstract form. See, for instance, van der Plceg
and de Zeeuw (1992).
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following functional forms are assumed for the cost functions of the players and the dynamics
of the systems Let i- f, c denote the country with and without forest respectively. Then:
R(h) - h(~ - 2~6) (10)
U`(e') - e`(X - 2rye') for i - f, c~
D'(Q) - dQ fori - f,c (12)
F(x) - b - Bx, (13)
where ~, ~, X' ry' d, b, and B are positive constants. The last equation implies that the focus
in the example is on the righthand side of the growth function F(x) as it was defined in (1).
That is, it is assumed that the initial stock of forest is large (x(0) 1 xh), or in other words,
that initially rotation periods are long. If the stock increases, growth decreases, because when
rotation periods become longer, the additional volume of harvested trees cannot make up for
the decrease in the harvested plot. With b- 0 and B G 0, the other case with F'(x) ~ 0 could
be considered.
3 The cooperative solution
This section considers rates of fossil fuel use and forest hazvest that aze optimal from the point
of view of a social planner that optimizes total welfaze. The resulting maximal total welfare
is what the two countries can divide between them, if they cooperate and side payments are
possible. If side payments are not possible, cooperation between the two countries results in
one of a set of Pareto optimal points. These are found from the maximization of one country's
welfaze, keeping the other country's welfare at some minimum level. In general, not all of
these points have maximal total welfare. Whether side payments aze possible or not, which
division results depends on the relative bazgaining power of each country. For example, the
Nash bazgaining solution relates bargaining power to the maximum welfare that each country
can obtain in the Nash noncooperative equilibrium.
3.1 Cooperative solution for the net emissions case
For the case where net emissions count, the social planner's optimization problem is:
max J ~ e-rt [Uf (e~) } R(h) - Df (Q) f U`(e`) - D`(Q)]dt (14)e~,e~,h 0
~This utility function dces not satisfy U'(.) ~ 0 for all e, but is nevertheless chosen here for simplicity. The
additional requirement that e' G x must be added.
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subject to (4) to (7) and
e~(t) ~ 0; e`(t) ~ 0; 0 c h(t) C hn`ar (15)
For analytical simplicity, assume in the sequel that Uf(.) - U`(.) - U(.) and Df(.) -
D`(.) - D(.) and assume interior solutions (that is, neglect the nonnegativity constraints on
the state variables for the moment). Hence, the only asymmetry between the countries is their
possession of forests. Let a and tc denote the shadow variables corresponding to the pollution
stock and the renewable resources respectively. Necessary conditions for an optimal interior
solution to this optimal control problem are:
U'(e~)f~-U'(e`)f~-0
R'(h)fa-p-0
d.~~dt - (r f a)a -~ 2D'(Q)
dtc~dt - (r - F'(a))tc f ,Q,~F'(~)







is satisfied, H is concave in (Q, x, ef, e`, h) and the Mangasarian sufficiency theorem for
infinite horizon problems (Seierstad and Sydsarter, 1987, p.234) can be applied. It follows that
sufficient conditions for an optimal solution are given by (16) to (19) together with (4), (5) and
lim e-rt~(t) - 0t~~
and
(21)
lim e-rsp(t) - 0 (22)~~~
provided that Q(t) and .~(t) are bounded.
From condition (16), it follows immediately that it is optimal to choose e~ - e` in the
cooperative solution. This is explained by the symmetry assumptions and the separability of
welfare in fossil fuel use and forest harvest. Denote the common optimal rate of energy use by
ê(.~).
For the moment, assume that an optimal solution exists which converges to a stationary point
(e~, e", h) with steady-state values (Q, i). The stability of the steady state(s) will be analysed
below on page 109. Given the assumption of convergence, condition (18) can be integrated
forward and inserted in (16) to give the net present value expression:
U,(et(t)) - ~~ e-(rttr)(~-t)~2D'(Q(s))~ds (23)
s
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Or in words, along a cooperative solution, marginal utility from fossil fuel use should equal
discounted marginal damage in both countries due to the addition made by fossil fuel use at
time t to future greenhouse gas stocks. This is the dynamic version of the usual condition on
marginal benefits and marginal costs.
Let ho denote the rate of harvest such that R'(ho) - 0. Then from the condition ( 17) and
R"(h) c 0 it follows that h(~, ~c), the optimal cooperative harvest rate, is smaller than ho
whenever ~ ) a.
Provided the optimal path converges to a steady state, forward integration of (18) and (19)
gives the following net present value expression for the optimal harvest rate:
~(h(t)) - r~ e-(rttr)(a-~)(2D'(Q(s))~ds- r~ e-r(9-i)f f,' F~(z(u))du~~~F~(~(s))~ds(24)
Je J~
Marginal revenues from harvest of wood must equal marginal damage due to the addition made
to future greenhouse gas stocks, corrected for changes in abatement due to the stock adjustment
that takes place in forests and that may stimulate growth and hence carbon sequestration (when
F'(~(s)) C 0) or reduce growth and sequestration (when F'(x(s)) 1 0). The changes in
abatement are valued at the shadow price of carbon in the atmosphere, ~(s). The proper
discount rate in the correction term includes ft' F'(x(u))du. This is because forests are a
renewable resource and grow at rate F(x) if left to themselves. Hence any marginal addition 0
to x at time t, contributes to growth and will have grown to Def~ F~(x(u))du at time s.
Now sufficient conditions for stability and optimality of steady states will be given so that the
forward integrations that were made to arrive at net present value expressions are justified. A
steady state, (Q, i, a, ~), is defined by the set of equations:
(r f a),~ - -2D'(Q)
(r - F'(~))r~ - -apF'(~)
aQ --QF(~) f h(~, F~) f 2ê(~)





which follows from ( 4), (5) and (16) to (19), when the time derivatives are set equal to zero and
ê and h are inserted. Multiple steady states are possible, since ( 28) usually has two solutions of
x, for a given h, due to the concavity of the growth function F(~). In appendix A, the following
sufficient conditions for a steady state to be saddle-point stable are derived: For ~3 - 1, the
steady state is saddle-point stable if F'(~) c 0, or if F'(i) 1 r.
For Q) 1, sufficient conditions for stability are:
j~ - ~Q ) 0 (29)
F'(i)(r - F'(i)) G 0 (30)
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and
F'(i)(I - (~)(r - (1 - Q)F'(i)) C 0 (31)
Condition ( 29) also guarantees that the Hamiltonian is concave, so that any steady state that
satisfies ( 29) is indeed optimal. Both conditions ( 30) and ( 31) are satisfied if either
F'(i) c ~ rI, (32)
or
F'(i) ) r (33)
These conditions are sufficient, but not necessary for stability, which can be seen in section
3.3, when they are applied to the example. The conditions ( 32) and ( 33) imply that stability
cannot be guaranteed for intermediate values of F'(x) ( with áTl C F'(x) C r).
3.2 Comparison with gross emissions case
In the model which we cal) the gross emissions case, forests are set to their optimal level
independent of carbon dynamics. Thus only R(h) counts as a source of welfare from forestry.
In the gross emissions case, the first-order conditions (16) and (18) remain valid, while the
conditions (17) and (19) change to
R'(h) - ~ (34)
and
~t - (r - F'(x))~
Steady states (i, Q, ~c, ~) are given by the system of equations:
(r f a)~ - -2D'(Q)








Note that ( 37) allows for two solutions. Either F'(z) - r or ~- 0 ensures that this condition
holds. As a consequence, multiple steady-state stocks of forest exist. A stability analysis of
the steady states for this model is given in appendix A.
Denote the results in the model that considers net carbon emissions by superscript F and those
in the model that considers gross carbon emissions by superscript NF. Rewrite the first-order
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conditions of the model for the gross emissions case to find that the optimal rate of growth in
forest harvest, when forests' contribution to carbon accumulation is ignored, must satisfy:
~
( h )NF - hR((h) (r
- F'(~)) (40)
This is the standazd rule for optimal extraction of a renewable resource with zero extraction
costs ( See e.g. Feichtinger and Hartl, 1986, p449). For the model that includes forests, an
analogous condition is:
( h)F - hR~~~h) (r - F'(~)) ~ ~(~ ~hRF(h))U~(e`)
~ aU~( hR~~(h~~(Q) (41)
The standard rule must be corrected for the direct contribution of harvest to cazbon dioxide
accumulation, "u'(`~)-zD'(Q) and for [he stock effects (harvest changes the growth rate ofhR"(h)
forests, which in turn changes the rate of abatement of carbon), -(p-h)R,~h~u (e ). The marginal
utility of energy use appears in this latter term, because it is the opportunity costs of changes
in the rate of carbon sequestration. This term is zero if ~3 - 1, in which case the sequestration
effect cancels out in the long run and therefore does not affect the growth rate of h. It dces,
however, affect the optimal path ofharvest as can be seen from the net present value expression
(24). For Q) 1 and F'(x) C 0, the term is negative, which implies that the growth rate
of hazvest should be adjusted downward. It should be adjusted more, the larger U'(e), Q or
~F'(x)~. If the opportunity costs of no sequestration in the form of lower energy use are high
or carbon sequestration is easy, it is better to have less growth in harvest rates. That is, for a
harvest rate that is increasing over time a flatter shape of the curve hF(t) is better. This flatter
curve then also lies at a higher level as can be seen from expression (24).
A comparison of the optimal steady-state use of fossil fuels in the two models leads to the
following result:
Proposition 5.1 éF , éNF.
To prove this, use the definition of ê(a) by (16) which must hold in both cases. The result then
follows from a comparison of (25) and (27) with (36) and (38) (a formal proof is provided in
appendix B).
When ~3 - 1, the steady-state conditions for Q and é are the same in both models, so that then
the inequality becomes an equality. Indeed, when Q- 1, the inclusion of carbon dynamics
in decisions concerning forests has only a temporary effect on carbon dioxide accumulation
and energy use. It is less insightful to compare the steady-state levels ofcarbon dioxide in the
atmosphere, since the two models reflect two different ideas about carbon dynamics.
Now insert ~ and ~ in (17) respectively (34) to find:
R,(hF) - 2D'~Q) [1 f r~FF~~)] - 0 (42)
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R'(hNF) - 0 or R'(ie~F) - R'(hr) (43)
where hT is defined by h' - F(xr) and xT defined by F'(x') - r. Remember that by its
definition, R'(ho) - 0. It follows from (43) that in any stationary point of the model without
carbon sequestration, either h - ho, or h- hT. If hr ~ ho, then R'(h') c 0 and ~NF - xr
is not a stable steady state (see appendix A). Furthermore, it follows from hf ~ ho that the
two steady states, denoted by x', respectively xz, that satisfy F(x`) - ho are both saddle-point
stable (see appendix A). For hT C ho, similaz results can be derived, which are ignored here.
Figure 1 shows the relative position of the three possible steady states.
A comparison of hF and hNF, as well as ~F and iNF is given in the following two propositions.
The first proposition considers the important case where the sink capacity of forests is only
temporary, so that (~ - 1:
Proposition 5.2 For h' 1 ho, a steady state to the forest model exists that is characterized by:
xz c~F and hF c ho. This steady state is locally saddle-point stable.
Furthermore, in this case, the forest model has at most two other steady states that are
characterizedby x' C~F C xr and hF 1 ho
A proof is given in appendix B. It may be concluded that when forests are only a temporary
sink of cacbon, if initial forests are large enough, it is optimal to converge to the steady
state chazacterized by iF 1 xz - iNF That implies that iF has lower growth and steady-
state hazvest rates than ~NF. The reason for that is that the direct addition to damage from
harvest dominates the contribution to abatement from growth of forests. Then it is optimal
to adjust forest such that harvest rates and growth are lower than would be the case when
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forest-atmosphere interactions were neglected. As a result, the stock of forest in the steady
state is larger when sequestration is taken into account. For small initial forests, it is optimal
to converge to the steady state characterized by iF 1~' - iNF Then the direct addition to
damage from hazvest is dominated by the contribution to abatement from growth. It is then
optimal to have larger harvest rates than would be the case when sequestration was neglected.
Growth rates are also larger and the stock of forests in the steady state is larger than when
sequestration is neglected.
A second proposition considers the case of ,6 ~ 1.
Proposition 5.3 For hr ~ ho, the forest model has at least one steady state larger than :rr.
This steady state is characterized by the equations (25) to (28) and F'(~) c 0. When in
such a steady state Q G 1- F;~sl, it is characterized by xF ~~2 and hF G ho. and it is
locally saddle-point stable. When in such a steady state ~3 1 1- E.,~il, it is characterized by
iF G~2 and hF 7 ho. For the special case ~i - 1- F,~x21, the steady state is given by:
iF - ~2 and hF - ho.
There may exist at most two other steady states, given by: xl G~F G xr and ha C hF G hr
A proof is given in appendix B. It follows that the optimal steady-state forest in the net
emissions case, xF, is larger than the optimal steady-state forest in the gross emissions case,
il`'F when the sink function of forests, ~3, is small and the initial forest is large. For a steady
state to the right of xr, it implies that harvest rates must be lower in the net emissions case.
When the sink function is large enough, these results are reversed. The abatement effect from
more forest growth then dominates the direct contribution to damage from harvested forests.
As a result, for lazge initial forests, the steady-state forest under net emissions is smaller than
under gross emissions so that it grows faster and abates more.
An interesting question is whether forests ultimately grow faster or slower when carbon-
sequestration effects are accounted for and harvest decisions adjusted. For an answer, first
compare the optimal growth paths of harvest and forest stocks for the net and gross emissions
case. Even in this relatively simple model, general results are not easy to obtain, due to the
existence of multiple steady states. But it is possible to compare optimal paths for the special
case where ~3 - 1, so that forests are only a temporary sink of carbon. Using the results from
propositions 5.1 and 5.2 and the optimality conditions ( 16) to (19), ( 34) and ( 35) it can be
found that, for given initial conditions:
Proposition 5.4 Let em'" C eF(t) and Qm`" G QF(t), where em'" and Qm'n satisfy
(r ~- ~)U'(e~"n ) C 2D'(Qm`n). Assume that ~(0) ~ xr. Then, for ,Q - 1, for all t) 0,
hF(i) G hNF(t) and xF(t) ~ xNF(t).
A proof is given in appendix B. The proposition says that the harvest rates of forest are lower in
the net emissions case than in the gross emissions case, provided that the condition mentioned
is met. Since a is probably a small number, that condition is expected to be satisfied. For a
given initial stock, xr C x(0), this implies that xF(t) ~ xNF(t), since harvest rates are lower,
so that stocks can grow at a higher rate (or decrease at a lower rate).
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To summarize, a social planner that chooses to count net rather than gross emissions, will choose
a lower harvest time path. The explicit recognition of an additional abatement opportunity
in the form of carbon sequestration by forests leads to a new balance between the damage
from greenhouse gases and the utility derived from fossil fuel use and forest hazvest. The
next section again compazes rates of fossil fuel use and forest harvest, for the two alternative
models, but now for the case of a noncooperative equilibrium between the two countries. But
first, the results and propositions above are illustrated in the example.
3.3 Example
For our example with lineaz damage, the first-order necessary conditions for a cooperative
optimum for net emissions can be found in appendix C. The steady-state values of the
variables are also given there. In this steady state, the controls take the values:
laF -. ~ }
2d(B(~ - 1) - r)
- zG zli(r f a)(r ~- B)
and
(44)
e,F - X - 2d
(45)
7 7(r f c~).
One needs to check the nonnegativity of Q,x,h and ê`, to ensure that this steady state makes
sense economically. Only a restricted range of parameter values results in such an interior
solution ( See appendix D).
Consider the local stability of this steady state. Condition (32) is satisfied for B~ p'-1. For
large enough B, it may be checked that in the steady state the three sufficient conditions (29)
to (30) aze all met and the steady state is stable. However, the example is so simple, that it is
also possible to directly determine the eigenvalues of the Jacobian, J. The eigenvalues of J
are -a, -B, r-}- B, and r~~ ( See appendix C). Since there aze two positive and two negative
eigenvalues, the steady state is saddle-point stable, whatever the value of B. The sufficient
conditions for stability (29) to ( 31) are too restrictive for this simple example.
An equilibrium convergent path is given as
Q(t) - cle-ae
} c2e-ee ~ Q (46)






with cl - Qo - Q- c2 and c2 - Qa xo-x Mar inal dama e determines a constant shadow~-B g g
value of pollution, affected only by a and the discount rate. This shadow value determines
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[he optimal rates of fossil fuel use in the two countries, ê', that are hence also constant over
time. Together with the constant shadow value of forest stock, the shadow value of pollution
determines the optimal harvest rate of forest, h, that is then also constant over time. The
stock of forest monotonically adjusts until it equals its steady-state value. Finally, the stock of
greenhouse gases adjusts to its steady-state value along an adjustment path which need not be
monotone.
For the gross emissions case, the steady-state values of the controls are given by:
h~NF - ~ (SO)
and
êr NF - X - 2d
7 7(r f a) ~
(51)
The values of the state and shadow variables in the steady state can be found in appendix C.
Again, nonnegativity requirements restrict the range of parameters for which these are valid
equations (see appendix D). The steady states are stable, as is easily seen from the eigenvalues
of the two separate dynamic systems. Convergent equilibrium paths then take the form of:
QNF(t) - (QO -
QNF)e-at } nNF




For a comparison of steady states in the two alternative models, apply proposition 5.1
the example. It can be concluded that:
1 êF ~ éNF
2 For ~3 - 1, since F'(~) --B c r, iF )~NF and hF ~~NF
3 For Q c 1 f B, iF )~NF and hF ~ hNF
4 For Q) 1 f B the steady state is stable and it holds that: ~F ~~NF and hF , hNF
These inequalities follow also easily from a direct comparison of the systems of equations that
determine the steady state in both cases, (C.14) to (C.17), (44) and (45) and (C.18) to (C.21),
(50) and (51).
Apply proposition 5.4 to find that, for ~i - 1,
hF(t) C ~NF(t), (56)
since the condition in the proposition is met. This can, like the other results, also be checked
directly by looking at equations (44) and (50).
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4 Non-cooperative equilibrium
Consider the dynamic noncooperative game between the two countries. Each player is assumed
to have complete information about the system dynamics and their interactions. We consider
here only open-loop solutions. Let af , a`, fc~ and ~` be the costate variables for the country
with and without forests respectively.
4.1 The net emissions case
Necessary conditions for a noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution in the open-loop game
are
U'(ef ) - -~J
R'(h) - p~ - a1
~f - (r f a)a~ f D'(Q)
j~f - (r - F'(~))f~1 } Q~JF'(~)
and
U'(e`) - -.~`
~` - (r ~ a)~` f D'(Q)








In contrast to the cooperative solution, each country has private shadow values, measured as
the costate vaziables, ~~, ~`, and ~~, ~`, for the two stocks involved. The development of the
forest stock is determined solely by the country that owns the forest. The other country takes
its growth or decline as given. Its valuation for this stock, p`, does not affect its decisions and
is `redundant' according to the definition of redundancy given in Dockner et al. (1985).
For this symmetric case it can, like in the cooperative optimum, be concluded from the first-
order conditions ( specifically from (57), (59), (61) and (62)) that in equilibrium e~ - e` - e.
Assume an equilibrium that converges to a steady state for the moment. An analysis of
stability requirements is given in appendix E. Denote Nash equilibrium values by a superscript
N. Integrate (59) or (62) forward and insert in (57) respectively (61) to find the net present
value expressions:
U,(e:rv(t)) - j~ e-(rta)(~-~)~-(QN(s))dt for i-f.c. (64)
f~
Comparison of expression (64) with its counterpart for the case of cooperation (23) shows that,
for any expected time path of carbon in the atmosphere, energy use in the open-loop Nash
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equilibrium is larger than in the cooperative optimum, for both countries. This reflects the
well-known result that free-rider incentives prohibit noncooperative countries to reach a Pazeto
optimal outcome.
Equilibrium harvest rates satisfy the following net present value expression that is obtained
from forward integration of (60) using (58).
R~(hN(t)) -~~ e-(Tf~)(9-t)D~(QN(s))ds- f~ e-r('-t)t f; F'(2N(u))du~l~F'(~N(s))ds(65)
c t
This is the counterpart of (24). The forest country decides on harvest rates and takes only home
damage into account, reflected by the direct damage effect D'(Q) and the indirect growth
effect, where ~~ reflects the home valuation for marginal changes in the stock of greenhouse
gases. Because only home damage is taken into account, the direct damage effect is considered
to be smaller, which leads to higher hazvest rates. Also ~f will be smaller in absolute value
than ~ in case ofcooperation, so that the same indirect growth effect causes a smaller change in
the harvest rate. If stock effects aze such that both under cooperation and in Nash equilibrium a
higher rate of harvest increases growth and hence contributes to abatement (that is, F'(~) C 0),
cooperation results in a higher harvest rate than the Nash equilibrium. Both terms of ( 65) are
positive and smaller than the analogous terms of (41). Results are more ambiguous, however,
when F'(x) ~ 0 for some t, since then cases may be thought of where hF'N(t) ~ hF,c(t) for
some t (here hF~c denotes the value of harvest in a cooperative solution that takes net emissions
into account.). These results are another vaziant of the general result that noncooperative
equilibria are inferior to cooperation with side payments.
The steady-state equilibrium conditions for the game are:
F(i) - h
aQ-(1-Q)F(~)~-2é-(1-Q)hf2é
(r f a)~f - -D'(Q)






(r f a)~` - -D'(Q) (70)
(r - F'(~))Í~~ - -QF~(~)~` (71)
4.2 Comparisons with the gross emissions case
First-order conditions and steady-state equations for the Nash equilibrium in case of gross
emissions are obvious analogues to equations (57) to (63) and (66) to (71) and therefore
omitted here. They can be found in appendix B.
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First compare the steady-state levels in the Nash equilibrium and in the cooperative optimum,
both for the model that includes forest-atmosphere interactions (denoted by superscript F) and
for the model that neglects these (denoted by superscript NF). It can be concluded that for
both models, cooperation results in a lower steady-state stock of greenhouse gases and lower
emissions than the Nash equilibrium. Formally:
PiOpOSÍtIOn S.S
éNF,C ~ éNF,N. j~NF,C ~~NF,N. éF,C ~ éF,N. j~F,C ~~F,N
These inequalities follow immediately from a comparison of the relevant steady-state con-
ditions. They are another restatement of the result that noncooperative behaviour leads to
suboptimal equilibria, with too high emissions and too much pollution from the point of view
of a social planner.
A compazison of energy use with and withou[ the inclusion of carbon-sequestration in forest
decisions gives an analogue to proposition 5.1 for the noncooperative equilibrium:
Proposition 5.Ó éNF,N ~ éF,N
The proof is an analogue to the one for proposition 5.1 and omitted. In a Nash-equilibrium
steady state, both the country that owns the forest and the country without forest burn more
fossil fuels in the net emissions case than in the gross emissions case. The country without
forest can be said to `use' part of the abatement capacity provided for by the forest country.
Note that this is efficient. One of the countries would act suboptimal if only the forest country
would increase fossil fuel use compared to the gross emissions equilibrium. That fossil fuel
use in equilibrium is equal in the two countries is due to our symmetry assumptions.
The optimal harvest rate of forests in the model that neglects forest-atmosphere interactions
(the gross emissions case) is only determined by the direct utility that the forest country derives
from the harvest. Therefore, it is equal in the cooperative optimum and in the Nash equilibrium
solution. This conclusion depends on our assumption of separable utilities.
Proposition 5.7 hNF,C - ~NF,N and ~NF,C - ~NF,N
This equality implies that we have for the Nash equilibrium the same benchmark steady-state
values for x in the gross emissions case as in the cooperative equilibrium, namely xl, ~' and
x2. An analogue to proposition 5.2 is then easy to formulate:
Proposition 5.8 Given that Q- 1, and hr ) ho, there exists a steady state to the forest model
that is characterized by: x2 ~~F,N and hF c ho. Furthermore, in this case, the forest model
has at most two other steady states that are characterized by r' c~F~N C ar and hF ] ho.
The proof to this proposition is very similaz to the proof to proposition 5.2 and therefore
omitted.
Now compare steady-state hazvest rates in the Nash equilibrium and in the cooperative outcome,
for the case of net emissions. Only the case of ~3 - 1 will be considered. For lazge enough
initial values of x(see proposition 5.2), ~2 G: r both in the Nash equilibrium and in the
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cooperative outcome. Then larger steady-state harvest rates imply higher forest growth, but
lower steady-state forest stocks and larger (negative) marginal growth rates (that is, smaller in
absolute value). In the Nash equilibrium, the forest country underestimates both the damage
effect of the direct contribution of harvest to carbon in the atmosphere and the indirect effect of
a smaller forest stock with larger mazginal growth rate compared to the social optimum. Both
work in the same direction and the result is that harvest is too large in the Nash equilibrium:
Proposition 5.9 Given that ,Q - 1, and hr ~ ha, for large enough initial value of x, x2 C
~F,N ~ ~F,c and ho ] hF,N ) j~F,C
This proposition is proved in appendix E. For lower initial values of x, x' C iF~N G xr and
xl G iF'c C xr. A larger steady-state harvest rate implies more growth and sequestration, a
larger stock of forest, higher direct contributions from harvest to carbon accumulation and a
lower marginal growth rate. Again, in the Nash equilibrium, the forest country underestimates
both the damage effect and the sequestration effect. A larger harvest rate implies a larger forest
stock with smaller marginal growth rate compazed to the social optimum. Now, however,
these two effects do not work in the same direction. The damage effect would imply larger
Nash-equilibrium harvest rates compared to the social optimum. The sequestration effect
would point to a smaller stock with larger growth rates and hence larger harvests in the Nash
equilibrium than in the social optimum. The overall effect is not clear ex ante and it is possible
that hF'N ] hF,c w,ith xi C xF,c ~~F,N ~ xr, or that the reverse holds and hF'N ~ hF'c with
xl ~ ~F,N ~ ~F,C ~ xr
A comparison ofequilibrium paths is restricted to the case of Q- 1. An analogue to proposition
5.4 can be formulated:
Proposition 5.10 In the Nash equilibrium, let emin'N ~ e(t) and Qmin'N ~ Q(t), where
emin, N and Q msn'N SatiSfy ~1' ~} (y)U~~emin,N) ~ Di(Qmin,Nl Then, fOr ~- I, for aU t,hF'N~t) ~ hNF'N~t). l I
The proof, which is an adaption of the proof to proposition 5.4 is given in appendix E.
4.3 Example
The results for the noncooperative equilibrium can again be illustrated by the example. For that
example, the game between the two countries belongs to the class of tractable games studied
by Dockner et al. (1985). In particulaz, the game is control-state separated with respect to
dynamics and objectives. This is mainly due to the simplifying assumptions of linear growth of
forests and linear damage that were made in the example. As a result, the example allows for
explicit analytical solutions of optimal paths in the cooperative case and equilibrium paths in the
game. Moreover, the equilibrium feedback solution coincides with the open-loop equilibrium
in this specific example.
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In the steady state, the Nash equilibrium values of the control values aze given as:
~F,nr - ~ } d(B(Q - 1) - r)
- ~ ~(r f c~)(r f B)
and
ê;,F,rr - X - d
y ry(r ~ cx) ~
Equilibrium time paths are given by
QN(t) - C1Ne-ac } C2Ne-BL } QF~N
2N(t) - (2p - 2F'N)C-Bt ~ 2F'N







z - .f, c (77)
with c1N - Qo - QF'N - c2N and c2 - pB~a-BF'N~. Apply proposition 5.5, 5.7 and 5.9 to
compare the Nash equilibrium with the cooperative solution or alternatively directly compare
the steady-state expressions. It follows that in Nash equilibrium, the gross emission of COz by
each country is higher than its cooperative emission ( compare equation (45) and (73)).
From the equations that define ê it is easily seen that for high discount rates the difference
between Nash equilibrium and cooperation is low. The difference is more prominent if the
natural removal of the carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is slow, as determined by a low
value of the parameter a, or if mazginal environmental damage is lazge.
From (44) and (72) it follows that for B(Q - 1) - r G 0, or equivalently Q C 1 f B, the
noncooperative steady-state harvesting of the woods is more intensive than the cooperative
harvesting. In this simple example, that holds irrespective of the initial value of a. For
Q- 1, alternatively proposition 5.9 may be applied, to find that x2 G~F'tv G~F'c and
ho ) hF'N 1 hF'c, which of course again says that harvesting is more intensive in the
noncooperative than in the cooperative steady state.
The difference between harvest in the Nash equilibrium and the cooperative solution is small
when the marginal damage in the country without forest ( which is the damage that is neglected
in (72)) is small, or when B(Q - 1) - r is small in absolute value. From equations (44) and
(72), it can be seen that forQ- 1, when the discount rate, r, a or B is small then the difference
between cooperative and noncooperative harvesting is large.
Since, for Q- 1, both harvesting and emissions aze higher in the noncooperative game the
ultimate stock of the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will be higher as well (see also equation
(C.14) and ( C.22)). Summarizing, in noncooperative equilibrium, neither player takes the
foreign damage into account in their decisions, which results in higher levels of pollution and,
for Q- 1, in lower levels of forest, as compazed to the cooperative game.
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Compaze to the game that neglects carbon sequestration. The first-order conditions and steady-
state values of the variables aze not explicitly written down for the Nash equilibrium, since
they aze variants of the cooperative equilibrium. From proposition 5.8, or a comparison of
the relevant steady-state equations for the `forest' and the `no forest' case, follows that the
steady-state stock of forests is larger when the role of forests in carbon dynamics is taken into
account than when it is not, while the equilibrium harvest rate is lower.
As in the cooperative equilibrium, due to constant marginal damage, an equilibrium in the
gross emissions case is characterized by monotone approximation of greenhouse gas stocks to
their steady-state levels.
When the sink capacity is included, so the net emissions case is considered, equilibrium growth
paths of the stock of greenhouse gases are no longer monotonic even given constant marginal
damage. The sink capacity of forests may for some time-interval turn an increasing pollution
path in a decreasing one. This sink capacity decreases, however, as forests increase and growth
rates decline. This reflects the time-buying aspect of the carbon-sequestration by forests.
5 Conclusions
A model was set up to analyse the effects for emission-reduction requirements and forest
growth when the net rather than the gross emissions of carbon dioxide from a country are
counted. When the cazbon dioxide abatement by the forests in a country is explicitly taken
into account, this implies for the world as a whole both a potential additional source of carbon
from forest harvest and a potential additional abatement opportunity from forest growth.
A comparison of cooperative optimal paths of forest harvest with net and gross emissions
shows that for a certain range of parameter values, in case of net emissions, harvest is lower
and forests are larger than when the interaction offorests with the carbon cycle is neglected. As
a result, equilibrium use offossil fuels can be higher. Similaz results follow from a comparison
of noncooperative open-loop equilibria with net and gross emissions.
These results aze stated in harvest rates and as such reflect the simplification that was made in
the modelling of forest growth and hazvest. To find precise results in terms of rotation periods,
a rotation period model would be needed. But roughly speaking, it could be said tha[ lower
harvest rates and lazger volumes aze obtained by lazger rotation periods. Then considering net
emissions implies an increase in rotation periods, which is confirmed by results from rotation
period models (see Sedjo et al., 1995).
An interesting effect here is that in the steady state both countries have higher use of fossil
fuels in the net emissions case than in the gross emissions case. Not only the country with the
forests profits in terms of welfaze from the increased carbon sequestration by its forest in the
net emissions case, but the other country as well. It would be interesting to analyse the effects
on bazgaining on emission reduction efforts. It could for instance be analysed which country
gains most from consideration of net emissions rather than gross emissions case. It seems that
it is the country without forest, since this country does not have to adjust its harvest of forest,
but may increase its use of fossil fuels.
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The usual effect, that free-rider behaviour under transboundary pollution cause noncooperative
emission levels to be higher than the global optimum, is also present when net emissions aze
counted. In the steady state, cazbon dioxide emissions under cooperation are lower than that
under noncooperation, the harvest rate is lower, the stock of forests larger and the stock of
cazbon dioxide smaller. A simple example shows that (even if inclusion of forest in the cazbon
dioxide emission reduction game does not change this general result) the interference of forest
and cazbon dynamics leads to more complex equilibrium paths.
In this chapter, harvested wood is considered to result in revenues separated from the utility
derived from energy use. An interesting extension for further research would be to include the
possibility that (some) wood is used as a substitute for fossil fuels. Tahvonen (1995) analyses
an optimal growth model that includes this option. He considers the question what is the right
way for a single country to implement an optimal carbon policy. In contrast, this chapter
focuses on what would be the optimal policy target given that forests aze important. When
wood is a substitute for fossil fuels it may be expected that the carbon abatement effect of forest
harvest is enlarged, because now additional hazvest of wood implies that less fossil fuels have
to be used. Thus it may be expected that equilibrium harvests are larger than the equilibrium
harvest which resulted in the case that was analysed here.
A Stability
The net emissions case
A steady state of the cooperative problem is saddle-point stable when the modified Hamiltonian system
that defines (Q, i, ~, ~) as a function of (Q, x, a, ~) has two eigenvalues with negative real parts and
two eigenvalues with positive real parts. The modified Hamiltonian system is found from (4), (5) and
(18), (19) with ( 16) and ( 17) inserted, to substitute for ë and h. From Feichtinger et al. (1994) it follows
that the conditions K G 0 and 0 G det(J) are sufficient, but not necessary to guarantee saddle-point
stabili[y. Here det(J) denotes the determinant of the Jacobian matrix, given by
-Q ~( ) t i i-a F i 2~ -~ -„ R„
0 F'(x) 1 - 'R" R"
2D" 0 rfa 0
fi (~~ - ~)F,~~(x) pF'(x) (r - F'(~))
and K is defined by:
-a 2~ i- 1 F~(~) ~f




K can also be written as Ii" - -a(r~ a) f U„~ ~- R;~ f cl with cl - F'(r - F') -~ ~RR~ F~~. When
cl C 0, (A.3)
it follows that K G 0. The determinant of J, is given by the rather complex expression:
-a(rfa)F'(r-F')-a(r-I-a)(Q~-W)R~~ f2D"[ R~~ F'(1-Q)(r-(1-ÍJ)F~)f U~~ (F~(r-F~)fR~, (~~-l~))~(A.4)
which can be rewritten to:
det(J) - - a(r -}- a)cl -~ 2D"[U~~cl -F R~~c2~
with c2 - (1 - ~3)F'(r -~ (Q - 1)F')
Sufficient conditions for det(J) to be nonnegative are (A.3) and
(A.5)
c2 c 0. (A.6)
For det(J) to be positive, at least one of the conditions should hold with inequality. Sufficient conditions
for saddle-point stability are then:
F'(1 - Q)(r -(1 - Q)F') C 0, (A.7)
F'(x)(r - F'(x)) G 0 (A.8)
and
(~Q - l~)F~~(~) ~ 0, (A.9)
where the first condition is equivalent to (A.6) and the latter two are sufficient for cl G 0.
Conditions (A.7), (A.8) and (A.9) are hence sufficient for saddle-point stability. When condition (A.9)
is satisfied, this implies [hat the Hamiltonian is concave, which ensures that the net present value
expressions (23) and (24) indeed describe an optimum.
The gross emissions case
The model that neglects the role of forests in carbon dynamics splits into two optimal control models.
A cooperative solution to the first one is characterized by the modified Hamiltonian system :
Q - -aQ -{- 2ë( a) (A.10)
a - (r f a).~ ~ 2D'(Q) (A.11)
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with é defined by:
U~(e) - -~. (A.12)
A steady state to this system is saddle-point stable when the Jacobian matrix, J, has a positive and a
negative eigenvalue, which is equivalent to det(J) G 0. Since det(J) is given by:
4D"
-a(r ~. a) -}- U~~ , (A.13)
this condition is satisfied. Furthermore, the steady state is uniquely defined by





Hence, the unique steady state (QNF, éi`'F) is always saddle-point stable, given the assumptions made
in section 2.
The second model has the modified Hamiltonian system:
i - F(x) - h(~)
~ - (r - F'(x))~e





The Jacobian maMx tha[ belongs to this system is given by de[(J) - F'(x)(r - F'(x)) - F~~R, R~ h
Any steady state is defined by:
F(x) - h(~,) (A.19)
and
Í~(r - F'(x)) - fi (A.20)
Since F"(x) G 0 and R"(h) G 0, these two equations have at most three solutions, denoted by xl,
x2 and xT, with xl and x2 characterized by ~c - 0 and xr by F'(xr) - r. For the steady states
x~ and x2, ~C - 0, so that these aze defined by R'(h) - 0. This implies that in those steady states,
det(J)- F'(x)(r - F'(x)). Denote h such that R'(h) - 0 by ho. Since the equation F(x) - ho has
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two solutions, let xl be defined by F(xl) - ho and F'(xl) ~ 0, while x2 is defined by F(x2) - ho
and F'(xz) C 0. Then in the steady state (xl, ho), ho ~ hr implies that F'(xl) , r, so that det(J)G 0,
while in the steady state (x2, ho) det(J)G 0 follows from F'(x) G 0 immediately. These steady states
are both saddle-point stable. For i- xr, det(J)- - RR~. From hr ~ ho, R'(hr) ~ 0 and hence
det(J)~ 0. From trace(J)- r ~ 0, it then follows that in the neighbourhood of (xr, hr), the system is
uns[able.
From a consideration of the phase diagram it can be seen that for x(0) 1 xl, the optimal convergent
path converges to i- x2. Along the path, h(t) - ho, while x(t) follows as the solution of
i - F(x) - ho (A.21)
with x(0) as the initial value. For z(0) G xl, an optimal convergent path converges to xl and this path
is characterized by h(t) G ho. That implies that ~,(t) ~ 0 along this path.
B Proofs to the propositions
Proof to proposition 5.1
From equations ( 16) and ( 25) it follows that é is defined by U'(é) - -a - z~á~ for both the
case of net and the case of gross emissions. To prove this proposition define a function g(Q) by
g(Q) - U'-1( 2D~ Q ). That is, g(Q) gives the level of fossil fuel use, e, that satisfies U'(e) - 2D Q.r}a r}a
Take the derivative ofboth sides of this expression to find g'(Q)- r}áDa~~ 9 Q . From the assumptions
follows then g'(Q) G 0.
The stationary level of fossil fuel use in the forest model (the case of net emissions) is de6ned by (see
(25) to (28)): éF - g(QF) with QF - á[2éF f hF(1 - ,Q)J, while in the gross emissions case the
stationary level of fossil fuel use is defined by: éNF - g(QNF) ~,~,i~ QNF - á[2é1`'F]. Or, inserting
for é, QF - á[2g(QF) } hF! 1 -~)] and QNF - á[2g(QNF)]. From h 7 0 and Q C 1 then follows
that QF ~ QNF which provles the proposition, since from g'(Q) G O it fOllOws that éF ~ éNF 1S
equivalent t0 QF G QNF
Proof to proposition 5.2
Remember that xl G xr G xz denote the three steady states of the model with gross emissions.
Furthermore, ho is the steady-state harvest rate that belongs to x 1 and z 2, and that is given by R'( ho)- 0,
while hr - F(xr ) is the s[eady-state harvest rate that belongs to xr. Consider the set of equations (25)
to (28), (16) and (17) that are necessary conditions for a stationary solution to the cooperative problem.
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Insert (26) and (25) in (17) and use Q- 1, to find that for gross emissions:
R~(h) - 2D}Q) r - F'(x)
(B.1)
This equation then defines the steady-state harvest rate together with (16), (27) and (28). Since
F"(x) G 0, equation h- F(i) has at most two solutions for any given h in the range of F(x) (that is,
for any 0 C h G F(xh)), a solution with a positive and a solution with a negative value for F'(x).
First restrict attention to the set {x~F'(x) ) 0}. Consider a possible hF which is larger [han ho. This
implies that R'(hF) G 0, so that ( B.1) is only satisfied for F'(x) ~ r. From ho G hr and F"(x) G 0,
this implies that such a steady state is characterized by: xl G i G xr. The steady state is given as the
solution of:
R~(h) -~~~(Q) r . F(i) - h; and F'(i) ~ 0 (B.2)r~a r-F'(x)
Note that there may exist more than one solution ( or none) to this set of equations.
A possible hF smaller than ho cannot exist. Such a steady state would imply R'(h) ~ 0, which would
require that F'(x) G r. That would again require [hat h~ hr, since F"(x) G 0, which contradicts
hGho.
Now consider the set {x ~ F'(x ) G 0}. Again consider a possible hF which is larger than ho. This implies
that R'(hF) G 0, so that (B.1) is only satisfied for F'(~) 1 r. That cannot be true for F'(x) G 0.
Hence, no steady state with h~ ho exists.
A possible hF which is smaller than ho implies that R'(h) ~ 0. Equation (B.1) then leads to: F'(i) G r.
This is always true for F'(x) G 0. Hence there exists a steady state with h G ho and F'(x) G 0. From
ho G hF and F"(x ) G 0, it follows that this steady state is characterized by: x2 G i. The steady state
is given as the solution of:
R~(h) - 2D~(Q)
r




Note that, given F'(x) - 0 for some x - xh, there always exists exactly one solution to this set of
equations. This follows since R'(h) is strictly decreasing in h, r-F,~x h 1 ts strictly increasing in h,
when x(h) is defined by F(x) - h and F'(x) G 0 and finally R'(h) and 2D~ r-F,~~~h 1 can be shown
to cross each other.
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Proof to proposition 5.3
The localization of possible steady states follows from a similaz reasoning as in the previous section.
However, now the correct equations to consider are:
2D'(Q) r ~- (Q - I)F'(x)
R'(h) - r -F a r- F'(i) '
F(i) - h,
and




Note that for F'(x) G 0, r f(~ - I)F'(x) G 0 whenever p ~ 1- F;~xl. For F'(x) ~ 0, given ~3 1 1,
r~(Q - 1)F'(x) is always positive. It follows that for F'(x) G 0, the right-hand side of equation
(B.6) is positive for ~3 G 1-~ and negative for p~ 1-~. Moreover, for r) F'(x) ~ 0, this
right-hand side is positive and for F'(x) ~ r, this right-hand side is negative for all Q 1 1.
Now try to solve for (B.6) and (B.7) with F'(x) ) 0. A solution with h G ho must have F'(i) 1 r
which implies that the right-hand side of equa[ion (B.6) is negative. This contradicts h G ho, hence
such a solution cannot exist. A solution with h ~ ho may be characterized by F'(i) ~ r as well, when
ho G h G h'. In that case, both sides of equation (B.6) are negative and such a steady state may exist.
The steady state is then characterized by: ho G h G hr and x1 G i G xr. Trying a solution with
h~ hr again leads to a contradiction.
Similarly, try to solve for (B.6) and (B.7) with F'(x) G 0. For small enough ~3, that is for ~3 G 1- F.,rT ,
the right-hand side of equation ( B.6) is positive and any solution h must satisfy R'(h) ~ 0. Hence it
can be concluded that a steady state may exist that is characterized by: h G ho and i~ x2. For large
Q, Q ~ 1- F;i , any solution h must be characterized by R'(h) G 0. It then follows that a steady state
may exist with: h ~ ho and xr G i G x2.
Proof to proposition 5.4
First define Qmin ~d em`n such that:
(r ~ a)U'(emin) G 2D'(Qmin) (B.9)
This cequires Qmin ~d e min to be large enough. From (B.9) it follows that aU'(em'n) G 2D'(Qmin)
Then, assume that em`n G e(t ), that Q(t) ~ Qm`n, that 0 ~ h(t) and that 0 G x(t) G xmax, with xmax
defined by F(xmax) - 0. Remember that in proposition 5.4 (3 - I.
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In the gross emissions case, the cooperative solution is hNF(t) - ho. Reasoning backward, it will be
derived now that hF(t) G ho for all t, if hF satisfies hF G ho.
Assume hence that hF G ho and suppose that hF(t) - ho for some t - t'. Then it can be shown
that aU~(e(t')) G 2D~(Q(t`)): For e(t`) 1 emin ~d Q(t.) ~ Qmin U~(e(t')) G U~(emin) and
D'(Q(t')) 1 D'(Qmin), so that condition (B.9) is sufficient for aU'(e(t')) - 2D'(Q(t')) to be
negative for all e(t`) ~ emin Q(t") ~ ~1min
From equation (41), if aU'(e(t')) - 2D~L'(Q(t')) G 0 and hF(t`) - ho, then hF(t`) 1 0. Hence, if it
can be proved that eF(t) ) em`n and QF(t) ) Qmin for all t, then if h - ho for some t", it follows
that hF ~ 0. Reasoning backward then, it follows that íf hF(t) `comes close to' ho, it will decrease
and stay below ho.
Summarizing, provided that eF(t) ~ emin and QF(t) ) Qmin where Qmin and em'n satisfy (B.9), it
Can be prOVed that hF(t) G hNF(t).
To prove that xF(t) ~ xNF(t), reason forward. It is given that xF(0) - xNF(0) - x(0). Use
d(t) - xNF(t) - xF(t) and take its time derivative, d(t) - F(xNF(t)) - F(xF(t)) f hF(t) - hNF(t).
Use hF(t) G hNF(t) which was just proved to see that d(0) G 0. Suppose that d(t) - 0 for some
t- t'. Then again use hF(t) G hNF(t) to see that d(t") G 0 also. It follows that d(t) G 0 for all
t~ 0, which is equivalent to xF(t) ~ xNF(t).
C Algebra in the example




d.~~dt - (r f a)a f 2d
d~~dt - -QaB -{- (r ~ B)~.
Steady-state values of the variables for the case of net emissions:











(r .{- a)(r ~ B)
and
yF - d- 1 ~ 2d(B(Q - 1) - r)
B B[~i -(r f a)(r f B)~i ]~
The modified Hamiltonian system can be written as dV~dt - JV f W with V' -[Q ~ a~,],




~ -B 1 1- ~G ~
0 0 T~a 0
0 0 -,QB T~B
W' - [( ~ - Qb f ~) ; (b - ~); 2d; 0].
Steady-state values of variables for the gross emissions case are:














Finally, the steady-state values of the Nash equilibrium solution under net emissions aze given by:
1~ 2X d(B(Q - 1) - r) 2dQF.N-a[~(1-A)~ 7 f(1-Q),~(r-~a)(rtB)-7(rfa)] (c.22)
~t'F'N - -d z - f ~(r -F a)' '
i FN - -QBd
Fr -(r f a)(r f B)
, i- f, c
and
yF,N - b- 1 ~ d(B(p - 1) - r)
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D Nonnegativity constraints for the example
For the functional fonns chosen in the example, some nonnegativity constraints must be laid on the
parameters in those functions. Else, the variables could possibly take values with no economic meaning.
In this appendix, these constraints are derived.
First consider the case of a cooperative solution in the gross emissions case. The steady-state values
of the variables are then given by equations (C.18) to (C.21) and (50) and (51). It should hold that the




2d C X(r ~ a)
(D.1)
(D.2)
The latter condition also guarantees that the stationary rate of fossil fuel use given in (51) is nonnegative.
Second consider the case of a cooperative solution to a model that incorporates the cazbon sequestration
by forests, that is, the net emissions case. The steady-state values of the variables are then given by
equations (C.14) to (C.17) and (44) and (45). Nonnegativity of the variables is satisfied if the following
conditions hold
2d G X(r ~- a)
2d(r ~ B(1 - Q)) C~(r f a)(r f B)





2d[(a -1)(r f B(1- A)) - y (r ~ B)] ? (r ~ a)(r -~ B)(~(Q -1) - 2yX ) (D.6)
For the Nash equilibrium case, similar conditions can be derived. These are for the case of gross
emissions:
d C X(r f a) (D.7)
and
~ C b (D.8)
~ -
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For the case of net emissions, the nonnegativity conditions are:
dCx(rfa)
d(r f B(1 -~3)) G~(r -~ a)(r f B)





d[(Q -1)(r f B(1- Q)) - 7(r f B)1 ?(r f~)(r f B)(~(Q -1) -~yX ) (D.12)
E The noncooperative equilibrium
Stability
For stability analysis of the open-loop Nash equilibrium, we use results ofHaurie and Leitmann and refer
to Hí;míilíiinen, Haurie and Kaitala (1985), for more details on these results. The results of Haurie and
Leitmann give sufficient conditions for the global asymptotic stability of a steady state. The conditions
require certain matrixes to be negative definite. Since multiple steady states cannot be excluded, we
have to restrict this stability to hold only for initial values that lie in specific subsets. Thus separately
considerthe intervals [O,xl) (xl x') (x' xz) and (xz oo)
First consider the model that neglects carbon sequestration. This model can be split up in two models,
like in the cooperative case. For the first model, a stationary equilibrium is defined by (E.15), (E.16)
and (E.18) together with (E.7) and (E.11). A sufficient condition for the stationary point of this model
to be stable is:
4rz C-~~~~Q~ for all nonzero (e`,Q), for ix,f. (E.1)
This condition ensures that the relevant maMces are negative definite.
For the second model, a stationary equilibrium is defined by (E.14), (E.17) and (E.19) together with
(E.8). Sufficient conditions for the stationary points to be stable are then:
~~ ~ 0 (E.2)
4rz c R"(h)~~ forallnonzero(h,x). (E.3)
The first condition is equivalent to h C ho and hence restricts the range from which to choose h. This
implies that for x(0) E(xl, xz), when it would be an equilibrium choice to have h 1 ho, paths cannot
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be ensured to converge.
For the model that includes carbon sequestration, sufficient conditions for stability are:
{c~ - Qa~ ~ 0 (E.4)
„ 1 1 1 2
D( R~~ }(j~~ ) f 4r
C 0
4r2Rii f(4T2 f Dn)(4r2 - Rii(F~~ -~a~)) ~ 0
Equilibrium conditions for gross emissions
In a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, the following conditions must be satisfied:
U'(ef ) - -af
R'(h) - ~~
af - (r ~ a)~t f ~~(Q)
~f - (T - F'(~))F~~
and
U'(e`) -F a` - 0
~` - (r -1- a)a` ~- ~'(Q)
N` - (r - F'(~))F~`

















~f - 0 or ~cf - R'(hr) (E.17)
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(E.18)
~` - 0 or ~` - R'(hr) (E.19)
Proof to proposition 5.9
From proposition 5.5:
éF,N ) éF,O (E.20)
This is equivalent to U'(éF~N ) G U'(éF'c) or ~;,F,N 1~F,c Since Q- I, the stationary rate ofharvest
is given by the two equations




both in the Nash equilibrium and in the Cooperative optimum.
From propositions 5.2 and 5.8, it is known that steady states either have xl G xF G ar or xz G xF
both in the Coopera[ive and in the Nash equilibrium.
Consider solutions to (E.21) that have az G áF for both types ofequilibria. These solutions are relevant
for large enough initial value of x. Then F'(iF) G 0. It will be proved by contradiction that
hF'N ~ hF'c (E.23)
Assume that
~tF'N G itF,C (E.24)
That would imply iF,N , xF,c ~is in tum implies that 0 G r-F;li~ G r-F~ Combined
~,i~ ~:,F,N ~~F,c ~at results in rF~~j G r-F- ,~~ G r-~. From (E.22) then follows
that R'(hF.N) G R'(hF~c). This is equivalent to hF~"' ~ hF~c which contradicts the assumption
that hF'N G hF,c Thus it must hold that hF~l`' 1 hF~c since the reverse assumption results in a
contradiction.
So for Q - 1,
2z G 2F'N G iF'c and ho ~ hF'N 1 itF~C (E.25)
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In the main text it was derived that for small initial values of x, such that xl G iF'N G x' and
xl G iF,C G xr it cannot be said whether xN 1 xc or vice versa.
This neglects the possibility that under the Nash equilibrium, the value of i is in another interval
than under the cooperative equilibrium. There are two possible equilibria then: iF'N ) x2 while
xl G iF'c G xr and the reverse case. For iF'N ~ xz hF'N G ho. Since xl G iF~c G x' implies that
hF'c 1 ho, then we have the possible equilibrium:
xl G iF'C G xr G x2 G iF'N and hF'N G ho G hF'c
The reverse case results in:
xl G xF,N G xr G x2 G iF'c and hF'C G ho G hF,N
(E.26)
(E.27)
However, gíven equal initial values, it seems not so likely that one of these two equilibria would occur.
Proof to proposition 5.10
The proof is analogous to the proof for proposition 5.4, but should be adjusted, since the forest country
only includes home damage. Thus adjust condition B.9 and define Qmin,N and em;n,N such thar
(r ~ ~)Ui(emin,lV) G D'(Qmin,N) (E.2ó)
Furthermore, instead of (41), the following growth rate should be used:
hF'N R'(h) , aU'(e) - D'(Q)
hF,N - R,~(h)h(r - F(x)) f R"(h)h
(E.29)
which is obtained from differentiation of (58), inserting (59) and (60). Then, the proof is obtained
through the same reasoning as given in the proof for proposition 5.4.
Chapter 6
Strategic trade and transboundary
pollution: a dynamic model
This chapter analyses the interaction between international rivalry and transboundary pollution. Trade
is modelled as oligopolistic competition between firms. Govemments are assumed to be interested
both in high profits for domestic firms and in low domestic environmental damage. As a result there is
strategic interaction between firms, between govemments and between firms and govemments.
A differential game model is used to analyse a duopoly, with each competitor situated in a different
country. If governments impose the strict policy they prefer from an environmental point of view,
this might harm domestic firms too much and decrease their profits substantially. It is assumed that
govemments do not want this, since they have a preference for high profits to be earned at home. This
leads to downward distor[ions in environmental policy. Transboundary pollution is another source of
distortions. This chapter analyses these distortions for the policy ins[rurr ~~~' ~ taxes and standards.
1 Introduction
Transboundary pollution implies that emissions originating in one country cause environmental
damage in another country. If regulators only care about damage in their own coun[ry, then
pollution in other countries is no incentive for these regulators to adjust their environmental
policy. From the point ofview of all countries, environmental policies are too lax when national
regulators neglect damage abroad that is due to domestic emissions. If the countries cooperate,
they impose stricter regulations (See for example, Míiler, 1989).
Competition between domestic and foreign firms in an oligopolistic market is a second reason
for governments to distort environmental policy. Distortions in environmental policies may
namely act as commitment devices for firms and give them a strategic advantage towards
their competitors. The phenomenon that governments set laxer environmental policy for trade
strategic reasoas is called `environmental dumping' (See Rauscher (1996)).
136 Strategic trade and transboundary pollution
With transboundary pollution, countries may have an even stronger incentive for environmental
dumping. Foreign emissions add to domestic pollution levels, and a strict environmental policy
at home might increase the market shaze of foreign relatively dirty firms, or lead to home firms
relocating to areas with laxer environmental policy. In this way the condition of the environment
may be made even worsel.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse why and in what direction governments distort their
environmental policies if both [ransboundary pollution and strategic trade are present. Gov-
ernments are assumed to have an interest to improve the position of their home firms, but also
a desire for a good environmental quality. They must strike a balance between these aims. A
comparison is made between the resulting distortions in the policy instruments emission taxes
and emission standazds.
Trade is modelled as international competition between two firms, each located in a different
country. These firms produce output, which they sell on the international mazket. They use a
polluting input in their production processes.
Only pollution related to production processes is considered. Another type of pollution is
related to products. These products cause pollution in the country where they aze consumed
and disposed of and not in the country that produces them. This type of pollution is left out
of consideration. Trade policies, for instance import restrictions for products that have been
produced through a polluting process, are ignored too. This type ofpolicies might conflict with
free trade agreements. However, a change is observed, because such agreements now tend to
take environmental concerns into account (See for instance the discussion on NAFTA by Esty,
1994).
A dynamic model is used to describe a firm that can invest in production with less pollution
and save production costs with that investment. By assumption, once the firm has invested in
abatement, it has gained a competitive advantage. But without environmental policy, the net
present value of such an investment is negative. Therefore, in the absence of environmental
policy, the firm would not invest in abatement. For an analysis that includes the possibility that
this net present value is positive, see Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1997). The assumption that
investment in abatement is rewazding (though not so rewarding that firms invest voluntarily)
is made to incorporate the idea that a reduction in emissions usually implies a more efficient
production in the sense of less inputs per unit of output. Due to this assumption the model differs
from Kennedy (1994), where abatement is a pure cost to firms. A formulation comparable to
ours is used in Kort (1994), Ulph and Ulph (1996) and Ulph (1994). The latter two papers use
a multistage game, while Kort considers abatement investment in a dynamic model as a flow
rather than a stock vaziable.
Compared to a multistage game, a full dynamic analysis in a differential game model is
interesting, because it allows for the analysis of different equilibria, with strategies that differ
in the degree of commitment, which is the key aspect of the effect on strategic interaction. The
feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is a type of equilibrium that describes a plausible situation.
An equivalent equilibrium in a multistage model does not exist. Furthermore, in a dynamic
~ In the context of global warming, this is also referred to as 'carbon leakage'.
2 Transboundary pollution 137
game model the behaviour of players at all points in time can be analysed, rather than just the
steady state.
First a formalization of transboundary pollution is given in section 2. Then, section 3 describes
the motives that may lead regulators to distort environmental policy from its socially optimal
level in a situation with transboundary pollution and international competition. A differential
game model is formulated in section 4 to describe the decision problems faced by firms and
regulators. The next section, 5, discusses three scenazios, respectively a situation of full
cooperation, a situation with a cooperative government that regulates competing firms and
a situation where both firms and regulators compete on the international market. Section 6
concludes the chapter.
2 ZYansboundary pollution
Transboundary pollution is an important aspect of the analysis in this paper. Since for a lot
of environmental problems eventually stocks of accumulated pollution cause environmental
damage, ideally environmental objectives should be s[ated in terms of these stocks2. Here,
for simplicity reasons, it is assumed that the objectives can be stated in terms of flows of
pollution. That is, it is assumed that the regulators in each country, i, have an environmental
damage function, D'(.), to value deposition at a given time. Marginal damage is assumed to
be non-decreasing in depositions, D`~~(. )) 0. Countries that value pollution differently or that
differ in natural chazacteristics have different damage functions.
The following linear equation is used to formalize the dispersion of emissions over the countries
(see for example Mi;ler, 1989). Let depositions in country i be given by P', emissions from
the firm in country i by e', and emissions from the firm in country j by e~, then
P'-Q"e`fQ'~e~ (1)
where pollution from elsewhere is abstracted away. Q`~ is an element of a transportation matrix
and denotes the percentage ofemissions from one country that is deposited in the other country.
Given one unit of emissions in country j, a fraction Q`~ of it is deposited in country i and ~3~~
stays in country j. It is assumed that Q`~ f ,Q~~ C 1, since some of the pollution may go to
a third country. This lineaz formulation contains a number of scenazios. For instance, in the
absence of transboundary pollution, when pollution is purely local, Q`~ - Q~` - 0. This case is
shortly mentioned in section 5, where it is compared with the case of transboundary pollution.
2 See for example van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) for a dynamic analysis with environmental damage from
stocks.
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3 Reasons to distort policy
Pigou concluded that it is optimal for regulators to set environmental policy such that marginal
social costs aze equated to mazginal social benefits (Pigou, 1932). The standard analysis
of environmental policy instruments is in a closed economy setting. In a framework where
economies interact, several effects may cause distortions in environmental policy.
In the literature3 distortions that are due to transboundary pollution and distortions that have to
do with trade and international competition can be found. In case of transboundazy pollution
a prisoner dilemma type of game is played among governments with the common objective
of a clean environment, but the competing objectives of low abatement costs. Free-rider
incentives cause governments to set laxer-than-optimal policies and to neglect their influence
on depositions in the other coun[ry. When trade is characterized by oligopolistic competition
between domestic and foreign firms, international rivalry may lead countries to reduce the
severity of their environmental policies, as a substitute for tariffs and other trade policy.
The last effect may be relatively small in case of local pollution, for the government that
`misuses' its environmental policy for trade strategic reasons has to pay for this with more
environmental damage. In case of transboundary pollution, however, the distorting effect is
strengthened. The additional damage is partly deposited in foreign countries and hence is
neglected by the home country, while a decrease in foreign output decreases home damage. So
transboundazy pollution and trade stra[egic considerations are interdependent reasons to distort
environmental policy from the level that is optimal from the point of view of all countries
together.
These reasons for distortion will be sorted out in more detail below and given a number for
later reference. First, the reasons connected with transboundary pollution are the following:
a first reason for distortion is that countries only take local damage into account. Damage
abroad is a part of global social costs, but not reckoned as such by a national government. This
leads to a too lax environmental policy (1). Another distortion occurs, since countries want to
shift costs of pollution reduction to other countries. If the state of the environment influences
the decisions of the other country, a bad environment may stimulate foreign countries to more
abatement. That may lead countries to set [oo lax a policy, wi[h efforts of the others partly
offsetting the distortion in environmental policy. This second distortion is absent in the analysis
below, because here the valuation of damage is related to flows of pollution rather than stocks.
Second, consider the reasons for distortion that are due to imperfect competition. If domestic
firms compete with foreign firms, there is reason for strategic distortion of environmental
policy, since the choices of foreign firms can be indirectly influenced by domestic policy. A lax
environmental policy in the home country stimulates domestic production, partially at the cost
of foreign production. So some output is shifted from abroad (while total output increases). As
a result, profits of the home firm increase. Three reasons for distortion can be distinguished.
First, since governments want to shift rents from foreign to domestic firms, they distort their
environmental policy (2). The type of distortion depends on the structure of the output mazket.
In this chapter, we restrict our analysis to Cournot competition, and environmental policy is
3Part of this literature is reviewed in the introdactory chapter 1.
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distorted downwards. An extension [o Bertrand competition is straightforward (See Bazrett,
1994) and would imply upward distortion in environmental policy. Second, countries want to
reduce environmental damage from abroad, hence they want to discourage production abroad.
This is another reason to set their own policy too lax (3). Finally, countries do not take into
account that a decrease in their own firm's output (and profits) increases the profitability of
the foreign firm's production. This is the usual effect of oligopoly. If the firms would form
a caztel and cooperate they could earn more profits. Given the objective function, that would
be welfare improving4. In short, governments overestimate the total (global) social marginal
costs of emission reductions by their home firm and set policy too lax (4). These 4 reasons
for distortion will be present in the analysis below. They all point into the direction of a
laxer environmental policy than is socially optimal from the point of view of the two countries
togeiher.
When consumer surplus is explicitly taken into account, an additional distortion can be distin-
guished. In case of oligopolistic competition, consumers favour increased output and hence
lax environmental policies. Since the model below abstracts from consumer surplus a good
discussion of this effect is not possible. In the conclusions we come back to the implications
thereof.
Transboundary pollution is for instance analysed by Conrad (1993), Katsoulacos et al. (1996),
Kennedy (1994) and van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992). Distortions due to trade policy
objectives are the subject of a large number of papers (for example, Barrett (1994), Conrad
(1993), Katsoulacos et al. (1996), D.Ulph (1994)). A good overview is provided by A.Ulph
(1994). Consumer surplus is included for example by Kennedy (1994) and Ulph (1996a).
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In this section a differential game model is formulated to analyse the distortions mentioned
above. The model describes two countries with home firms that compete with each other
on a world market. Governments are assumed to set environmental policy to maximize an
objective function that values firm profits and reductions in the environmental damage caused
by the emissions from that firm and its foreign competitor. Consumer surplus is neglected,
that is, it is assumed that the largest part of the consumers is located outside the two countries.
Two environmental policy instruments are discussed: a tax and an emission standazd. Both
countries are assumed to apply the same environmental policy instrument. Firms aze modelled
as profit maximizers. They compete with each other on the market for outputs. The analysis
below is only a partial analysis. Effects on other sectors of the economy are left out, as well as
adjustments in other than environmental policies. To sum up, firms decide on their output and
investments in emission reduction and govemments decide on environmental policy.
40f course, usually consumer surplus is also included into welfare so that cartels are not better than oligopolies
from a welfare point of view. In the curren[ setting the governments are solely considering environmental damage
and firm profits.
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Investment decisions differ from decisions on environmental policy and output, because their
effects last longer. Investment builds a capital stock, that affects future profits, while output
and environmental policy decisions only influence the current period.
A country's government by assumption acts as a Stackelberg leader vis a vis the firm in its
country. This is taken here to mean that the government's decisions at some point in time
are given to the firm, when it has to take its decisions. It is more reasonable to assume
that the firm knows the decision of the government and takes this as given, than the reverse.
Reasons for that are the higher degree of openness and publicity of government decisions when
compared to firm decisions. Furthermore, the government can bind itself with the help of
laws. The length of the period of credible commitment for the government however, is an open
question. It depends on the practise of law setting and the reputation of the government. If
the government is able to change its policy quickly and can commit for only a short period, a
feedback equilibrium is the proper equilibrium concept. This results in a solution that consists
of strategies that are contingent on the situation at hand. The equilibrium strategies are time
consistent and subgame perfect. If the government can commit for a long period, it is more
appropriate to apply an open-loop equilibrium. Note that the structure of multistage models
such as analysed in Kennedy (1994) and Ulph and Ulph (1996) is similar to a dynamic game
model with an open-loop structure. In these settings, the government sets its policy once and
for all and cannot react to firm decisions.
It is assumed that firms set output according to a feedback strategy. That is, firms' commitment
to their output decisions is assumed to be short. They can adjust their rate of output instanta-
neously without adjustment costs. This is an abstraction, but compared to investment decisions
it seems reasonable to assume that it is easy to adjust output plans. If the investment decisions
of firms are rigid and require long term commitments, firms could be modelled to compete in
an open-loop equilibrium. If investment strategies can adjust quickly, firms' competition could
be modelled by a feedback equilibrium. Here, both possibilities are considered.
The interaction between governments of different countries and the competition between firms
is modelled as a(Cournot) Nash equilibrium. If countries can commit their policies for a long
period, an open-loop Nash equilibrium in environmental policies between the two governments
results. If not, the equilibrium is a feedback Nash equilibrium in environmental policies.
Similarly, if firms apply feedback strategies for output and investment, a feedback equilibrium
results, while if they apply open-loop investment strategies, the resulting equilibrium is open-
loop in investment and feedback in output.
The interaction between a government and a fim~ is more complicated. At each point in time,
each government is by assumption a Stackelberg leader for the firms, because the firms take
the decisions of governments as given when they decide on output and investment rates. But
the stock of abatement capital influences government decisions if the government applies a
feedback strategy. The firm takes these inHuences into account, so that its investment decisions
are affected by the effect that changes in the capital stock have on government regulation.
Following Ba~ar and Olsder (1995, proposition 7.7, p.418), the equilibrium solution is called
a feedback Stackelberg solution as regards the interaction between a government and a firm, if
firms and governments use feedback decision strategies.
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If governments use open-loop decision strategies, the equilibrium is called an open-loop
Stackelberg solution (cf. Ba~ar and Olsder, 1995, p.410). In that case, governments decide
on a time path for their environmental policy, taking into account the effect on the equilibrium
investment strategies. The firms take government policy as given in their decisions.
The third possibility, where firms use open-loop investment strategies and governments use
feedback strategies, is not consistent with the assumption that the firm knows the environmental
policy before it takes its decisions, at each point in time.
For consistency, a government that uses open-loop strategies in the game with firms, is also
assumed to be in open-loop equilibrium with the other country. If governments use feedback
strategies in the game with firms, then they aze assumed to be also in feedback equilibrium
with the other country. Analogous consistency requirements hold for firms.
Hence, several equilibria exist, depending on the type of strategies assumed to be relevant for
the decision vaziables output, investment and environmental policy. As mentioned output is
always set according to a feedback strategy. For investment and environmental policy, the case
where both follow open-loop strategies and the case where both follow feedback strategies are
considered. The following section (section 4.1) first presents a formal model of the firm and the
regulator. Then in section 5 three benchmazk solutions are discussed, one where the two firms
are a cartel and the governments cooperate, another where firms compete but governments
cooperate and a third where both firms and governments compete. In each case both countries
are assumed to apply the same environmental policy instrument. But countries may differ in
the strictness of their policy.
4.1 A duopoly model
Consider a firm i that maximizes profits from exports over an infinite time horizon. Let
its production capacity be fixed to focus on the adjustment of technology to environmental
requirements. For production of output, x', the firm uses a polluting input, e`. The world
market price per unit of this input is pe. Environmental policy as faced by the firm is a tax, r',
on the use of the polluting input e'. Alternatively, a standard on emissions, in the form of a
maximum, é', on the use of the polluting input is considered.
The environmental friendliness of the production process is summazized by a vaziable A',
referred to as`abatement capital' . If the firm owns a stock A` of abatement capital and wants to
produce x` of output, it needs to use e` - E(A`)x` of the polluting input. Hence it is assumed
that the firm needs a fixed amount of E(A) per unit of output. This amount can be reduced if
the firm, through investment in abatement technology, increases its stock of abatement capital:
E'(A) G 0. It follows that aA'ái, - E'(A) G 0. That is, more abatement capital decreases the
amount of emissions, e', required per additional unit of output.
Furthermore, consider the output that can be produced with a given level of polluting input,
~'(e', A') - E A , . The marginal productivity of abatement capital, xA,(e', A') --ÉE~ A~ is- ~ ) (A')
positive. It is assumed that xA, is decreasing in A`, so iA,A, G 0.
Abatement capital can be accumulated by investment I` at a cost of C`(I'). Investment costs
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aze increasing and convex, C'~ ) 0 and C'~~ ) 0. Abatement capital grows according to a
standard capital accumulation function:
A' - I` - ó'A` (2)
Here ó' denotes aconstant depreciation rate. Revenues are denoted by R` ( x`, x' ). The firm sells
output ~' on the world market where it has to compete with firm j's output x~. Let subscripts
denote partial derivatives. It is assumed that R'~ C 0, R;~ G 0, R;; c 0 and R`~~ - O5.
These assumptions imply that revenues decrease if competing output increases, and marginal
revenues decrease in own and foreign output, while the marginal effect of foreign output does
not change with foreign capital stocks. The firm's profits in the case of taxes reads:
II` - R'(x', x') -(p` f r`)e' - C'(I') (3)
From revenues, the firm must subtract the costs of the polluting input, e`, and costs of investment
in abatement, C'(I'). In the case of emission standards, profits are similarly defined except
that the firm does not have to pay emission taxes.
The mazginal change in profits due to an additional unit of abatement capital will be called
MBA', this is the derivative ofII' to A', áÁ, , wtth output at its equilibrium level. The following
regularity condition is assumed to hold for all scenarios that are discussed in section 5:
BMBA' BMBA~ ~ aMBA' BMBA~ (4)
8A' 8A~ aA~ 8Ai
This condition requires that own effects of abatement capital dominate cross effects. It ensures
that open-loop equilibria exist.
The optimization problem faced by the firm can be summarized as follows. It has to decide on
strategies for its output and investment to maximize its discounted stream of profits, given the
capital accumulation function (2) and environmental policy. In case of taxes, this results in:
~
max r e-rc~R`(~t, ~') -(P` f r')E(A')~` - C'(I')]dtr'~0,1'~0 JO
(5)
s.t. .9' - I` - ó'A' (6)
Here r is the rate of discount that is assumed to be equal for firms and governments. In case of
standards, a similar optimization problem results, but then r` - 0 and the following constraint
on emissions is added:
e` C é` (~)
Whether environmental policy is binding depends on the world mazket price for e`. If this
Se.g. R' - p(x', x~ )x', with p a linear decreasíng function of x' and x~ has this characteristics.
sIf environmenta] taxes are redistributed in a lump sum way, this increases the level of profits, but it will not
change the decisions taken by firms.
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is high enough, then in equilibrium firms would not emit more than the standard anyway.
Here, it is assumed that prices are such that without government intervention, firms do not
invest in emission reduction and the environmental standard is a binding constraint on their
behaviour. A sufficient condition for zero investment in abatement without environmental
policy is that the user costs of capital exceed the marginal private benefits of additional capital
at A` - 0. Let x'o denote the Nash equilibrium output for A' - A~ - 0. The mazginal
private benefits of additional capital consist of reductions in factor costs,-peE'(0)x'o, and of
a strategic advantage, R'~xÁ;, since foreign output is discouraged. This last term, which has
a positive sign, is due to commitment effects. A larger capital stock provides firm i with a
strategic advantage. This results in less output for firm j and hence higher revenues for firm i.
The condition reads:
(r f b')C`~(0) ~ -peE'(0)x'o ~ R'~xA, (8)
which assures that A` - A~ - 0 is an equilibrium steady state. A formal proof is given in
appendix A. Given this condition it is not optimal for a firm to invest in emission reduction,
given that current levels of abatement capital are zero for both firms and no environmental
policy is applied. It is assumed that condition (8) holds for all t for both firms and that at t-0
both firms have no abatement capital installed due to lack of environmental policy until that
time.
The regulator has to set taxes or standards such that they balance firm objectives, II', against
environmental objectives as summarized by the damage function D`(P'). The regulator's
current welfare is then:
G' - R'(x`, x~) - p`e` - C'(I') - D`(P`) (9)
In case of taxes, its intertemporal decision problem is given by:
r~
max J e-'t[R'(x' x') - p`e' - C'(I') - D'(P`)~dt (10)T~ o
s.t. 1', x', I', x' from firm behaviour' ( I 1)
The government redistributes tax revenues in a lump sum way. In contrast to the firm it
takes environmental damage into account. In the case of emission standazds, the government
optimizes its objective function with respect to the level of standazds, é`.
Mazginal social damage and mazginal social benefits can now be defined. Both aze defined
per unit of emissions and for given levels of abatement capital. ` Social' here means from the
macro economic point of view of the two countries together. Mazginal social damage of one
unit of polluting input used by firm i consists of marginal damage due to depositions ,Q"e' in
country i and marginal damage due to depositions Q~'e' in country j.
MD' - D'~~" ~- D~~~3J' (12)
~This is used as a shorthand for the equilibrium values of (5) to (6).
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Marginal social (net) benefits of one unit of input used by firm i are determined by the amount
of output, 1~E(A') that is produced with this unit. It consists of the marginal revenues to
country i plus the (negative) marginal revenues to country j minus marginal production costs,
i.e. the price pe of one unit.
MB` - E,(Á~)[R; f R;] - pe (13)
From a static efficiency point ofview, it is socially optimal if the govemment sets environmental
policy such that the following condition holds:
MD' - MB` (14)
This level of policy that equates marginal social damage to the mazginal social benefits of
emission is referred to as the `Pigouvian' level of environmental policy. Similazly, the level of
taxes that satisfies:
r' - MD' (15)
will be referred to as the `Pigouvian' level of taxes.
5 Equilibrium policy for three scenarios
5.1 The case of full cooperation
Consider the `full cooperation' solution as a benchmazk scenario. Assume that there is an
overall government that wants the best for both countries together, while the two firms are
owned by one overall manager. From the discussion in section 3 it follows that in this case
there are no reasons to disturb policy from its Pigouvian level. The motives 2 and 4 disappear
since there is no competition between firms. The remaining motives, 1 and 3 disappeaz since
in the eyes of the overall government there is no transboundary pollution. Indeed it turns out
that mazginal social damage (MD`) equals marginal social benefits (MB') in equilibrium.
The objective functions add the objectives of both firms and of both governments. In case of
taxes, the `cartel's' objective function is maxx~,~,,I,,f, fó e-'`[II` f II~]dt, while the overall
government has the objective function maxT.,,, fó e-r~[G` f G']dt, with II` as defined in
equation (3) and G' as defined in ( 9). For standards, obvious analogous objective functions
can be formulated. The cooperative firms' manager divides production and investment in an
optimal way over firm i and firm j, to maximize total profits. It takes environmental policy as
given. The cooperative governments are a Stackelberg leader and set policy in country i and j
to maximize welfare.
Analysis of feedback Stackelberg equilibrium conditions ( see appendix B) shows that in equi-
librium ( 14) must hold for both emission taxes and emission standards. It is understandable that
it is optimal to set policy at its Pigouvian level since transboundary pollution nor trade strategic
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motives play a role here. Hence none of the reasons to disturb policy from its Pigouvian level
are present.
The first-order conditions for an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium are also given in appendix
B. The cooperative firms' manager chooses an optimal time path of investment, given a time
path of policy levels. He balances adjustment costs against marginal revenues of additional
abatement capital (reduced future payments for the use of e`). The government takes firm
behaviour as given and sets an optimal path of policy. In case of taxes it can be shown
(see appendix B) that a time-consistent policy path satisfies the first-order conditions and is an
optimal path. This path is characterized by (14) or equivalently by (15). In case of standards on
emissions, manipulation of the first-order conditions for an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium
leads similarly to the condition (14). It can be proved that the solution is time consistent (see
appendix B)).
It follows that in an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium with one overall government and
one overall manager the government chooses the Pigouvian level of environmental policy.
Moreover the time paths of the variables in open-loop equilibrium equals the time paths in
feedback equilibrium. The latter follows, since setting environmental policy at the Pigouvian
level, enables the government to reach the socially optimal path of investment in environmental
improvement and of output in both equilibria. In case of open-loop strategies, there is no time
inconsistency, because the government achieves the social optimum. It does not need to try to
improve on this result at a later time.
5.2 Cooperative government with competition between firms
As a second scenazio, the case where cooperating governments regulate two firms that compete
with each other is considered. The relevant objective functions aze then maxx,,1; fo e-T t[II`]dt,
and maxT,,,, fó e-rt[G' f G']dt, with II' as defined in equation ( 3) and G` as defined in (9) in
case of taxes. In case of standards, obvious analogues can be formulated. Since firms compete
with each other, while governments cooperate, some of the effects mentioned in section 3 work
in a different direction in this scenario. For example firms derive no utility from increases in
profits of the foreign firm when they decrease their own output, while the common government
values both firms' profits. Compared to the social optimum, firms produce too much output.
Therefore effect 4 now induces the governments to set stricter policies to reduce output.
In case of a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium it can be proved ( see appendix B) that the
condition ( 14) must be satisfied by an optimal environmental policy. Governments cooperate, so
they still equate marginal social benefits to mazginal social damage, like in the first case. In case
of taxes, from the first-order conditions on a firm's choice of output, that is, R; -(p`f r`) E(A' ),
from condition ( 14) and definition (12) it follows thar. r' - MD` - E~. The upward
distortion (-R; ~ 0) of taxes compared to the scenario in section 5.1 is due to effect 4 as
explained above. Note that, since R; and MD' depend on x', which in tum depends on r',
the righthand-side of the expression above still contains r`. But this is a convenient way to
represent the equilibrium conditions, since the expression clarifies what distortions are present.
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In case of standards, (14) is an equilibrium condition.
For an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium the first-order condition for optimal policy is:
MB' - MD' f v'E~A~) f v'E~A~~ (16)
under taxes. The fac[ors B' and B' are complex expressions (see appendix B) that denote the
combined effect of marginal policy changes on the two firms' valuation of abatement capital.
Under standards, the condition is:
MB' - MD` f v`MBAéN f v'MBAéN (17)
The v' denote the shadowprice of the cooperative government for the valuation by firm i (i-1,2)
of its own abatement capital. These terms signal the time inconsistency that exists in the open-
loop equilibrium in this case where firms compete. A rough explanation for the existence of
time inconsistency goes as follows. Due to firms' competition, the cooperative governments
can at most reach a second-best solution. They apply open-loop strategies with commitment.
Hence at a certain point in time, they decide on an optimal policy path for the whole future. At
any given future point in time t however, governments could steer firms to a better solution for
the remaining future. For, at such a point, abatement capital stocks are given to the firms and
can only be adjusted gradually through investment. Governments would prefer to change their
policy once time t is reached. Bu[ they have committed themselves to the chosen policy path.
As noticed by Kennedy (1994), environmen[al policy can at most be a second-best instrument
for the scenario with competition between firms, since there are two goals to be attained by
one instrument (reduction of strategic behaviour, which is welfare decreasing in this case, and
reduction of environmental damage). So the first-best optimum is not obtainable. The time
inconsistency is a sign that the feedback solution, which by definition is time consistent, is
characterized by a different time path of investment in abatement capital and environmental
policy than the open-loop solution8.
If firms would be in perfect competition, they would not be able to influence each other's
revenues through output. Then taxes in a feedback equilibrium are not distorted from their
Pigouvian level. There is no reason for cooperating governments to distort them, for there is
no oligopolistic competition among firms which they can change. In open-loop equilibrium
the distortions are absent as well, for the same reason that the government cannot influence
competition if it is perfect. That can be seen from a consideration of the B`-factors in appendix
B. These factors equal zero in case of perfect competition. If standards are applied as the
environmental policy instrument, and firms are in perfect competition, the feedback equilibrium
condition is (14) as before. However, in open-loop equilibrium, not all distortions disappear.
Under standards, the government has a larger influence on firms output choices than under
taxes. That implies that in an open-loop equilibrium, time inconsistency is still present, even
BTherefore, considering a full dynamic model shows that the predictions of multistage models, whose equilibria
are compazable to our open-loop equilibrium, may be wrong if the players' interaction is better described by a
feedback equilibrium.
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if firms are in perfect competition. The term MBAe, namely dces not disappear completely.
5.3 Competition between firms and between governments
In a situation of strategic international trade, when both governments and firms compete with
each other, all the reasons for policy distortion mentioned in section 3 are present and work the
way they were presented there. The objective functions are given by max~.,~, fo e-'t[II`]dt,
and maxt, fó e-r~ [G']dt,with II` as defined in equation (3) and G` as defined in (9), in case of
taxes. In case of standazds, governments optimize over standards and firms' objective functions
are adjusted accordingly. The feedback Stackelberg equilibrium with emission standards can
be summazized by (see appendix B):
MB` - MD' - D'~,d'' -{- R; E(Át) (18)
Standards deviate from the Pigouvian level due to the distortionary effects 1 and 4. Governments
neglect foreign damage D~~a~` and set standards which are too lax, so that marginal damage
exceeds marginal benefits. Furthermore, effect 4 leads governments to stimulate production
,
by their own firms. This is represented by the term E~ in the formula above.
In case of emission taxes, the condition for optimal policy is ( see appendix B):
MB' - MD' - D'~Q'` f R' I -f- D'~~3''E(A~) ~'n - R'. I xTN (19)~ E(,q;) ( ;) N , E(A;) ~N
Compared to the case of standards, two more distortionary effects (2 and 3) are present,
since firms have indirect influence on each others output through the market price. They
discourage foreign production to reduce damage from abroad (effect 3, represented by the
term: D'~Q'~ EIA,I ~). And they discourage foreign production out of a rent shifting motive
~N
(effect 2, represented by the term: - E-~,~ ~). Both terms are negative and lead to too lax
policies. Using the condition on equilibrium output choice, R; -(p` ~T`)E(A`) and definition
(12) the condition on optimal taxes can be rewritten:
; ;-r- MD D~~,Q'' -~ D'~Q`~ E(A~) ~'N - R`. I xTN (20)E(A;) xN ~ E(A;) ~N
Both in case of taxes and in case of standards, environmental policies are distorted and set too
lax from a social point of view.
The open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is characterized by the following condition on envi-
ronmental policy in case of emission standards:
MB` - MD'-D'~Q''fR;E(Á~)-u"É,~~Á.~~ [R;E(Á~)fR;;E(Á~)~]-v`'R;;E~A~)É((Á )z(21)
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In case of taxes the condition is:
,~ ,~ ~ I , ,, E(A') ~TIV , I xTlvMB` - MD' - D Q ~- R; E(A;) f D(3 E(A;) ~N- R; E(A;) xN f
I ~v;; 1 aMBA` ~ v;~ 1 BMBA~~
E(Ai) xN 8Ti iN aT'
(22)
Both conditions are derived in appendix B. Like in the second benchmark case, the open-loop
equilibrium solutions aze not time consistent. This can be seen from the presence of the nonzero
terms with v" and v'' representing the government's valuation of changes in the shadowprice
of capital as perceived by its home firm (v") and the foreign firm (v'~), respectively.
In general the direction of distortions in the case of open-loop strategies (and in case of
compazable multistage models) is inconclusive. This is due to the twofold effect of an increase
in abatement capital. More abatement capital leads to less emissions per unit of output.
But, more abatement capital may also lead to increased output and hence emissions, because
production costs per unit are lowered. For governments there is no general rule how and in
what direction to steer abatement investments. A stricter tax policy, for instance, increases the
profitability of investment in emission reductions for each unit of output produced. But it also
reduces the optimal level of output and hence decreases the profitability of a given investment
in emission reduction. Hence it is inconclusive whether policies aze distorted upwazd or
downwazd. For feedback investment strategies that is not the case. Firms base their investment
on their expectations about future policies. When current policies imply no commitments to
future levels of environmental policy, as is the case in the feedback equilibrium, governments
cannot directly influence investment in abatement technology with current po]icies. In this
case the only distortions in policy levels are due to transboundary pollution and strategic trade
effects.
Compaze the results above to a situation with only transboundazy pollution. That can be done
by considering (18) and (20) with R`~ - R; - 0. When firms do not try to influence each other's
output, the terms with these derivatives and therefore also ~T, and ~r, disappear. Condition
(18) then becomes:
MB` - MD` - D'~Q''




The distortions numbered 2 and 3 disappear, since they are due to strategic interaction among
firms. The resulting policies are closer to their Pigouvian levels. As a result output as well as
environmental damage is lower than in the equilibrium under the scenario described in section
5.3.
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6 Summary and conclusions
This chapter describes environmental policy setting by national governments that balance
environmental targets with domestic firm competitiveness in a dynamic game model of an
international duopoly. Three different scenarios were considered for two types of decision
strategies on investment and environmental policy.
In the benchmazk case, scenazio 5.1, where governments and firms cooperate, no distortions
from the Pigouvian policy occur and governments are able to reach the first-best solution. In
this specific case open-loop and feedback strategies result in the same equilibrium.
If firms compete, while governments cooperate, scenario 5.2 applies. Then, governments have
the double target to reduce environmental damage as well as competition among firms. Only a
second best solution can be reached with distortions in the environmental policy instruments.
These distortions are the same with and without transboundary pollution, since the cooperating
governments consider damage in both countries. Under perfect competition there would be
no distortions at all. With oligopolistic firms, distortions exist and open-loop strategies are
not time consistent. It is undetermined whether policy instruments are distorted upwazd or
downward. Feedback strategies are time consistent and it can be seen that these are distorted
downward.
The third scenario with competition between firms and between governments is characterized by
distortions as well. Now, governments want to provide their domestíc firms with a competitive
advantage. Furthermore, each government only considers domestic damage. In open-loop
equilibrium, the sign of the distortions is undetermined and the equilibrium strategies are not
time consistent. Feedback equilibrium strategies are time consistent. These strategies are
always distorted downwards, that is, environmental policy is laxer than the Pigouvian level.
With trade that is characterized by strategic interaction there are several additional reasons,
compazed to trade under perfect competition, for regulators to deviate from the Pigouvian
level of environmental policy. Apart from the usual distortions due to transboundary pollution,
governments may also distort policies to increase a domestic firm's profits.
Compared to a multis[age model, a full dynamic model has the advantage that additional
possible means of interaction between firms and governments can be analysed. With the most
rigid interaction considered in this chapter, an equilibrium where governments use open-loop
strategies and firms use open-loop investment strategies, results are in general inconclusive and
time inconsistent. If feedback investment and government strategies are considered, though,
the sign of the distortion of environmental policy can be characterized.
The formulas above characterize policy setting along equilibrium time-paths. The analysis in
chapter 7 uses this to investigate the investment paths of firms in the model more carefully.
In this model, with perfect knowledge and no uncertainty it seems logic that standards and
taxes aze equivalent instruments of environmental policy. However, consider the feedback
equilibrium. As mentioned, the signs of the distortions in case of feedback strategies can
be determined. Both under taxes and under standards, environmental policy is set at laxer
than socially optimal levels. But in case of emissíon standazds, firms' commitment to a certain
output level is greater, because the standard is a binding constraint on output for given abatement
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capital stocks. Therefore, it is more difficult for the government to affect the output choices
of the competitor with standazds than with taxes. Some distortionary effects aze absent under
standazds. It cannot be concluded however, that standazds are always less distorted, because
the remaining distortions may be stronger under standazds. But it is clear that equilibrium
output and emission levels differ under the two instruments, even in this model with complete
knowledge and no uncertainty.
With feedback strategies, current policies do not influence the investment behaviour of firms
since the latter is based on the future profitability of investments. This conclusion at the same
time clarifies the circumstances under which the result holds. The analysis assumes perfect
foresight so that firms are indeed able to base their investment decisions on expectations about
the future. In reality such foresight is absent and it may very well be the case that current taxes
are used to estimate future taxes. To compare what happens when firms aze myopic and base
their decisions on current tax levels is a possibility for further reseazch. In a closed economy
framework, models with myopic firms subject to environmental policy are analysed in Magat
(1978).
An extension of the analysis presented here would be the inclusion of consumer surplus, as in
Kennedy (1994) or Ulph (1996a) so that two more aspects of distorted environmental policy,
the increase in polluting production in foreign countries and the benefits to consumers from
increased production, could be analysed. The result of the inclusion of consumer surplus
depends on how large a part of total production is consumed at home. If home consumers are
only a small fraction of total demand, the results are not expected to change very much.
A The case of no environmental policy
In this appendix it is proved that in case no environmental policy is applied, the equilibrium steady state
is characterized by A` - A~ - 0, when condition ( 8) is satisfied, both for open-loop and feedback
strategies. The proof is only given for the case of Nash competition between firms. For the case of
cooperation between the two firms, very similar derivations result in slightly different conditions. This
proof is omitted.
A firm not subject to environmental policy and in Nash competition with the other finn has to solve [he
optimization problem defined by (5) to (6) with the tax rate set at zero. Because its competitor solves
the same problem, a differential game results. Consider first the equilibrium conditions for output.
Since output has no effect on the dynamics, the equilibrium condition is just the standard condition that
mazginal benefits equal marginal cost ( where R; denotes áR, ). In case of an interior solution, this is:
R~ - P`E(A`) (A.1)
If it is furthermore assumed that the firm uses a feedback strategy for its investment choice, the following
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Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman condition, where equilibrium output has been inserted, must hold for i-1,2:
rU'(A', A~) - max[R' - p`E(A')~' - C(I') f UÁ,(I' - ó'A') ~- (JÁ,(P - ó'A~)], (A.2)
Necessary and sufficient conditions on equilibrium investment, I, are then:
Ct'(I') ! UA, i I' 1 ~; I'~UA~ - C',(I')1 - Q (A.3)
It is assumed that the value functions U' are differentiable. From (A.3) it follows that I' - 0 is the
equilibrium investment strategy for A` - A~ - 0, if
UÁ, (0, 0) G C'(0) (A.4)
Moreover, since the inequality is strict, ÏA, - IÁ, - 0. To find an expression for UÁ, (0, 0), take the
full derivatives of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman conditions to A' and A~ and evaluate them in (0, 0).
After rearrangement and the insertion of equilibrium output and equilibrium investment the following
expression results:
(r -F ó')UÁ~(fi, fi) --peE~(fi)~tN( fi p) ~- RÍ,~A (fi, fi) (A.5)
If this is inserted in (A.4) then ( 8) results, where x`o denotes x'N(0, 0):
C~(fi) ) r~ ó~ ~-peE~(fi)yi0 ~ R~~o~ (A.6)
If this condition is satisfied for both firms, Ï' - 0 is the equilibrium choice of investment, so that
A' - A~ - 0 is an equilibrium steady state.
For open-loop strategies, the first-order conditions for equilibrium investment in the no policy case are:
C'(I') ~.~'; P ~ 0; I'[C'(I`) - a'] - 0 (A.7)
~' - (r -~ á').~' - MBA` (A.8)
with MBA` --pe~tNE'(A') f R'~iÁ . If the condition (8) holds, then Ï` - 0 and a' - MBá '
satisfy conditions (A.7) and (A.8) for A' - A~ - 0. This is necessary condition for A' - A~ - 0 to be
an equilibrium steady state. If appropriate conditions are satisfied, it is also sufficient. That requires at
least that MBA`A, G 0 in an environment of A' - A~ - 0. Here MBA' denotes the marginal benefits
per time unit from a unit of abatement capital. These are reductions in payments for the polluting input,
pex'N E'(A' ), and a strategic term, R'~ iÁ , due to the competitive advantage gained by a more efficient
production process. This second term gives the marginal decrease in competing output and the effect
this has on own firm revenues.
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B Details for section 5
Appendix B provides the details for section 5. Each scenario is considered in a separate section. Each
section gives first the conditions for equilibrium output, then details on the feedback equilibrium and
on the open-loop equilibrium. In this appendix, subscripts deno[e partial derivatives. A variable y in
equilibrium is represented by y. Partial derivatives of revenues to output, áR; and áR , aze denoted
by R; and R`~. Furthermore, A, r, x, and é denote the vectors (A`, A'), (T`,T~), (x',z~) and (e ,é')
respectively. Remember that margínal benefits per unit of emission, MB', were defined by:
1
MB` - E,(A~)(Ri - }- Ri) - pe (B.1)
and that marginal damage was defined by:
MD' - D'~A" f D~~p~'




These definitions aze used repeatedly in the rest of the appendix. Recall the definition ( 1) of pollution
in country i, P'. The derivative of P`, to a tax r~ is:
PT, - Q"E(A`)xr, f p''E(A')x'r,
The derivative of pollution in country i to a standazd é~ is:
Pt - Q`ie~
Scenario 1: Full cooperation
(B.4)
(B.5)
The first-order conditions for optimal choice of output for an overall firm manager in country i aze in
case oftaxes:
R; f R? G(P` f r')E(A`)
z' ~ 0




All three conditions must hold for i-1,2. Nash equilibrium results in output choices xl~(A, r) and
x2C(A, r). Assume that an interior solution with both outputs positive is reached. Then (B.6) holds
B Appendix
with equality. If these optimal output choices are inserted, the following differential game results:
manager:
max J ~ e-r~ [II1 -f IIZ] dti~~o,r2~o 0
S.t. II` - Rt(xC) - (pe } ,ri)E(Ai)xiC - G.i(Ii)
Ai-I'-biAi
govemment:
max J ~ e-rt [Gl -1- G2] dtT~,T~ O
s.t. firm behaviour
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The phrase `órm behaviour' is used as a shorthand for the equilibrium values of Ii, h, ï' and x~
that follow from solution of the firms' problem for given taxes. That is, the govemment, which is the
Stackelberg leader, takes into account the equilibrium behaviour of the cartel's manager.
In case of an emissions standard, é`, for the overall firm manager, the first-order conditions for optimal
outputchoice read:
R; f R? G(pe f~')E(A')
x' 7 0
x'[Ri f R? - (jle ~ ~')E(A`)] - 0
~i~0
E(A')x` C é







for i-1,2. Here ~` f pe is the shadow price for the polluting input. If R; (x) f R?(x) ~ peE(A') for
x' - E(Á'1, the standard is binding for a given output x~. Assume that, for i- 1, 2, it holds:
R~(E(Al), E~Az)) f R?(E~AI)e E~A2)) ? PeE(A`) (B.15)
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Then the case where both standards are binding and x'C -
differential game reduces to:
manager:
max J ~ e-rt [IIl f IIZ] dtI~10,h~0 p
S.t. 11' - R ` - ]1eÉ' - C'(J')
A'-I'-À'A`
government:
max J ~ e-rt [G' f G2 ] dté~,e p
s.t. firm behaviour
E~A,I, for i-1,2, is an equilibrium. The
Feedback investment
Under full cooperation, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman conditions are in case of taxes:
rU(A) - Ri~R2-(pe~Ti)E(At)xiC-(Pe~r2)E(A2)~2C-C~-C~fUA~(h-ó`Ai)fUA2(h-ó`A~)(B.16)
rW(A) - R~}R2-~eE(A1)ytC-peE(A2)~sc-Ci-C2-D'-D2fWA~(II-ó'Al)~-Wqs(I2-ó'A2)(B.17)
Here U and W are the value functions of the cooperating firms, respectively the cooperating governments.
I' is the equilibrium rate of investment in abatement and T' the equilibrium rate of taxes. Theequilibrium
rate of investment must satisfy the following first-order conditions:
C'~(Í') ~ UA~(A); Í` ~ 0; Í'[C'~(Í') - UA~] - 0 (B.18)
These result in I'(A), so the firm's rate of investment is not directly influenced by environmental taxes.
The equilibrium rate of taxes, T`, must satisfy the following first-order conditions:
r1E(A')xTC f r2E(A2)xT~ - D'~PT, f D2~Pz, (B.19)
r1E(Al)zT2 f r2E(AZ)x;z - D~~PT~ f D2~PT, (B.20)
These follow if the value function W is maximized over r' and ( B.6) is inserted. Use (B.4) to rewrite
(B.19) and (B.20) to:
E(Ai)yTc[ri - Di~~ii - D z~psi] - -E(As)ysc[r2 - Di~~iz - D~~pas] (B.21)
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for i-1,2. It follows that
T' - D'~,0" } D,~p~'




Use the first-order condition on output, (B.6), equation (B.23) and definition (B.1) to find that in
equilibrium:
MB' - MD', (B.24)
as it is stated in the main texL In case of emission standards, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
read:
rU(A) - 1Z1 f R2 - peël - peé - Cl(il) - CZ(i2) f UA~(Íl - b`Al) ~- UAz(i2 - ó'AZ) (B.25)
rW(A) - R1fR2-peél-peë2-Cl(Il)-C2(IZ)-D1-D2~-WA,(Il-ó`A1)fWAz(I2-ó'A2)(B.26)
Conditions for the equilibrium rate of investment are given in (B.1 S). The equilibrium rates of standards,
é`, follow from the first-order conditions for the maximization of W over é`:
(R; f R?)E(A;) -P` - D'~Pé, - D2~Pé1 - 0
for i-1,2. Use (B.2), (B.1) and ( B.5) to rewrite this to:
MB' - MD`,




In case of an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, the first-order conditions on investment for cooperating
firms read:
A'-I`-ó'A'
C`~(j`) ?~`; I` ? 0; I`(C`~(I`) -~'] - 0
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for i-1,2. Here MBA`C denotes the marginal benefits per time unit of a unit of aba[ement capital in
firm i for the firms, in case of cooperation. In case of taxes, MBA'C --(p` f r')x'cE'(A'). In case
of emission standards, MBA'c --[R; f R?] eE A)~ '
The first-order conditions to the government read in case of taxes:
[Ri -~ R~ - peE(A1)JxTc .}- [R2 f R2 - p`E(Az)]x;c-
iC 2C
D1~PT~ - Dz~PT, -
v18MB A - vzBMB A - 0
Fr` -(r f ó')~` - [Ri f Ri - P`E(f1i)]xá -[Rz f Rs - P`E(Az))iÁ f
e i;~C ~~ ~ 2~ z ~aMBA'C zBMBAzcpE(A)z ~D PA;fD PA;fv aAti ~v 8A'





v'(0) - 0 (B.35)
for i-1,2. Here ~' is the shadow value for abatement capital in firm i and v` is the shadow value that
the government as a Stackelberg leader attaches to ~`. Insert the first-order condition on output, (B.6),
in (B.32) and (B.33) and try the solu[ion vl(t) - vz(t) - 0. For this solution, all conditions in (B.29)
to (B.35) are satisfied if taxes are set according to:
T~ - Di'~Qi~ ~ Di'~i~ (B.36)
for i-1,2, for all t.
In case of emission standards, the open-loop first-order conditions for cooperating govemments read:
[Ri } Rz) E(A~) - pe - Dr~~~~ - Dz~az~ - v18Má A1C - vz BMBAzC - 0 (B.37)
~' - (r f ó')~' - [R; ~ R?]iÁ } vi
BMBAIC } vz BMBAzC (B.38)
8A 8A
v; - -ó;v~ ~, ( Cs~ - F~')
~~C'
(B.39)
v'(0) - 0 (B.40)
for i-1,2. The first-order conditions for cooperating firms were given in (B.29) to (B.31). Use x' - E~A, )
and try the solution vl(t) - vz(t) - 0. It follows that all conditions in (B.29) to (B.31) and (B.37) to
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(B.40) are satisfied if standards are set such thaC
(RI } Rz) 1 - pe - Dl~pli } D2~~zi
i i E(Ai)
or, equivalently,
MB` - MD` (B.42)
(B.41)
The latter condition follows immediately from (B.2) and (B.1).
So for both instruments, a time-consistent open-loop equilibrium exists for this scenario. The equilibrium




e-rt[Rl ~- R2 - p`(el f ez) - C1(71) - CZ(IZ) - Dt (Pl) - D2(P2)]dt (B.43)
The first-order conditions for investment and output for the social planning problem equal (B.29) to
(B.31) and (B.6) respectively (B.9) to (B.14), with environmental policy (B.36) or (B.41) inserted. With
these policies, the cooperating governments therefore reach the first-best solution. Furthermore, the
op[imality conditions are the same for feedback and open-loop stra[egies.
Scenario 2: Competition between firms and cooperating governments
Assume that in case of taxes an interior equilibrium results. Then the Nash equilibrium conditions for
output are in case of taxes:
Ri - (P` f r')E(A') (B.44)
for i-1,2. The Nash equilibrium ou[put choices are denoted x'N(A,T). If these output choices are
inserted, the following differential game results:
manager of firm i:
r~
max J e-'t [II`] dtI'~o 0
S.[. II' - R'(xN) - (i~e




max J e-rt [Gl ~- G2] dtT~,T~ o
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s.t. firm behaviour
Assume that both standazds are binding in equilibrium. Then in case of standards x'N - E~Á,I. The
assumption
R;(E(Ai), E(Az)) ? PeE(A')
for i-1,2, ensures that this is a Nash equilibrium indeed. The differential game reduces to:
manager of firm i:
r~
max J e-'~ [II'] dtr~~o 0
S.t. 11' - IZ'(XN) - peC` - C`(1') 1-1,2
A' - I' - 6`A' i-1,2
cooperating governments:




The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations for scenario 2 are in case of taxes:
rU'(A) - R' -(Pe
} Ti)E(Ai)xiN - C'(Í') f U`q~(1` - ó`A`) f UÁ~(1~ - ótA~) (B.46)
rW(A) - R~~R2-peE(At)x~N-peE(A2)x2N-C~-C~-D~-D~fWqi(Ïr-b'A~)~-W,q~(h-b`A2)(B.47)
for i-1,2. Here U` is the value function of firm i and W is value function for the cooperating governments.
T'he first-order conditions for the equilibrium rate of investment, l', are:
C'~(I') ~ UA,(A); I' ~ 0; i'[C'~(T) - UÁ,] - 0 (B.48)
Note that this differs from (B.18), since now each firm bases investments on its own value function. T'he
equilibrium rates of taxes, T', must satisfy the first-order conditions:
r'E(Al)x.'rN f r2E(A2)x?N - D'~PT, f D2~PT, - R2xTN - IZixTN (B.49)
T1E(AI)x'rN f T2E(AZ)x?~ - DI~PT2 f D2~Pzz - R2x?N - RixTN (B.50)
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Insert (B.44) and solve for rl and rz:
Ti - Di'Qi~ ~ Di'~i~ - 1 R~.
E(Ai) '
Use (B.2), ( B.1) and (B.44) to rewrite this condition to:
MB` - MD',
as it is stated in the main text.
(B.51)
(B.52)
In case of emission standazds the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations read:
rU`(A) - R` - peê' - C'(I`) -}- U,`g;(I` - ó'A') -}- U'q~(P - á`A') (B.53)
rW(A) - Rl~-R2-peét-peé -C1(It)-C~(I2)-D1-D2fW,qi(ÏI-ó'Al)~-W,qz(I2-S`A2)(B.54)
for i-1,2. For I`, the equilibrium rate of investment, 6rst-order conditions are given by (B.48). For ê',
the equilibrium standard, first-order conditions are:
(R; f R?)E(Ái) - pe - Dt~Pé~ - D2~Pé - 0
for i-1,2. Remind ( B.5) and use (B.2) and (B.1) to see that this can be rewritten to:
MD' - MB',




In case of an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, the first-order conditions on investment for competing
firms aze given by (B.29) to (B.31), but with different mazginal benefits of abatement capitai. That is,
MBA`N replaces MBAi~. In case of taxes, MBA;N --(pe ~- r;)x;NE'(A`) f R~xÁ . The last
term stands for the marginal decrease in competing output and the effect this has on own firm revenues.
In case of emission standazds, MBA'N --Rie E A'~ ~)
In case of taxes, the first-order conditions to the cooperating governments are in case of taxes given by
(B.32) to (B.35) with x`N instead ofx`~ and MBA`N instead of MBA`~. Insert (B.44) in the adjusted
versions of (B.29) to (B.35) and try the time-consistent solution vl(t) - v2(t) - 0. A contradiction is
the result, namely:
Ri ~iN } R~(1~e } rt)R~,i - 0 B.57)
E(A`) Ri;Ri~ - RiiR~i
(
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Therefore, for scenario 2, the open-loop equilibrium with taxes is not time consistent. Insert (B.44) in
(B.32) for i-1,2. Rearrange the system of two equations that results, to find:
Ti - Di,~ii } D~,p~i - 1 R~ } vi B~ ~~ B~
E(Ai) ' E(A') E(Ai)
where B' and B~ denote the expressions:
Bi - MBA`Nx'TN - MBATNxTN
x`Nx~N - x`Nx~NT~ T~ T~ T
and
B~ - MBA'rNx'rN - MBArNxrN
x'Nx~N - x'NZ~N
T~ T~ T~ T
Use (B.2), (B.1) and (B.44) to rewrite (B.58) to:





In case of emission standards, the open-loop first-order conditions to the cooperating governments are
given by ( B.37) to (B.40) with MBA`N and x'N instead of MBA`~ and x`~. Try the solution vl (t) -
v2(t) - 0 in the adjusted versions of (B.29) to (B.31) and ( B.37) to (B.40). Some straightforward
reordering gives:
i-i E~(A~) -R;e (Ai)2 0 (B.62)
This is not true so that there is no time-consistent solution to (B.29) to (B.31) and (B.37) to (B.40).
Insert (B.2) and (B.1) in (B.37). T'he result is, that in equilibrium standards should be set such that:
MB' - MD` f v'
8MBA1N } v28MBA~N
8éi 8éi
Scenario 3: Nash competition
(B.63)
In case of taxes, the first-order conditions for Nash-Coumot equilibrium choice of output by firms,
xiN(A, r) are given by (B.44). If these are inserted, the following differential game results:




S.[. II' - R'(x1N x2N) -(71e },ri)E(Ai)xiN - C.i(Ii)
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A'-I`-ó`A'





In case ofemissions standards, assume that both standazds aze binding in equilibrium, so that x' - E~Á, ~
for i-1,2. The assumption (B.45) assures that this is a Nash equilibrium indeed. The differential game
reducesto:




s.t. II' - R` - peé - C'(P)
A'-I'-ó`A`
govemment of country i:
r~
max J e-'t[G`]dté 0
s.t. firm behaviour
Feedback investment
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman conditions for the game above are in case of taxes given by ( B.46) and:
rW'(A) - Rr
- peE(A[~2tN - C'(I') - D' f WÁ,(I' - ó`A`) f wÁ~(I' - ó'A') (B.64)
with for I', the equilibrium investment strategy, the first-order condition (B.48). The equilibrium rate
of taxes, r' must satisfy the first-order conditions:
(R; - p`E(A`))x'T;' - D'~P;, - R'~xTN for i-1,2
Insert ( B.44) and solve for r` to find:





Then use (B.2) to rearrange this to:
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- MD` - D~`Q~' f D'~Q`' E~A~) ~TN - R` 1
2Ttv
E~At) xN ~ E~,q;) xN
or with ( B.1) also inserted:
t- í- 1 1 x TN .Í 1 ~~ i t t~ ;j E~A') xTNMB - MD Rj E~At) ~N f R; E~A~) - D A f D Q E(A;) xN
(B.67)
(B.68)
In case of standards on emissions, the conditions for a feedback equilibrium aze (B.53) and:
rW'(A) - R' - peê` - C`(I') - D' ~ WA~(I' - ó'A`) ~ WÁ, (I~ - á'A~) (B.69)
First-order conditions on equilibrium investment policy, I', are again given by (B.48). The first-order
conditions for standards are:
R;E,~A;) - Pe f
D;~~;; (B.70)
Use (B.2) and (B.1) to rewrite this to
MB' - MD' f R~ E~Áti) - D'~Q'' (B.71)
Open-loop investment
The first-order conditions for the firm manager are given by (B.29) to (B.31) with MBA'N instead of
MBA`~. For the government in country i, in case of taxes, the first-order conditions read:
; e ; ;rv t jn~ - , , ;iBMBA'N i28MBA2N )~R; - P E~A )~~T~ f R~xT, D~PT, - v aTi - v aTi - 0 (B.72
Ilu -~T f ó')f~t1 -~Ri - peE~A`)~xA' - RjiA' ~ peE~~Ai)~iN ~- Di~PA,
}vi18MBA1N } v;28MBA2N
8A' aA'
li'' -~T f ó`)Fi`' -~Ri - PeE~A')~xA - RjxA ~- D'~Pq,
}vi18MBA'N } ve28MBA2N
8Aj 8Aj












vii(0) - 0 (B.77)
v'~(0) - 0 (B.78)
for i-1,2. Insert the first-order condition on output, (B.44) in ( B.72) and rearrange to find:
, j, ;j E(Aj) xTN ; 1 xT;~ 1 ;; BMBAiN ;j BMBAjN






e ri xiN i jN iN i jN
-(P f) r~ ] f R;jxA, x,, f RjxA;T;
ÓMBA~N e j ~ j jN j iN jN i iN
8ri --(7~ -~ r)E (A ) x,~ f Rijx,q, xT~ ~- RjxA,r~ C 0
Use the definitions of marginal benefits and marginal damage to rewrite this to:
J,t ~ I ,`, E(Aj) xTN ~ 1 xTN
MB'-MD`-D A fR. fD Q -R ' fs ElAil EfAil yN 7E(Ai) xiN
1 v;; BMBAiN } v;j BMBA~N





The solution vll(t) - v22(t) - v1z(t) - vzl(t) - 0 results in a contradiction if it is inserted into into
the equilibrium conditions. It can be concluded that the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is not time
consistent.
In case ofemission standards, the first-order conditions to the government of country i read:
i e i I i~ ii - il aMBA1N i2ÓMB`QZN[Ri -1i E(A )] E(A;) - D Q v ae - v ~ - 0 (B.83)
f ó`)liii - Rixi~N } vil
óMBA1N } viz BMBAzN
8Ai 8Ai
~C'' - (r -I- ó')F~' - R`jx'Á ~
viláMBA1N } vizóMBAzN
aAj aAj
bivi; } Cd(Ii) - ~ii
C;n(I')
~t~
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v"(0) - 0 (B.88)
v'J(0) - 0 (B.89)
for i-1,2. Insert the derivatives of x' - E~A,~ to A' and of MBA'N to own and foreign standards and
rearrange equation (B.83). Then, it follows that in equilibrium standards should be set such that:
R;-peE(A`)-R'-D~~QJ'E(A')-v"[R;;é'E~(At)-}-R'E'(A')]i-v`JR~éJ E(At) E~(AJ) - 0(B.90)
` E(A') ' E(A~) E(A~)
Which can be rewritten [o
MB' - MD' - D'~~3J' ~ R; E~At) f v"MBAéN f v''MBAéN (B.91)
If the solution with v"(t) - v'J(t) - 0 is inserted, a contradiction is obtained: From the conditions on
each firm and government and specifically from ( B.85) and (B.87), it follows that
R'xJN - 0J A~ (B.92)
is required in that case, which cannot be true for general functions. This shows that the open-loop
Stackelberg equilibrium in case of emission standards is not time consistent.
Chapter 7
Environmental policy and investment in
emission reduction, the case of
international competition
In this chapter, we analyse firms' incentives to invest in emission reducing technology under emission
taxes and emission standards. That is done in a context of imperfect competition, international rivalry and
transboundary pollution. As a result there is strategic interaction between firms, between govemments
and between firms and governments.
A differential game model is used to analyse a duopoly, with each competitor situated in a different
country. Govemments balance trade interests with environmental concems. If they impose the strict
policy they prefer from an environmental point of view, this might harm home firms too much and
decrease their profits substantially. It is assumed that governments do not want this, since they have a
preference for high profits to be earned at home. This leads to downwazd distortions in environmental
policy. At the same time, investments in emission reduction, once installed and paid for, lead to a cost
advantage.
Firms base their decisions to invest on expected future policy. Due to the distortions in environmental
policy, it is not a priori cleaz which type of instmment, taxes or standards, gives the best incentive to
invest in emission reducing technologies, that is [he incentive that is closest to the social optimum.
In contrast to what is generally believed, it can happen that environmental taxes are less dynamically
efficient than standazds.
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1 Introduction
International rivalry may seriously affect decisions on environmental policy, if governments
value high profits for their home firms, besides high environmental quality. An extensive
literature now exists on environmental policy making within a framework of international
competition among firmsl (among others Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994), Markusen, Morey
and Olewiler (1993), Rauscher (1994), Ulph (1996) and Ulph (1994), who also provides an
overview). With oligopolistic international output markets, concern for the competitiveness of
their home firms may lead governments to distort environmental policies. Such distortions are,
in the absence of trade policy, a second best-policy for a govemment that wants both to reduce
environmental damage and to improve home firms' profits.
The question arises what aze the implications for fim~s' incentives to invest in emission reduction
technologies. Governments have an interest in these investments, because they value low
environmental damage in their countries. At the same time governments want to improve, or
at least not reduce, the competitiveness of their home firms. Since firms decide on and pay for
the investments to reduce their emissions, it is important to consider their incentives to invest.
Without environmental policy, firms are assumed to neglect the environmental consequences
of production. In that case, they have no reason to pay for investment to reduce emissions. As
a result, governments have a different view about the "right" rate of investment in emission
reduction technology than firms.
Environmental policy changes the incentives of firms, because it changes the (shadow-) price
of emissions. The degree to which an environmental policy instrument gives firms the "right"
incentives to invest in environmental improvements is also called its dynamic efficiency. Loose-
ly speaking, the dynamic efficiency of a certain environmental policy concerns the incentives
provided for polluters to invest in innovation and the direction in which innovative activities
are steered. This chapter, however, analyses investment in emission reduction, rather than
innovation. The chapter analyses the incentive to invest in emission reduction under different
environmental policy instruments. That is done in a context of imperfect competition, interna-
tional rivalry and transboundary pollution. As a result there is strategic interactions between
firms, between governments and between a firm and its government.
Investment means that commitments for the future are made. These commitments play a role
in strategic interactions. The interactions are formalized in a dynamic game model. This
enables to be precise about the structure ofdecision making. It is shown that, beside immediate
cost savings, strategic interactions aze an important determinant of the rate of investment in
emission reduction technologies.
Two environmental policy instruments are compared, namely emission taxes and emission
standazds. These two are chosen, since they represent policies directed at prices and policies
directed at quantities. It turns out that the differences in commitment between them, have an
impact on the incentives to invest in emission reductions.
Papers that analyse the relative dynamic efficiency of environmental policy instruments are
among others Downing and White (1986), Jung, Krutilla and Boyd (1996), Magat (1978) and
1 Part of this literature is reviewed in chapter l.
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Milliman and Prince (1989). Except for Magat, these papers analyse a static one country model
with perfect competition. In that context, dynamic efficiency is easily defined to be the level of
investment chosen by a social planner. Furthermore, strategic interactions do not play a role,
due to the assumption of perfect competition. Moreover, there is no obvious reason to distort
policy instruments from their pigouvian level.
The papers mentioned above concentrate on a comparison of the cost savings that can be
obtained by firms, if they adopt a new technology that results in an overall decrease ofmarginal
abatement costs to this firm. A good example is Downing and White (1986). They find that
taxes give rise to overincentives to innovation, while emission standards lead to a(relatively
stronger) underincentive. In case of emission standards, firms gain, because a new technology
decreases abatement costs. In case of taxes, firms can adjust to a new level of emissions and
their gain is larger, since it also includes some reductions in tax payments. If the original tax
level is a reasonable approximation of social costs, then the incentive in case of taxes is close
to the social optimum.
Requate (1994) includes output adjustments into the analysis. He compares taxes to auctioned
marketable permits, under perfect competition. With output adjustments taken into account,
taxes may provide more incentives to innovate to individual firms than marketable permits. It
depends on marginal social damage, whictl instrument is to be preferred from a social welfare
point of view. Malueg (1989) also points to the indeterminacy of dynamic incentives. He
considers a case where the instrument is not set at the socially optimal level and compazes
emission standards to grandfathered marketable permits. Malueg shows that if permit prices
do not coincide with marginal social damage, it cannot be concluded that permits provide more
correct incentives for innovation than standards. A similar reasoning can be followed for taxes
and standards. It can be concluded that if taxes aze set below marginal social damage and the
standard imposed on a firm implies a lower level of emissions than the tax, this standard gives
better incentives than the tax. Malueg does not give an explanation why environmental policies
are distorted. The analysis below provides such an explanation. It derives the distortions that
can be expected under international rivalry and transboundary pollution.
When govemments use open-loop strategies and firms apply open-loop investment strategies,
results aze in general inconclusive, as it was shown in the previous chapter. The inconclusive-
ness is due to the twofold effect of an increase in abatement capital. More abatement capital
leads to less emissions per unit of output and therefore decreases total emissions given constant
output. But, more abatement capital also leads to increased output and therefore more emis-
sions. As a result, there is no general rule in what direction governments which prefer both to
improve firm profits and to reduce environmental damage should steer abatement investments.
Ulph and Ulph (1996) applies a multistage model. As noted results from such a model will be
compazable to open-loop equilibria in the full dynamic model. It is therefore not a surprise that
they find that both the question whether stricter environmental policy encourages or discourages
firms' investment in emission reduction and the question in what direction governments distort
their environmental policy has an answer that depends on the specification of the model. A
crucial determinant is the shape of the function that models the relation between emissions and
the amount of abatement capital.
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When feedback investment and environmental policy strategies are applied, the direction of the
distortions in policy instruments can be determined. If governments have no commitments to
future levels of environmental policy, firms base their investment on their expectations about
future policies. Hence governments cannot influence investment in abatement technology with
current policies. Then the only distortions in policy levels are due to transboundary pollution
and strategic trade effects.
The overall effect of all distortions on investments in emission reduction is difficult to predict.
In pazticular it is shown below that it is not true that taxes aze always more dynamically efficient
than standazds. That is, it is well possible that distorted standazds result in investments that are
closer to the social optimal rate than distorted taxes.
The model used in this chapter was introduced in chapter 6. Sections 6.1 to 6.4 in that chapter
give the basis for the analysis below. The rest of this chapter is set up as follows. The next
section gives equilibrium conditions for environmental policy for a social planner benchmark
case and repeats the equilibrium conditions for the scenazio of Nash competition between firms
and governments given in chapter 6. The distortions in environmental policy are explained.
Section 3 uses a counterexample to show that taxes do not always provide better dynamic
incentives than standards. The resul[ is clarified with the help of equilibrium conditions on
investment in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Equilibrium policy for different instruments
In this section, the first-order conditions for the equilibrium strategies of the government for
the "social planner" benchmark aze given and the conditions for the scenario with competition
between firms and competition between governments are recapitulated from chapter 6.
Consider first the "social planner" solution as a benchmark case. Assume that in each country,
the government completely controls its home firms. In that case it does not need environmental
policy but decides directly on output and investment. In Nash equilibrium with the other
country it then has to solve:
~
max f e-'t [R`(~`,x') - p`E(A')x` - C(I`) - D'(P')] dt
x',I' 0
(1)
s.t. Ái - Ii - bAi (2)
A'-7'-SA'. (3)
Equilibrium condítions for this dynamic game can be found in appendix A. A condition on
equilibrium output, ~is, is:
Ri(~iS ~jS)
- (pe f D'~(P`)N")E(A`)' (4)
Given the choices of the other country, output is chosen such that marginal benefits equal
marginal costs, which include environmental damage at home, but neglect damage done in the
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other country.
Now consider the dynamic game set up in section 4 in chapter 6. Two governments set
environmental policy and two firms compete in a Cournot duopoly. The government should
set standazds respectively taxes in Nash competition with the other government, such that
the equilibrium behaviour of the two firms given these policies maximizes the government's
objectives. A complete set of equilibrium conditions is given in appendix B in chapter 6.
An equilibrium condition for emission standazds is:
R4(~iN' ~jN) - (~e f D'~(P')p")E(A`) (5)
This is similar to condition (4). But now the governments cannot directly control output and
have to evaluate mazginal benefits and costs at the rate of output, ~`N, that will be chosen by
the firm if it satisfies the standard. Given a stock of abatement capital A and assuming that the
standard, é, is binding, it immediately follows that this output rate is equal to E~A~ .
In case of emission taxes, the comparable equilibrium condition is different:
jN
Rl (~iN ~jN)
- (~e ~- D'~(P`)a")E(A') ~ (D`'~i`jE(Aj) - Ril ~iN (6)
~?~
T~vo distortionary effects aze present, because firms have indirect influence on each others output
through the mazket price. As a consequence, lower taxes in one country reduce equilibrium
output in the other country and governments take that into account. For the government of
country i it is advantageous to discourage foreign production by a downwazd distortion in
its taxes. A downwazd distortion lowers foreign equilibrium output, which reduces damage
N
from abroad ( as represented by the term D`~Q'jE(Aj)~) and shifts rents to its home firm
(as represented by the term - R'j x~ ). Both motives hence explain lower equilibrium taxes
than would be set if equilibrium {output in the foreign country was independent of home
environmental policy like under environmental standards. Using firms' equilibrium condition
on output, R; -(p` f T`)E(A'), condition ( 6) can be rewritten to give:
jN
T' - D~~~'~ ~ E(A,) ~E(A')D~~Q~' - ~j~ ~~N (~)
r~
This shows that taxes aze set below marginal damage, due to the two motives mentioned above.
3 Dynamic efficiency
Dynamic efficiency in this chapter refers to the efficiency of the rate of investment chosen by
firms as evaluated by theirgovernment. Given the context of perfect foresight and intertemporal
optimization, individual decision makers always choose solutions that aze dynamically efficient
from their point of view. Since it was assumed that firms and govemments shazed the same
rate of time preference, differences therein are no reason for dynamic inefficiencies. With
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only one firm in each country, positive externalities related to investment, which are another
reason for dynamic inefficiency, aze also absent. However, as will be shown below, firms
distort their investments for strategic reasons. They want to influence environmental policy
and foreign output to their own advantage. Likewise, the government distorts its policy for
strategic reasons, as it was shown in the previous section. As a result of these distortions, it
may be expected that the investment choices of firms aze not considered dynamically efficient
by their government.
As a benchmark case, the path of investment that results from the social planner solution
is defined to be dynamically efficient. This path would be chosen if the government could
directly choose the investment rate. Note that the choice of this benchmark implies that dynamic
efficiency is defined for an individual country, because the two social planners compete with
each other to maximize the welfare of their own country. In Nash equilibrium, the stock
of abatement capital in one country affects the output and investment decisions by the other
country. Therefore, strategic interactions between the two social planners distort investment
in abatement capital from the rate that is based on immediate reductions in environmental
damage and production costs. Besides, since investment and output rates are set according to
feedback strategies, investment in abatement capital is a commitment to higher future output
rates (because .~A, 1 0) as well as a commitment to lower future investment rates (because
IA, c 0).
When the decisions on output and investment aze taken by independent firms subject to envi-
ronmental policy, three types of strategic interaction are present. First, like the social planners
in the benchmark case, firms compete with each other on the output market. Therefore, there is
strategic interaction between firms. Second, there is strategic interaction between governments,
because they set their environmental policies in competition with the other country. Third,
when firms are aware that the equilibrium strategies of environmental policy are functions of
the stock of abatement capital, they try to choose these stocks such that environmental policy
is as lax as possible. That is, strategic interaction between firms and governments is another
reason for distortions in the rate of investment.
The total result of all these interactions is not cleaz ex-ante. It certainly is not true that taxes are
always more dynamically efficient than standards, which was derived in Downing and White
(1986) in a static one country context with perfect competition. That is shown below with the
help of a counterexample. It shows a case where the incentives to invest under regulation with
standards are under certain circumstances closer to the benchmark case than the incentives
under regulation with taxes. With explicit functional forms, the two-state-vaziable dynamic
game can be approximated by a linear-quadratic dynamic game. The linear-quadratic game's
steady state can be computed analytically, using a method explained in Fershtman and de
Zeeuw ( 1992). For details on the approximation algorithm used here see chapter 3.
The example uses the following functional forms for i-1,2:
R` - P ~ x' (8)
p` - 10 -~' - a~ x~ with 0 ~ a ~ 1 (9)
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D`-4~P`
C'-15I`fl'2
E(A`) - 0.2 f (Eo - 0.2)e-6'A~




Thus, complete symmetry, linear damage, exponential abatement reduction and quadratic
revenues are assumed. This example satisfies condition (8) in chapter 6, so that in the absence
of environmental policy, A` - A~ - 0 is the equilibrium steady state.
The parameter a describes the degree of substitutability between the products of the two
firms. If ~- 0, the products aze traded on separate markets and firms do not compete with
each other. In that case, strategic interaction between firms is absent, whereas interaction
between governments is confined to transboundary pollution. If a- 1, the products are
perfect substitutes and strategic effects on the output market are strongest.
For different values of~, table 1 shows the equilibrium steady-state stocks of abatement capital.
This shows that indeed when strategic interaction through the output market is sufficiently
strong, investment under taxes is further from the benchmark than investment under standards.
Table 1: Steady state stocks of abatement capital.
a taxes standards social optimum
0 2.7 1.5 2.7
0.1 2.6 1.5 2.6
0.5 2.8 1.6 2.4
1.0 4.6 2.1 2.7
The effects of interaction between firms, distorted environmental policies and interaction
between the firm and its regulator together result in either underinvestment or overinvestment
when compared to the benchmark case. Section 4 describes these effects in more detail. If
the products aze close substitutes (a close to 1), strategic interaction between firms leads to
lazge overinvestments in abatement technology in case of taxes. In contrast, under standards,
investment in abatement is too low compared to the benchmazk case. Since taxes lead to
more distortion from the dynamically efficient rate of investment than standards, this gives the
counterexample that was required.
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Table 2: Steady state stocks of abatement capital, case of local pollution
~ taxes standards social optimum
0 2.7 1.5 2.7
0.1 2.6 1.5 2.6
0.5 2.7 1.6 2.4
1.0 4.3 2.1 2.6
When a is lower and strategic interaction in the output market is therefore less important, the
order is reversed. For very low interaction or no interaction in the output market, taxes provide
almost the right incentives for investment in abatement capital. In case of standards, there is
underinvestment also for low a. This underinvestment is mainly due to the interaction between
the firm an its regulator. Section 4 gives a more complete analysis of the various distortions
that lead to under- or overinvestment.
For comparison, consider a case with only local pollution (see table 2). The interaction
due to transboundary pollution disappears, so that remaining distortions are completely due to
competition on the output market and strategic interaction between the firm and the government.
Take the same functional forms as given in (8) to (12), with the same parameter values, except
that ,Q'~ - 0.
Benchmark investment is slightly lower in case of local pollution. That is, strategic interaction
is a bit lower, but not much. Investment under taxes is also slightly lower. Note, however,
that the numbers have only illustrative value, so that conclusions about the relative magnitude
of effects can not be made from them. Under standards, investment is the same whether
transboundary pollution is absent or present. That makes sense for this specific example with
constant marginal damage, because pollution from abroad can only be affected through foreign
output and under standards there is no way in which foreign output may be influenced by home
investment.
When markets are separate (a - 0), strategic interaction through the output market is absent.
The two firms act as local monopolies. Only interaction through transboundary pollution and
interaction between government and firms remains. A comparison of the transboundary case
and the case with only local pollution shows that interaction between government and firms
is more important than interaction through transboundary pollution for the parameter values
that were used in this example. There is almost no difference between equilibrium investment
with or without transboundary pollution when ~- 0. Due to interaction between firm and
government, under standards there is underinvestment compared to the social benchmark.
Taxes provide almost conect incentives, since under taxes, interactions between the firm and
its government are small (see section 4).
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4 The firm's incentive to invest
To analyse the results suggested by the example it is useful to consider the equilibrium condi-
tions on investment in some detail. A decision maker that optimizes its investment decisions
equals the user cost of capital, (r -~ ê)C'(I') to its expected mazginal value. The latter is ex-
pressed by the marginal derivative to capital of the value function, VÁ; and denotes how much
an additional unit of capital contributes to future profits and possibly environmental damage.
The marginal derivative is only well defined when the value functions aze differentiable. That
is assumed to be the case in the sequel. The value function V' is recursively defined by the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman optimality condition on investment in country i:
rV`(A`,A') - max[W` - C'(I') f VA;(I` - óA`) f VÁ;(I' - bA')] (13)
Here W` is either equal to R` -(p` f T`)e' respectively R' - p`e', when the firm decides on
investment, or equal to R` - p`e`, in the benchmark case, where the social planner directly sets
investment. From ( 13) it follows that the first-order condition for equilibrium investment is:
-C'(I') f VA; C 0 I` ~ 0 I`[VÁ, - C'(I`)J - 0 (14)
Assume an interior solution and take the partial derivatives of (13) to find an expression for
VÁ;. The general equilibrium condition on investment then becomesZ
(r f b)C'(I') -(r -f- ó)V'A; - WÁ, ~- VÁ, IÁ, -I- 1;~(I` - êA`) ~ V;i(I~ - bA') (15)
where VÁ, , the partial derivative of V' to A' is given by:
VÁ, -
(r ~ bl I,'4,)
[WA, -f- V;(I` - bA`) ~- V;;(I' - bA')J (16)
Condition (15) is compazable to the condition r- fk that must hold for optimal investment in
static models, without investment costs. In that case the user costs of capital equal the discount
rate r, while here depreciation and adjustment costs must be taken into account.
The conditions (15) and (16) include terms with second-order partial derivatives of the value
function to own and foreign abatement capital, V~ and V;;. These denote how net growth
in own respectively the foreign capital stock is evaluated. In the steady state considered in
the numerical example above, the last two terms are zero, since capital stocks do not grow
in the steady state. Therefore, these terms are left out below. The mazginal value of a unit
of abatement capital is then its direct mazginal contribution to welfaze, WÁ, plus its effect on
foreign investments, IÁ; as valued by VÁ, . The paztial derivative of the value function toforeign
capital, VÁ„ expresses the valuation of the foreign capital stock. Since investment decisions
immediately lead to a different capital stock, VÁ, is the right price at which to evaluate 1,'q, . The
value of VÁ, in turn is given by the properly discounted effects of a change in foreign capital
stocks on home welfaze (see (16)).
ZHere V;~ denotes the second-order partial derivative of V' to A' and A~, etcetera.
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For a social planner, W' - R' - pee' and the first-order condition on equilibrium investment
is therefore3:
(r f ó)c'(1`) --(~` t D'~a")E~(A`)~` ~ Ri,~A , - D`~Q`'E(A')~Á; -F VÁ, I,'4; (17)
with
~
V' - 1 [R' x' D'~Q''ej (18)
A~ -(r f b- I,'y, ) 2~ A~ - dA~
The marginal effect of abatement capital on home welfare consist of four pazts. The immediate
cost savings that result aze the first part. Per unitofoutput, social costs ( including environmental
costs at home) are decreased by -E'(A`)(p` f D'~~")~`. Here ~' is the equilibrium rate of
output. This is given by condition ( 4). The second and third part represent a rent-shifting
effect and the change in damage from abroad, both due to changes in foreign equilibrium
output. They are positive, so that strategic interaction in the output mazket leads to more
investment than is justified if only direct cost savings are counted. Both effects disappear if
there is no strategic interaction in the output market, that is, when a- 0. The fourth term,
VÁ, IÁ; , describes the valuation by the social planner of changes in foreign investment. If more
abatement capital discourages foreign investment and the social planner in country i values this
reduction positively, then this term also is an additional incentive to invest. That is the case
in our example. VÁ, as defined by (18) is determined by a rent-shifting effect (less foreign
abatement capital decreases foreign output) and by the change in damage from abroad that is
due to changes in foreign abatement capital.
The incentive to invest defined by equation ( 17) is the benchmark against which other incentives
should be compared. Due to competition between governments, competition between firms
and between firm and regulator, this benchmark cannot be obtained by regulation. There are
too many distortions to regulate with only one environmental policy instrument.
Now consider the equilibrium conditions for investment for a firm under environmental policy.
For an easier exposition, the terms that have to do with the interaction between the firm and
its governments are suppressed at first. They are added later, so that the complete conditions
are given by (23) and (25) on page (175) below. For standards as an instrument of policy, the
first part of the condition on optimal investment for firm i, that competes with firm j and is
regula[ed by the government i, is then given by:
(r f b)C~(j`) --(P` f D'~(p')~t')E~(A~)~` f UÁ,jA~ (19)
where UÁ, is given by:
',- 1 ~ [ ` ÁjUA (r~b-IA,) Rx~~ ~
(20)
3leaving out the V;; and Y~ terms.
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Here equilibrium output is from condition (5). Standards provide strong output commitments,
because when they are binding, it is always optimal for firms to produce exactly at rate E~AI.
Due to that commitment, strategic interaction through the output mazket is no longer possible.
As a result, only immediate cost savings and effects on foreign investment contribute to the
marginal benefits of an additional unit of abatement capital. Whether or not pollution is
transboundazy then makes no difference in case of standards, because terms with ~`~ aze absent
from the equilibrium conditions. When a- 0, interaction through the output market is absent
and the firm attaches no value to changes in foreign output. Hence UÁ, is zero in that case.
Then only immediate social cost savings determine equilibrium investment in abatement under
standards. Note that this is not true for the benchmark case, because the social planner, in
contrast to the firm, values foreign output also for its effect on transboundary pollution. The
term D`~,Q`~E(A~)xA; in (17) reflects this.
For taxes as an instrument of environmental policy, the incentive to invest contains strategic
terms, since in that case, like in the benchmark case, the decision makers (now firms) can affect
each other's output choices. Firms take environmental damage into account only as far as this
is reflected by emission taxes. The first part of the equilibrium condition in case of taxes [hen
is:
(r ~ ó)C'(I`) - -(pe ~ Tt)E'(A')~`T } R',~á } Uá,IA, (21)
with x'T the output rate chosen by firm i in case of taxes and UÁ, given by:
UÁ; - I ~ ~E`~ ~á, ~ (22)(rfê-IA,)
The first term again gives immediate cost savings that include the [ax. This tax does not fully
reflect environmental damage in country i, since the government distorts taxes to influence
competition. From (6), taxes are set below marginal damage at home. Immediate cost savings
are therefore lower than in the benchmark case and than in case of standazds. The second term
reflects strategic effects. Since in case of taxes, the foreign firm is more flexible, there is better
possibility to influence its behaviour than in case of standards. Compared to the benchmark
case, the term that reflects changes in damage from abroad is absent here, because the firm now
decides on investment and does not value environmental damage. Instead the regulator distorts
the tax. That is, however, a less effective way to reduce foreign output than direct distortions
in investment.
In the above expressions for equilibrium investment under standazds and taxes, a number of
distortions are yet missing. These concern interactions between the firm and its regulator.
Given feedback strategies of environmental policy, capital stocks at home influence both
environmental policy at home and environmental policy abroad. The latter affects foreign
output and therefore home damage and profits. Under standards, the interaction through
foreign policy is the only way in which firms may influence foreign output choices. When
these interactions are taken into account, conditions under standards are extended to:
(r f ê)C~(I`) --(p` f
D~~at~)~tisE,(A;) f R`~xe,éÁ~ -F D~~atceA f UÁ,I,'4; (23)
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The sign of éA, and éÁ, is derived in appendix C for the special case of a linear damage
function. It turns out that éA, G 0, which means that more foreign abatement capital induces
a stricter environmental policy at home, that is a lower standazd. An explanation could be
that the government tries to induce the home firm to keep up with the foreign firm and invest
in abatement technology. Note that transboundary pollution cannot explain the sign of éÁ, in
this case, since linear damage was assumed. Linear damage implies that changes in Aj do
not change the marginal damage at home, measured by Di~, of emissions from the home firm.
The marginal effect on foreign standards of changes in domestic abatement capital, that is,
éA„ is hence an incentive to invest more, because more investment is a way to reduce foreign
standards and discourage foreign output. The sign of éA, is indeterminate. It depends on
which of two effects dominates. One effect is the incentive for the government to set a stricter
standard, since it is cheaper for a firm with more abatement capital to obey this standazd. The
other effect is the incentive to set a laxer standard, since with a more environmental friendly
technology, output causes less damage. When the total effect is negative, there is an incentive
for the firm not to invest too much in environmental friendly technology, because this would
induce stricter policy.
For taxes as an instrument of environmental policy the equilibrium conditions become:
i i e i i i iT i jT jT i jT




Uq~ - I j ~Rj(xA ~ xTT TA~ f~'r~TÁ~ )- E'(A i)2iTTÁ,~ (i6)(r f b - IA,)
Effects on foreign output now include indirect effects through policy adjustments. The ad-
ditional terms in (25) and (26) reflect effects on home environmental policy. The signs of
these effects are derived in appendix C, again for the special case where the damage function
is linear. Then rA, G 0 provided that a reasonable condition is satisfied, while the sign of
TÁ, is undetermined (For details see the appendix). A rough explanation why more domestic
abatement capital leads to lower domestic taxes, is that emission per unit of output is lower if
the abatement capital stock is higher. With lower emissions per unit, the marginal damage per
unit ofoutput decreases, while its mazginal benefits stay the same. The rate of output preferred
by the government, which balances firm profits and environmental quality, is therefore higher.
As a result, taxes are set at a lower level. Of course, lower taxes aze appreciated by the firm
and the effect on taxes is an additional incentive to invest. If TÁ, ~ 0, more foreign abatement
capital leads to higher taxes, which the firm does not like. It hence tries to reduce foreign
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investment. An explanation why foreign abatement capital increases taxes could be that the
government tries to stimulate its home firm to invest in abatement as well, in order to keep up
with the foreign firm. However, parameter values such that TA, c 0 also exist. Then other
effects dominate the effect that the government wants to stimulate its home firm to keep up
with the foreign firm.
Besides these direct effects of capital stocks on equilibrium policies, the expressions (23) and
(25) include more indirect effects of investment in abatement capital on environmental policy.
In total, these expressions contain a lot of direct and indirect effects of investment. It is not
cleaz ex-ante what are the signs of all distorting terms, neither whether the fina] effect will be
too much or too less incentives to invest compared to the benchmark case. In the numerical
example above, it depends on the degree of competition between firms, whether taxes provide
almost correct incentives or lead to too much investment compazed to the benchmark case.
Standazds, in contrast, in the example ]ead to underinvestment. When output competition is
lazge, standards as a result are closer to the benchmazk case than taxes.
In static analyses, like in Downing and White (1986) standazds give an underincentive, while
taxes give a more or less right incentive to invest. This however was derived in a case with local
pollution, perfect competition and no adjustments. In the context of the expressions above that
implies that it is assumed that ~'~ - 0, x'A, - xÁ, - 0 and R`~ - 0. Then (17) becomes:
(r } b)C(I`) - -(Pe -I-
Dt~~~t)E~(At)~~s ~ VA~I~; (27)
with VÁ, equal to zero, since no reasons for foreign abatement capital to have any effect on
home welfaze are included in the model assumptions. Thus, the incentive to invest in abatement
capital only consists of direct costs savings. Under standards, since output is assumed to be
constant, the only cost savings are reduced payments for e':
(r } ó)Ci(It) - -pe~isiD, i(Ai) (28)
The term UÁ,IA; is left out since, like in the benchmark case, UA, - 0. Under taxes, the
equilibrium condition for investment is given by
(r f ó)C~(1') - -(p` -}~ T')E~(A')x`T (29)
and again UÁ, - 0.
It can immediately be seen from these three conditions, that indeed standards provide too little
incentive, while taxes provide the correct incentive, provided that they aze set according to
equation ( 6), which here simplifies to r' - D'~~". It is clear that these conditions assume
quite rigid behaviour, with almost no adjustment possibilities. The conditions above, (25)
and (23), aze the other extreme, where due to a lot of adjustment possibilities, all conceivable
vaziations aze possible. From the counterexample it follows that the neglect of these vaziations
may result in misleading conclusions regarding the dynamic efficiency of policy instruments.
In the presence of strategic interaction, there is not one instrument, either taxes or standards,
that always is more dynamically efficient than the other.
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5 Conclusions
A dynamic game model of an international duopoly was used to describe the environmental
policy setting by national governments that balance environmental targets and home firm
competitiveness. When pollution is transboundary and trade is characterized by strategic
interaction there are several reasons for regulators to deviate from the pigouvian level of
environmental policy. Quantity based instruments, in the form of emission standazds, were
compazed to price based instruments in the form of emission taxes. Under emission standards
firm's commitment to a certain output level is greater than under taxes. Therefore, there is less
possibility to affect the output choices of the competitor with standards than with taxes. This
leads to different equilibrium output and emission levels under both instruments.
Attention focused on the dynamic efficiency of both instruments. Within the specific setting
that we used, with much more adjustments than in the usual case, no instrument is dominating
the other in this respect. Hence, if decision makers act rationally and take all direct and indirect
effect of their decisions into account, it is not true that standards aze always less dynamically
efficient than taxes. It depends on the initial level of technology, on the shape of revenue
functions and on the effects of a more environmental friendly technology on operating costs
which instrument is more dynamically efficient.
In the model, abatement investments decrease operating costs, since they tend to increase the
efficient use of inputs. As a result, if the price of the polluting input is high enough, firms
already invest in abatement technology. However, when the price of the polluting input is not
high enough, the net present value of abatement investments is negative, so that firms do not
invest in abatement, unless they are subject to some environmental policy. This is the case that
is considered in the main part of the analysis
The analysis assumes perfect foresight so that firms are indeed able to base their investment
decisions on expectations about the future. In reality such foresight is absent and it may be
the case that current taxes are used by firms to predict future taxes. In that case the open-loop
equilibria discussed in chapter 6 may give a better description than feedback equilibria.
Alternatively, it maybe compared what happens when firms are myopic and base their decisions
on current tax levels, as is done in Magat (1978). In Magat's paper firms choose between
investment that improves their productivity and investment that improves the environmental
friendliness of their production process. Taxes and standazds have a different effect on the
degree to which firms invest in abatement. They lead to a bias in investment either towazds
abatement or towards productive investment. The direction of the bias under each instrument
changes with the flexibility of the production function, that is with the possibility for the firm
to switch factors from productive to abatement activities. These results aze in agreement with
our results in the sense that there is not one instrument that can be said to be the instrument
that always leads to most investment in abatement technology.
The interaction between the firm and its regulator is an important part of the strategic incentives
to invest ín abatement capital. Since no information asymmetry was assumed, this interaction
differs from principal-agent problems. The regulator dces not need to extract information
from the firm, but it reacts to the commitments made by the firm. The firm can foresee what
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environmental policy it will face in the future. Cadot and Sinclair-Desgagné (1995) analyse a
related problem. In their paper, a firm is faced with a regulator that will impose a prescribed
standard at some, yet uncertain, future time. Since the regulators pay-off also depends on the
profits of the firm, it reacts to the firm's efforts to develop a new, less polluting, technology.
T'his leads to a game, where the threat of regulation gives the firm incentives to indeed invest
in abatement technology. Firms cannot exactly foresee future environmental policy, since
they may or may not be regulated. If governments weigh firm profitability very high, the
equilibrium may be a situation with no regulation and no investment. In the model analysed
in this chapter, an analogous situation exists, when for zero stocks of abatement capital, still
the weight attached to firm profits is so high that rather than environmental taxes, regulators
introduce subsidies on emissions, because strategic motives dominate environmental damage.
In case of standards, that would imply an equilibrium with no binding standards.
An important extension would be to include stock damage of pollution, so that a realistic
environmental damage function, instead of an evaluation of policy targets, could be used for
the trade off between firm profits and environmental benefits. However, this would introduce
at least a third state variable to the problem, which makes analysis very complicated.
A Equilibrium conditions for the social planner case
Equilibrium output
The first-order conditions for optimal choice of output for a social planner in country i are:
Ri ~ (7~e }
Di~~ii)E(A~) (A.1)
x' ? 0 (A.2)
x'~R~ - (Pe f Di~Ri,)E(A')~ - fi (A.3)
All three conditions must hold for i-1,2. Nash equilibrium results in output choices xls(Al, Az) and
x2S(Al, AZ). Assume that an interior solution with both outputs positive is reached.





Di(x1S x2S)~(lt1' 0 l (A.4)
A' - I' - áA' i-1,2 (A.5)
I' ~ 0 i-1,2 (A.6)
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Equilibrium investment
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman conditions for the game (A.4) to (A.6) are:
rV'(Al~ A2) - R' - peE(Ai)~:S - C`(I`) - D' f Vq`.(I` - bA') ~- Vq',(I' - bA') (A.7)
Here V` is the value function of the social planner in country i. I' is the equilibrium rate of investment
in emission reduction derived from the condition that I` should maximize the right-hand side of (A.?):
C'~(Í') 1 VA,(Al, A2); Í` ~ 0; Í'[C'~(Ï') - VÁ;] - 0 (A.8)
The equilibrium rate of output is given by equation ( A.1) above, that must hold with equality in an
interior solution. Assume that the value function is differentiable and take the partial derivatives to A`,
respectively A'. This gives the following expressions, where the first-order conditions on investment
and output, ( A.8) and (A.1) are inserted.
(Tfb)Vá~ - -(PefD;~~,~)E'(At)x;s-f-R`~zA,fVA,IA;-D'~~3"E(A')xA,fV~](I'-bA`)~-V,~(I~-6A')(A.9)
(r~-b)VA, --D'~(3`~E'(A~)x~SfR'~xA,-D'~Q''E(A~)xA,fV,~(I'-6A')fV~~(h-bA')(A.10)
B Equilibrium investment with environmental policy
First some notation is introduced. Let A, r, x and é denote the vectors (A', A'), (r`, r~), (x`, x') and
(e , é~ ) respectively. Let U, denote [he partial derivative of U` to A` and define W,' analogously. The
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman conditions for the game above are in case of taxes:
rU`(A) - R' -(p` f T;)E(A;)x.N(r A) - C'(I~) f U, (A)(h - bA') f U~(A)(h - óA') (B.1)
rW`(A) - Ri-peE(A~)z~~(T A)-C`(I')-D'(P`(x,A))fW~(A)(I'-áA`)fW;(A)(h-áA')(B.2)
In case of standards on emissions, the conditions for a feedback equilibrium are:
rU'(A) - R' - peé - C'(I') f U; (A)(I' - óA') f U~(A)(P - 6A') (B3)
rW`(A) - R' - peé - C'(h) - D`(P`(é)) f W; (A)(I' - bA`) ~ W~(A)(h - bA') (B.4)
Assume that the value functions are differentiable, and partially differentiate U`(A`, A~ ) to A` and A~
respectively. This gives the following expressions for the mazginal value of a unit of own and foreign
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abatement capitaL Here the optimality conditions on output, investment and taxes, which can be found
in section 6.B, have been inserted.
(r -{- ó)U; - -(Pe f ri)E'(A')x'" ~- R
axj" axj" ari axj" arj
aAi } ari aAi } arj aAi )-






axj" axj" ari axj" arj i i~v ari
aAj } ari aAj } arj áAj )- E(A )~ áAj }
(B.5)
U;j(Ii - óA`) f U~j(Ij - óA')] (B.6)
For standards, these expressions read:
(r ~- ó)Ut --(Pe f D~~~~t)E~(A~)~,nr } Rj aaéN aAi
~- D'~~i~éq; f U~Ijq; f
U;;(Ii - óAi) -}- U;j(Ij - óA~) (B.7)
and
i 1 i a~~" a~~" ae~ i~ ii aé i (- i i j
U~ - r-f6-IjA,[R~( aAj } aéj aAj)}D p
aAjtU;j(I bA)-~Ujj(Ij-6A )](B.8)
Also here, optimality conditions on output, investment and standards have been inserted. These can
again be found in section 6.B.
C The effect of abatement investment on environmental
policy
To find the signs of eq; , é'q, , rA, and rÁ, , consider the first-order conditions that were derived in chapter
6 for the optimal policies under feedback strategies:
(Ri -7~`E(A`))~N- ~i~QiiE(A')y N f D'~~3'~E(A~)xr;v - R`j~rN, (C.1)
fortaxes and
RiE(Ai) - Pe f
D'~~", (C.2)
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for standards. Take the derivatives of these equations for i-1,2 and assume that D'~~ - 0 and that third
derivatives of the revenue function can be neglected. Assume as well that R'~~ - R;; - 0. Then two
systems of equations can be derived, that can be solved to give:




A- ,( t)[E(A`) Rj;Rii - R;~j~i~ J']
e - E~(A )E(A')R;~(pe f Di'~ii




; E~(`4')RiiR;iF e i~ ii i .7 R.t i~ ijElA')Tq~ -
E(A;)(jZi~R:iF2 - R;~3Ri~3)~(1~
f D Q)R~~R,~ - E(A;)F-f- D Í3 E(A;)F~,(C.5)
with F- R;;R~~ - 2R,~R;~. This is negative provided that F 1 0 and (R;;R~~F2 - R,~3R;~3) ~ 0,
which requires own effects ( R;; and R~~) to dominate foreign effects (R;~ and Ri~) to a strong enough
degree.
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Given that F ~ 0 and (R;;R~~F2 - R;~3R,~3) ~ 0, rÁ, is positive provided that the two second tenns
in the part between square brackets dominate the two firs[ terms. If that is not the case and the two first




Environmental problems often have international aspects and this thesis analyses some of
these aspects through the use of dynamic models. A recurrent theme is the comparison of the
environmental policy instruments taxes and standazds. There is a tradition of literature that
compazes these two instruments, when applied to solve environmental problems (see Bohm
and Russell, 1985). Most of the advantages and disadvantages have become textbook material
(see, for instance, Pearce and Turner, 1990). Usually, taxes and standards aze compared on
four aspects: their allocative efficiency, their effectiveness, their dynamic efficiency and their
transaction costs. A fifth obvious difference between taxes and standards is that under taxes
polluters must pay these taxes. Regulators at the same time receive the tax revenues, which
they may redistribute. Taxes and standazds therefore have different distributional implications.
These compazisons take place in a closed economy setting. An open economy with international
trade introduces new aspects. Pollution may cross borders, while governments aze not able to
directly regulate the behaviour of foreign polluters. Moreover, polluters may have international
competitors. T'he regulation of polluters then affects their position in the international market.
T'he comparison of taxes and standards in case of international trade is especially interesting
when trade can be considered as oligopolistic competition on an international market. The
market participants aze aware of each other's behaviour and will deliberately try to inftuence
the actions of others, that is, there is strategic interaction.
It was explained in the introduction (chapter 1) how oligopolistic competition between polluters,
together with the interest of governments in the profits earned by domestic firms, explains the
trade-strategic distortion of environmental policy instruments. Decisions on environmental
policy influence the position of regulated firms in the international market. If governments
care about the profits of domestic firms, that in turn affects their decisions about environmental
policy; they distort policy for trade-strategic reasons. An interesting question is whether the
type of environmental policy instrument makes any difference.
Ulph (1992) compares taxes and standards in a multistage game, which models firms which
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strategically trade on an intemational market. The model is a game consisting of three stages:
first governments decide to apply taxes or standards, then firms choose their capital stocks and
finally firms decide on output. The chosen instrument of environmental policy changes the
chazacter of strategic interaction among the firms.l Ulph finds that the government prefers
standazds because domestic firm earns more profits under standards than under taxes while the
same environmental target is realized.
The research in this thesis was motivated by that result and by the observation that the problem
at hand has many dynamic aspects: Investment in capital and the accumulation of pollution in
the environment aze inherently dynamic processes that take place over time. An investment
at some point in time has implications for future production possibilities. Emissions at some
moment imply an increase in pollution, which mostly assimilates only gradually.
Furthermore, most of the interactions involved, those between firms on the international market
for output, those between governments and those between firms and governments do not involve
once-and-for all decisions, but take place over a longer time period. That is, the interactions
are a repeated process of action and reaction. Decision strategies may differ in their adjustment
possibilities and therefore determine how players can react to the actions of other players. The
more ftexibility, the more interaction and the more important it is to use dynamic models, that
allow for such continuous interaction. The reseazch in this thesis therefore applies differential
game models of the interactions between firms and governments. Such models give insight
into the various interactions that occur and the effect of the different decision strategies which
players adopt.
1'he price that must be paid for the precise modelling of the dynamics and for analytical
tractability, is that the model has to be relatively simple in other aspects. In pazticular, this
implies that chapters 2, 3, 6 and 7 model duopolies with each duopolist located in a different
country, while consumers are assumed to be in a third country. The duopolists are regulated,
each by its own government, which values only environmental quality and home-firm profits.2
Furthermore, perfect foresight, complete information, interior solutions and no transaction
costs aze assumed. Tax revenues aze redistributed to polluters by lump-sum transfers.
These simplifications imply that, with one firm in each country, the differences between taxes
and standazds in allocative efficiency cannot be studied. Furthermore, the model is not suitable
to analyse differences between policy instruments in transaction costs, in effectiveness or in
distributive effects. These aspects are abstracted away, to concentrate on the main theme of
this thesis: issues of dynamic efficiency and distortions for trade strategic reasons. Dynamic
efficiency is addressed especially in chapter 7. The comparison of standards and taxes is
the subject of chapters 2, 3, 6 and 7, where the latter two chapters include transboundary
pollution. A third environmental policy instrument, namely marketable permits, is considered
in chapter 4. Chapter 5 focuses on the dynamics of transboundary stock pollution in a model
lOther papers use similaz multistage models to analyse environmental policy tazget choice for given policy
ins[ruments in a setting of international rivalry. This literature and the strategic trade literature which forms the
background for it has been reviewed in chapter 1.
2'Iltese same assumptions aze common in multistage analyses of strategic trade models as well.
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that abstracts from firm behaviour under government policy, but instead models the choices
made by countries which have to decide on their emissions.
A common result is the following: There are differences between emission taxes and emission
standards, if these instruments are applied by governments that engage in environmental policy
competition. However, it is not true that one of these instruments is unambiguously `better'
than the other, in the sense that it results in higher values of the social objective function.
Which instrument is `better' depends among other factors on the type of investment strategy
which the regulated firms apply.
2 A dynamic model of environmental policy competition
This section summazizes the intuition behind the general result stated above. With the help
of the concept of commitment, it is explained why different equilibria result from different
assumptions about either the type of investment strategy or the type of environmental policy
instrument.
To explain environmental policy competition, commitment is a useful concept. The rationale
for the government to interfere actively with the international competitiveness of its home
firms is that, in case of trade by oligopolists, the government has the ability to give its home
firms commitment and therefore a strategic advantage. Commitment means that the firm gains
the ability to bind its hands, which is to its advantage in the competition with other firms
on the output market. For example, if competition takes the form of Cournot competition,
then commitment to a high level of output means that the reaction curve of the firm is shifted
out. Governments could give their firm such commitments directly by export subsidies, but
also indirectly by distorted policies, for instance environmental policies. If the degree of
commitment is well chosen, the firm can earn more profits. To determine the appropriate
degree of commitment, the government must balance the cost to provide the commitment with
the additional profits that firms can earn with it.
For a given environmental target, the government prefers the policy instrument which guaz-
antees the highest profits for its firm. If the target of environmental policy is not given, the
government chooses the tax or the standard so that an objective function, that consists of both
environmental damage and home firm profits, is maximized. Similar incentives exist for the
other country. An equilibrium can be determined where all players act strategically.
How investment strategies influence the outcomes is best understood through a dynamic analy-
sis of the implications of different investment strategies. The degree of commitment to the use
of production factors or to output is the relevant factor. Some strategies imply quick reactions
to changing circumstances, while others imply a greater rigidity. Under open-loop strategies
of investment the rate of investment is fixed from the beginning and the firm will not change
this in reaction to the actions of others. Under feedback strategies of investment the rate of
investment depends on the current situation, and the firm adjusts its investment in reaction to
186 Conclusions
changes in both its own and the foreign stock of capital.3
Tlte environmental policy instruments of emission taxes and standards differ in their
commitment effects. An emission standard implies a strong commitment to the use of the
polluting input. For marginal changes in other's actions, the firm will not change the amount of
the polluting input. In contrast, an emission tax dces not give any commitment to the quantities
of the polluting input.
Under open-loop strategies of investment then, standards are a preferred choice of instrument,
because they give the firm a strong commitment and make it less sensitive to strategic interac-
tion. As a result, if both governments apply standards, in equilibrium investment for strategic
reasons is lower than if both governments apply taxes. This result, which is derived in chapter
2 confirms what was found in a multistage model.
In chapter 3 it is shown that this result depends on the assumption of open-loop investment
strategies. Under feedback investment strategies such clearcut results are no longer possible. It
is not necessarily true that taxes are `better' than standards or vice versa. A numerical example
in chapter 3 shows how this depends on the parameters of the model.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 extend the analysis with transboundary pollution, which is an independent
reason for distortions in environmental policy. Without international cooperation, transbound-
ary pollution is, by itself, a cause of suboptimal levels of environmental policy.
Chapter 5 addresses the role of production forests in the transboundary pollution problem of
global warming. Trees assimilate carbondioxide while they grow. Harvested trees release
their carbon content at some point in time. If a country owns a lazge production forest, it
may want to include the cazbon dynamics of its forest when net emissions of carbondioxide
are determined in international agreements. This chapter compares the global social optimum
and the noncooperative outcome for the case where the role of forests is included with the
outcomes for the case where this role is ignored. It turns out that for a large enough initial
forest, harvest should always be lower if net emissions count and if carbon assimilation and
emission of forests is included.4
Transboundary pollution furthermore increases the distortions that are due to strategic trade,
since the additiona] damage from laxer policies is valued less if this damage is partly abroad.
With transboundary pollution, the emissions from a firm in one country cause environmental
damage in both countries. Hence, a given environmental target for each country can no longer
be applied as a useful abstraction to make comparisons easier. In the model used in chapters 6
and 7, the governments balance environmental damage, valued by some damage function, with
firm profits. If firms are large enough to have mazket power, they may also be large enough to
have influence on environmental regulation. When a given environmental target is no longer
assumed, interactions between firms and regulators must be included in the analysis.
Investment is considered to be investment in abatement capital in the chapters 6 and 7. That
is, the role of capital as a substitute for the polluting input is made stronger than in chapters
3A mathematically precise definition of open-loop and feedback strategies was given in section 1.3.1.
4At the recent Kyoto meeting on global warming, it was discussed that countries with large forests should be
given compensation in their emission reduction requirements.
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2 and 3. This is done deliberately to analyse dynamic efficiency aspects in chapter 7. The
strategic interaction that can occur in a model with strategic trade and transboundary pollution
if all players (now two firms and two governments) use feedback strategies are quite complex.
However, it is possible by taking derivatives, to sort out the effects of all interactions on
investment and sign them for the special case of linear damage.
When firms and governments use open-loop strategies and governments balance environmental
quality and firm profits, results for the model with transboundary pollution aze different than
under feedback strategies. In analogy with the results in chapter 2, it might be expected that
with open-loop strategies, one instrument is clearly `better'. However, that is not the case.
To the contrary, the distortions of the instruments are more ambiguous. The reason is that
for open-loop investment strategies a stricter environmental policy implies that investment in
emission reduction becomes both more and less attractive. It becomes more attractive, because
a stricter policy means an increase in the costs to be paid for emissions per unit of output. It
becomes less attractive, since under stricter policy, the optimal output is reduced and hence
emissions. In case of feedback strategies investment is neutral with respect to changes in
current environmental policy, because investment in emission reduction is determined by its
future marginal benefits. Under feedback strategies, the government is flexible in its policy
choice, so that current policy has no direct link with future policy, which determines the
marginal benefits from investment in emission reduction.
In chapter 4 the role of flexibility is stressed again, but in a somewhat different setting. This
chapter models the investment behaviour of firms, in a closed economy, under a system of
permits that gives firms some flexibility to allocate their emissions over time. Firms get
this flexibility through transferable permits which they can bank or trade. The firms have
more flexibility than under a strict emission standard, but they are less flexible than under
environmental taxes. Their flexibility is further reduced, since they are required to satisfy
individual emission standards at the end of the period of regulation. Since investment takes
place over time, it is important for the firms to be flexible over time. That explains the
cost savings, that may result even when firms are only allowed to reallocate their emissions
individually, that is, can only bank permits for their own later use.
Bankable permits offer more flexibility than standards, but less than taxes. What may be
expected then from these permits in an international duopoly? That is an interesting question
for further reseazch. With the ambiguities found in chapters 2, 3, 6 and 7 in mind and
considering the complexity of a system of permits in case of investment, it is clear that it is not
easy to answer this question. With permits, the government can no longer directly steer the
amount of emissions at each point in time. In the models from chapters 2, 3, 6 and 7, that causes
complications, since the objective of the government consists of flow damage (or a fixed flow
target) and firm profits. When firms can bank permits it becomes a hard task for the government
to balance these objectives. Firms namely need to know the path of future emission allowances
to determine their investment. Through banking, they can reallocate their emissions over time
and change the flow of emissions. Governments have to predict such reallocations and choose
the optimal time path given their predictions. But if they cannot commit to such a path, time
inconsistent solutions are probable. Firms invest based on their expectations about a certain
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path. Since the government also values firm profits it is intuitively attractive for the government
to put some extra permits on the market once all firms have invested sufficiently.
3 Some last remarks
The chapters in this thesis all analyse environmental policy and international rivalry in compact
and abstract models. The intention is to disentangle mechanisms, more than to find immediate
policy implications. The result is a structured description of interactions that take place in
a setting of oligopolistic international competition, transboundary pollution and governments
that value both environmental quality and home-firm profits. With the use of dynamic game
models, the role of decision strategies is explained and insight is gained into the concept of
commitment which drives the results.
The research is conceptually rather than practically oriented. Yet, it is a nice exercise to dwell
a little on possible policy implications. The four chapters on environmental policy competition
use a differential game model that distinguishes firms, who produce to maximize profits from
sales of output on an international market and govemments, who regulate, to control some
unidentified environmental problem. Possible applications are easy to find if the model is
taken in a loose way. For example aluminium factories, large companies in the chemical sector
and airports are well aware of their international competitors, while their production causes
environmental pollution. Furthermore, the regulation aimed at these firms is often tailored to
them and their international competitiveness is an issue for regulators.
It is not possible to directly translate the model to such applications. Application would require
first to make adequate assumptions about the type ofcompetition, the form of the environmental
regulation and the type of decision strategies used by the players. The assumption ofcomplete
information and perfect foresight should be modified and it must be considered how players
form their expectations and what information they can obtain at reasonable costs. Effects which
were ignored to concentrate on the main issues, such as distortions in the environmental policy
of other sectors, the possibility of entry, and income distribution effects should be considered
to check whether their influence can indeed be safely ignored in the specific case at hand.
It would not be surprising if in the end, the resulting model would be too complex to find
analytical results. Numerical methods might then be useful.
In the presence of transboundary pollution and oligopolistic international trade, strategic effects
play a role that cannot be ignored. This thesis shows that differential game models can provide
important insights into this role. Commitment is the determinant behind all results. Different
commitments related to taxes and standards explain why standards in some cases may reduce
stra[egic overinvestment. Different commitments related to open-loop and feedback investment
strategies explain why under feedback strategies the same result dces not generally hold.
The model with transboundary pollution furthermore includes new results on dynamic efficien-
cy. It sorts out all incentives to invest in emission reduction, in case of strategic trade, firms
that interact strategically with governments, and governments who engage in environmental
policy competition. An instrument is defined to be dynamically efficient if it comes close to
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the rate of investment in emission reduction that is socially optimal. If governments react to
a higher environmental capital stock through stricter regulation, an incentive arises for firms
to invest less in emission reduction. It is shown that cases exist where taxes provide too much
incentives to invest, whereas under standards the firm comes closer to the socially optimal rate
of investment.
In short, differential game models provide a rich structure that allows to consider various
types of equilibria. Some of these equilibria, especially those that result when players are
assumed to use flexible decision strategies, cannot be found in models with a less extensive
dynamic structure. As a result, the analyses in this thesis detect mechanisms that were not
(and could not) be found with the multistage models that are usually applied in the literature.
Therefore, the analysis of differential game models adds to the understanding of the behaviour
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Internationale aspecten zijn een kenmerk van veel milieuproblemen. Ze komen in verschil-
lende vormen tot uitdrukking: De meest voor de hand liggende vorm is grensoverschrijdende
vervuiling, zoals optreedt bij de lozing van giftige stoffen in de Maas of bij klimaatverander-
ing. Meer indirect komen internationale aspecten tot uitdrukking in geval bedrijven lokale
vervuiling veroorzaken, maaz hun producten verhandelen op een internationale markt. Ook
kunnen geïmporteerde producten tijdens of na hun consumptie voor vervuiling zorgen; een
voorbeeld hiervan zijn batterijen. Dit proefschrift gaat hoofdzakelijk over de als tweede ge-
noemde uitdrukkingsvorm: vervuilende producenten die te maken hebben met internationale
concurrenten. Milieubeleid gericht op deze vervuilers zal hun (internationale) concunen-
tiepositie beïnvloeden. Immers, de concurrentie wordt gereguleerd door een andere overheid,
met ander beleid. De overheid zal, in haar rol als ontwerper en uitvoerder van milieubeleid,
rekening houden met de internationale concurrentiepositie van de bedrijven die aan dat beleid
onderworpen worden, wanneer ze, naast een goede kwaliteit van het milieu, belang hecht aan
de aanwezigheid van winstgevende bedrijven.
Strategische interactie tussen oligopolisten op de wereldmazkt kan leiden tot aanpassingen in
milieubeleid. De verklazing daazvan kan worden gevonden door de interacties tussen bedrijven
in oligopolie nader te bekijken. Een bedrijf dat concurreert op een mazkt met onvolledige
mededinging kan profijt hebben van `commitment', wat betekent `het ergens aan gebonden
zijn' (bijvoorbeeld aan milieuregulering). In een oligopolie zijn slechts enkele concurrenten
op de mazkt aanwezig, waardoor de beslissingen van de één merkbaze gevolgen hebben voor
de ander. In evenwicht zal dan sprake zijn van strategisch gedrag: de bedrijven zullen rekening
houden met de invloed die hun beslissingen hebben op hun concurrenten en met de reacties van
die concurrenten. Het aangaan van commitments is een vorm van dergelijk strategisch gedrag:
door zich te binden aan bepaalde acties, wordt de concurrent als het waze afgeschrikt. Het
bedrijf kan bijvoorbeeld investeren in een grote productiecapaciteit en zich zo binden aan een
hoge productie. Het wordt minder winstgevend voor de concurrent om zelf een hoge productie
op de mazkt te brengen, omdat het grote aanbod op de markt dan tot een lage verkoopprijs kan
leiden.
Het bedrijf kan zelf commitment aangaan, bijvoorbeeld door bepaalde investeringen te doen.
2~2 Samenvatting
Daarnaast kan de overheid voor commitment zorgen, onder andere via milieubeleid. Milieu-
regulering vormt namelijk een commitment voor het bedrijf, wat de overheid door aanpassingen
kan beïnvlceden. Zo kan ze haar positie als regelgever benutten en de oligopolist in het bin-
nenland bevoordelen. Wanneer de overheid zowel hoge winst voor de oligopolist als een lage
vervuiling nastreeft, zullen in evenwicht zulke aanpassingen optreden. Een centrale vraag in
dit prcefschrift is welk type instrument van milieubeleid de overheid het best kan toepassen,
indien ze expliciet rekening houdt met internationale concurrentie en haar milieubeleid hieraan
aanpast.
De vergelijking van diverse types milieubeleidsinstrumenten, zoals heffingen en maximum
standaards op emissies, heeft een lange traditie in de milieu-economische literatuur (Zie Bohm
en Russell, 1985). Een aantal verschillen tussen de diverse instrumenten behoort inmiddels
tot de standaard literatuur. Pearce en Turner (1990) bijvoorbeeld noemen: verschillen in
allocatieve efficiëntie, in effectiviteit, in dynamische efficiëntie en in transactiekosten. Een
ander verschil heeft te maken met distributie-effecten: bij heffingen en in sommige systemen
van verhandelbare emissierechten betalen de vervuilers een prijs voor elke eenheid emissie.
Dat betekent een herverdeling van inkomsten tussen de vervuilers en de overheid. In de
analyses in dit proefschrift wordt aangenomen dat de overheid de opbrengsten van heffingen
of verhandelbare emissierechten kan terugsluizen naar de vervuilers, zodat dit effect verder
buiten beschouwing kan worden gelaten.
Bovengenoemde verschillen betreffen de vergelijking van instrumenten in een gesloten
economie, dat wil zeggen, er wordt geen rekening gehouden met onderlinge afhankelijkheden
tussen landen, via handel of grensoverschrijdende vervuiling. Wanneer een open economie
wordt beschouwd, moeten extra aspecten in de vergelijking worden betrokken. Zo kan vervui-
ling afkomstig uit een ander land niet altijd op een doeltreffende manier worden gereguleerd.
Ook kunnen vervuilende bedrijven internationale concurrenten hebben. In geval van perfecte
mededinging hebben de acties van individuele bedrijven geen merkbare invloed op elkaars
mogelijkheden. Dan is het, ook in een open economie, optimaal voor de overheid om het
milieubeleid te baseren op de gelijkheid van marginale kosten en marginale baten (zie Ulph
(1994) en andere literatuur genoemd in hoofdstuk 1). Echter, in geval van competi[ie tussen
een klein aantal concurrenten met marktmacht, is het aantrekkelijk voor de overheid om
af te wijken van dat niveau van milieubeleid. Daarmee kan ze de binnenlandse bedrijven
van concurrentievoordeel voorzien. Het verschijnsel dat de overheid haar beleid aanpast uit
handelsstrategische overwegingen heet ook wel beleidsconcurrentie. Beleidsconcurrentie kan
niet alleen plaatsvinden via milieubeleid, maar ook bijvoorbeeld via winstbelastingen of beleid
op het gebied van de sociale zekerheid. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de verschillen tussen
milieubeleidsinstrumenten wanneer er sprake is van beleidsconcurrentie via het milieubeleid.
Ulph (1992) vergelijkt heffingen en standaards op emissie in een driestappenmodel van twee
oligopolisten die ieder in een ander land gevestigd zijn. In een eerste fase beslist de overheid
welk instrument ze inzet, heffingen of standaards, om de vervuiling tot een bepaald maximum
te beperken. In een tweede fase kiest het bedrijf de hoeveelheid kapitaalgoederen die in de
productie wordt gebruikt. Tenslotte kiest het bedrijf de omvang van de productie en daarmee de
vervuiling. De keuze voor heffingen dan wel standaards beïnvlcedt de strategische interactie
Samenvatting 203
tussen de bedrijven. Ulph concludeert dat in evenwicht beide overheden voor standaards
kiezen, omdat het eigen bedrijf dan hogere winsten kan behalen, terwijl de vervuiling even
groot is als onder (goed gekozen) heffingen. Het is opvallend dat standaards tot hogere winsten
leiden, zelfs als wordt gecorrigeerd voor de betaling van de heffingen. Als er geen sprake zou
zijn van strategische interactie tussen de duopolisten, dan zouden de bedrijven, afgezien van de
betaling voor de heffingen, dezelfde winst halen onder beide instrumenten. Door de strategische
interactie tussen de bedrijven is er sprake van overinvesteringen, welke verschillend zijn onder
heffingen en standaards.
Het verschil tussen heffingen en standaards wordt dus verklaard via hun invloed op de keuze
van de kapitaalgoederenvoorraad. De keuze voor een bepaalde kapitaalgoederenvoorraad is
echter geen eenmalige keuze. Kapitaal wordt opgebouwd via investeringen. Investeringen in
en productie met kapitaalgoederen vinden plaats over de tijd. Investeringen hebben daarom
niet alleen effect op de winst van het bedrijf op het tijdstip waarop ze plaatsvinden maar ook op
de winst in de periode daarna. Interacties tussen de betrokken economische agenten, overheden
en bedrijven vinden ook over een langere periode plaats. De mate van reactie op elkaars gedrag
hangt af van de flexibiliteit van de betrokkenen en van de gekozen beslissingss[rategieën.
Dit is aanleiding om in dit proefschrift de dynamiek van de interactie tussen de bedrijven en
tussen de overheden nader uit te werken. In plaats van een stappenmodel wordt de interactie
tussen de bedrijven en de overheden als een differentiaalspel gemodelleerd. Differentiaalspelen
maken het mogelijk om het dynamisch proces van interacties gedetailleerd te modelleren.
Hierdoor kan interactie tussen bedrijven en overheden over de tijd geanalyseerd worden. Dat
geeft inzicht in de effecten van verschillende beslissingsstrategieën en maakt het mogelijk om
investeringen in kapitaal expliciet als proces in de tijd te bestuderen.
Inhoud valn het proefschrift
In hoofdstuk 1 staat ter inleiding een overzicht van relevante literatuur op het gebied van
strategische internationale handel en differentiaalspelen. Eerder onderzoek naar de relatie
tussen handel en milieu wordt kort behandeld, met de nadruk op zogenaamde `stappenmodellen'
van internationale oligopolies. Ook geeft dit hoofdstuk een introductie opde differentiaalspelen
die in de rest van het proefschrift worden gebruikt.
De hoofdstukken 2 en 3 analyseren een duopolie, dat wil zeggen een tweelandenmodel met één
bedrijf per land. Door deze abstractie verdwijnen de verschillen in allocatieve efficiëntie tussen
heffingen en standaards. Bij aanname vindt consumptie van de output van het duopolie volledig
plaats in een derde land. Bovendien wordt geabstraheerd van verschillen in transactiekosten, in
doeltreffendheid en in verdelingseffecten tussen heffingen en standaards. De nadruk komt zo
te liggen op verstoringen uit handelsstrategische overwegingen en op dynamische efficiëntie.
De hoofdstukken 2 en 3 vergelijken heffingen met standaards voor respectievelijk investerings-
strategieën met weinig flexibiliteit (open-loop strategieën) en investeringsstrategieën met veel
flexibiliteit (feedback strategieën).
Een derde instrument van milieubeleid, verhandelbare emissierechten wordt geanalyseerd in
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hoofdstuk 4. In dit hoofdstuk analyseren we het investeringsgedrag van een bedrijf in een
gesloten economie onder een systeem van emissierechten die verhandelbaar zijn en op de
`bank' kunnen worden gezet voor toekomstig gebruik. Bedrijven hebben zo enige flexibiliteit
om hun emissies over de tijd te verdelen. Verder stelt het model in dit hoofdstuk eisen aan de
kapitaalgoederenvoorraad van de bedrijven aan het eind van een bepaalde periode.
Grensoverschrijdende vervuiling en de dynamische interactie tussen landen is onderwerp van
hoofdstuk 5. Er wordt geabstraheerd van bedrijven en overheden. Dit hoofdstuk gaat over de
rol van productiebossen bij de vermindering van de uitstoot van kooldioxide naar de atmosfeer.
Groeiende bomen assimileren kooldioxide. Een land met grote productiebossen, zoals bijvoor-
beeld Finland, kan redeneren dat het via de groei van zijn bossen bijdraagt aan bestrijding van
klimaatverandering. Zulke landen pleiten ervoor om te onderhandelen over de netto emissies
van kooldioxide, dat wil zeggen de emissies waarin assimilatie door bossen wordt meegeteld.
In dit hoofdstuk leiden we evenwichten af waarbij zulke netto emissies worden gebruikt in
plaats van de bruto emissies van kooldioxide.
De hoofdstukken 6 en 7 borduren voort op hoofdstuk 2 en 3. De analyse wordt uitgebreid naar
grensoverschrijdende vervuiling. Grensoverschrijdende vervuiling is op zich een reden voor
de overheid om af te wijken van het milieubeleid wat optimaal is voor een gesloten economie.
De overheid zal immers niet altijd rekening houden met emissies van het eigen bedrijf die in het
buitenland voor vervuiling zorgen en kan op haar beurt geen controle uitoefenen op vervuiling
afkomstig van bedrijven over de grens. Bovendien zal de verstoring in het milieubeleid voor
handelsstrategische doeleinden versterkt worden.
In de modellen in deze hoofdstukken maakt de overheid een afweging tussen milieukwaliteit
in het binnenland en bedrijfswinsten van het eigen bedrijf. Naast interactie tussen bedrijven
en interactie tussen overheden, wordt ook de interactie tussen bedrijven en overheden geanal-
yseerd. Investeringen worden specifiek als investeringen in de vermindering van emissies
beschouwd. Dat wil zeggen, de bedrijven investeren in zogeheten milieutechnologie. Kapitaal
is daarmee, meer nog dan in hoofdstukken 2 en 3, een substituut voor emissies. Hoofdstuk
6 analyseert de verstoringen in milieubeleid voor heffingen en standaards. Hoofdstuk 7 gaat
expliciet in op dynamische efficiëntie en analyseert in hoeverre de investeringen in emissiere-
ductie onder heffingen en standaards optimaal zijn, wanneer de overheid het milieubeleid
aanpast uit handelsstrategische overwegingen.
Hoofdstuk 8 tenslotte sluit af inet een samenvatting van de resultaten.
Samenvatting van de resultaten
In deze paragraaf worden de belangrijkste resultaten uit het proefschrift uiteengezet. Tussen
de hoofdstukken 2, 3, 6 en 7 is een duidelijk verband, omdat ze een vergelijkbaar model
analyseren. Daarom zal de nadruk eerst op de resultaten uit die hoofdstukken liggen. Aan het
eind komen ook de resultaten van hoofdstuk 4 en 5 aan de orde.
Uit bovengenoemde vier hoofdstukken kunnen de volgende twee algemene conclusies worden
getrokken: Ten eerste verschillen heffingen en standaards inderdaad wanneer de overheid
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handelspolitieke overwegingen meeweegt in haar milieubeleid. Ten tweede is op grond van
deze verschillen niet één instrument als `beter' dan het andere instrument aan te wijzen. Welk
instrument `beter' is vanuit de optiek van een overheid die milieu enbedrijfswinst beide meetelt,
is onder meer afhankelijk van het type beslissingsstrategie dat door bedrijven wordt gebruikt bij
hun investeringen. Deze twee conclusies zijn te verklaren door nader in te gaan op verschillen
in commitment. Hiermee kan worden uitgelegd waarom een ander evenwicht tot stand komt
bij een andere investeringsstrategie of een ander type milieubeleidsinstrument.
De overheid kan het eigen bedrijf bevoordelen door de strategische aanpassing van het milieu-
beleid dankzij het commitment wat de overheid aan dat bedrijf kan geven. Wanneer de bedrijven
hun marktmacht uitoefenen via keuze van de omvang van de productie, is het een voordeel
voor het bedrijf om een commitment te hebben om veel te produceren. De overheid kan zulke
commitments direct aan het bedrijf geven, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van exportsubsidies, maar
ook indirect, via verstoringen in het milieubeleid (een lagere heffing of een minder strenge
standaard). Mits juist gekozen, resulteren zulke verstoringen in meer winst voor het bedrijf.
De overheid moet deze extra winst afwegen tegen het verlies in milieukwaliteit als gevolg
van het minder strenge milieubeleid. Het kan aangetoond worden dat een evenwicht bestaat
waarin beide overheden een kleine verstoring hebben in hun milieubeleid (zie bijvoorbeeld
Ulph, 1994). Omdat de overheid in elk van de twee landen op dezelfde manier zal redeneren
ontstaat een evenwicht waarbij alle partijen strategisch handelen.
Heffingen en standaards als instrumenten van milieubeleid verschillen in de mate van
commitment die ze voor het bedrijf impliceren. Een standaard op de emissies betekent een sterk
commitment voor wat betreft het gebruik van de vervuilende productiefactor. In evenwicht
zal het bedrijf juist de toegestane maximum emissie uitstoten. Het is dan niet optimaal om de
emissies aan te passen voor kleine veranderingen in de acties van de concurrent. Onder een
heffing daarentegen is het bedrijf flexibel in de keuze van de hoeveelheid vervuilende input die
het gebruikt.
Met een differentiaalspel is het mogelijk om de invloed van de investeringsstrategie te
analyseren. De investeringsstrategie bepaalt de mate van commitment met betrekking tot
de productiefactor kapitaal en beïnvloedt daardoor het commitment op output. Beslissings-
strategieën waarbij het bedrijf reageert op de huidige situatie, feedback strategieën, impliceren
flexibele reactie en daarmee weinig commitment. Strategieën waarbij het bedrijf een invester-
ingspad volgt zonder te reageren op de huidige situatie, open-loop strategieën, impliceren
minder flexibiliteit en meer commitment.
Met een open-loop investeringsstrategie wordt het tijdpad van de investeringen in feite aan
het begin van het spel vastgelegd. Dan zal de overheid standaards prefereren boven heffingen
omdat standaards bij dezelfde emissies tot hogere bedrijfswinsten leiden. Het doorde overheid
opgelegde commitment van het bedrijf op emissies impliceert namelijk een commitment op
output. Daardoor is het minder zinvol voor bedrijven om strategische investeringen te doen. Het
gevolg is een evenwicht met minder overinvesteringen en hogere winsten dan het vergelijkbare
evenwicht onder heffingen. Dit resultaat wordt afgeleid in hoofdstuk 2 en bevestigt eerdere
resultaten van Ulph in een meerstapsmodel die genoemd zijn in paragraaf 3 hierboven.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt aangetoond dat dit resultaat afhankelijk is van de veronderstelde
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investeringsstrategie, namelijk een open-loop strategie. Bij feedback investeringsstrategieën,
waarbij investeríngen worden aangepast aan de huidige situatie, is het niet langer mogelijk om
één instrument aan te wijzen als `beter'. Heffingen zijn onder sommige omstandigheden beter
dan standaazds. In geval van feedback investeringen kunnen bedrijven elkaars investerings-
beslissingen strategisch beïnvloeden. Een numeriek voorbeeld laat zien dat het dan afhankelijk
is van specifieke kenmerken van de bedrijven welk instrument beter is. In het voorbeeld
zullen bij een lage rente, kleine depreciatie en hoge investeringskosten heffingen beter zijn dan
standaards.
In de hoofdstukken 6 en 7 wordt grensoverschrijdende vervuiling toegevoegd. Naast interactie
tussen bedrijven en tussen overheden, is ook interactie tussen overheid en bedrijf geanalyseerd.
Wanneer zowel overheden als bedrijven feedback strategieën gebruiken zijn veel interacties
mogelijk en ontstaan zeer complexe evenwichten. Voor een specifiek geval kunnen alle effecten
op de investeringen in het evenwicht nader toegelicht worden.
Opnieuw zijn in geval van open-loop investeringsstrategieën de resultaten anders dan in geval
van feedback strategieën. Een voor de hand liggende gedachte is dat, analoog aan de resultaten
in hoofdstuk 2, onder open-loop investeringsstrategieën één instrument aan te wijzen is dat
` beter' is. Dit blijkt niet het geval te zijn. Dat komt omdat het effect van een strenger
milieubeleid op de incentives voor het bedrijf om in reductie van de emissies te investeren
onder open-loop strategieën ambigu is. Investeren in reductie word[ aantrekkelijker, omdat
de toekomstige opbrengsten van de investering, het vermijden van de ( hogere) kosten per
eenheid emissie, als gevolg van een strenger milieubeleid toenemen. Aan de andere kant
wordt investeren minder aantrekkelijk, omdat de optimale hoeveelheid productie daalt en
daarmee ook de totale hoeveelheid emissies. In geval van feedback investeringsstrategieën en
feedback overheidsbeleid hebben verstoringen in het huidige milieubeleid geen invloed op de
investeringen, omdat de overheid in dat geval ftexibel is in haar beleidskeuze en het huidige
beleid geen effect heeft op het toekomstige beleid (wat de winstgevendheid van investeringen
bepaalt). Daazdoor is het bij feedback investeringen wel mogelijk om voor een vrij algemene
specificatie te bepalen in welke richting de totale verstoring van het milieubeleid zal gaan in
de diverse scenazio's die in hoofdstuk 6 worden geanalyseerd.
De analyse in hoofdstuk 7 concentreert zich op de dynamische efficiëntie van heffingen en
standaards. Een instrument van milieubeleid is meer dynamisch efficiënt gencemd naarmate
de investeringen dichter liggen bij de investeringen die optimaal zijn vanuit het standpunt
van een planner in ieder land die waarde hecht aan milieukwaliteit en bedrijfswinst over
de hele periode. Het is mogelijk om een voorbeeld te vinden waarbij onder heffingen in
evenwicht `teveel' wordt geïnvesteerd en de investeringen onder standaards dichter bij het
sociale optimum komen. Dit is voornamelijk het gevolg van de strategische interactie tussen
overheden en bedrijven die bij heffingen in dat geval de vorm aanneemt van extra investeringen
met als dcel een lagere heffing.
Tot slot van deze paragraaf komen de resultaten in de overige twee hoofdstukken aan de orde.
In hoofdstuk 4 vinden we dat bedrijven, die investeren in emissiereductie en te maken hebben
met een systeem van verhandelbare emissierechten, profiteren van de mogelijkheid om hun
emissierechten op de bank te kunnen zetten voor later gebruik en hun investeringen over de
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tijd hieraan aanpassen. Omdat investeringen een proces in de tijd zijn, is het van belang voor
bedrijven om enige flexibiliteit over de tijd te hebben. Dat verklaart de kostenbesparingen
die bedrijven kunnen behalen, zelfs in een systeem waarin ze hun emissierechten niet kunnen
verhandelen maar alleen op de bank kunnen zetten. Verhandelbare emissierechten bieden meer
flexibiliteit dan standaards, maar minder dan heffingen. Het is interessant om te overwegen wat
het resultaat zal zijn van dit instrument van milieubeleid in de setting van de eerder besproken
hoofdstukken, waarbij de overheid het beleid verstoort uit handelspolitieke overwegingen.
Gegeven de complexiteit van de analyses in de hoofdstukken 2, 3, 6 en 7, is het duidelijk dat
deze vraag niet zomaar te beantwoorden is. Onder dergelijke emissierechten heeft de overheid
geen directe controle meer op de emissies van het eigen bedrijf op een bepaald tijdstip, want
het bedrijf beïnvloedt de allocatie van emissies over de tijd als het een permit op de bank zet.
Dat betekent dat het model aangepast moet worden, omdat eerder uitgegaan werd van ofwel
gegeven emissies op elk tijdstip (in de hoofdstukken 2 en 3) ofwel een doelstelling waarin de
emissies op ieder tijdstip tellen.
Hoofdstuk 5 geeft analyses van evenwichten tussen een land zonder en een land met bos, die
over hun emissies van kooldioxide moeten beslissen. Het land zonder bos profiteert eveneens
als bos wordt meegeteld bij de bepaling van de netto emissies van kooldioxide van de landen.
Ook dit land kan namelijk rekenen op de extra mogelijkheid tot assimilatie van kooldioxide en
kan daardoor een hogere emissie kiezen terwijl de uiteindelijke accumulatie van kooldioxide
in de atmosfeer lager uitvalt. Het meetellen van kooldioxide-assimilatie door bossen betekent
een verandering in de benutting van het bos. Voor een bos wat om te beginnen redelijk groot
is zal de oogst van bomen lager zijn wanneer bossen wel meetellen bij bepaling van de (netto)
emissie van kooldioxide dan wanneer dat niet het geval is.
Tenslotte
Alle modellen in dit proefschrift zijn conceptueel van aard. Ze zijn opgezet om na te denken
over mechanismen en deze systematisch te analyseren. Het is uitdrukkelijk niet de bedoeling
geweest iets te zeggen over concreet beleid. Dat zou een ander type modellen vereisen, met een
empirische invulling en bijgevolg meer details en aandacht voor eventuele indirecte effecten.
De analyses onderzoeken op systematische manier de interacties die kunnen plaatsvinden
wanneer de overheid handelspolitieke overwegingen laat meetellen in haar milieubeleid, in
het geval dat dit beleid gericht is op enkele grote vervuilers met marktmacht. Met behulp
van dynamische speltheorie worden de effecten van diverse aannames met betrekking tot de
beslissingsstrategieën uitgewerkt.
Het begrip `commitment' blijkt een centraal begrip om de interacties te verklaren. Verschillen
in commitment tussen heffingen en standaards verklaren waarom in hoofdstuk 2 gevonden
wordt dat standaards een `beter' instrument van milieubeleid zijn dan heffingen. Verschillen
in commitment als gevolg van open-loop dan wel feedback investeringsstrategieën verklaren
waarom dat resultaat alleen geldt bij open-loop strategieën. Bij feedback strategieën kan het
omgekeerde, waarbij heffingen `beter' zijn dan standaards, ook voorkomen.
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Differentiaalspelen vormen daarmee een rijke modelstructuur, waarin verschillende typen even-
wichten bekeken kunnen worden. Sommige van deze evenwichten kunnen niet worden geanl-
yseerd in simpeler modellen, waarbij de dynamische structuur minder expliciet gemodelleerd
wordt. Dat zijn die evenwichten waarbij de spelers gebruik maken van flexibele beslissings-
strategieën en hun beslissingen aanpassen aan de toestand op het moment. Indien de spelers
zulke flexibele strategieën gebruiken, doen zich interacties voor die niet gemodelleerd kunnen
worden met behulp van de meerstapsmodellen die gebruikelijk zijn in de literatuur van strate-
gische internationale handel en beleidsconcurrentie. Differentiaalspelen modelleren gedrag
wat zich afspeelt over de tijd, zoals de accumulatie van kapitaal, heel precies. Dat is belangrijk
om het gedrag van bedrijven en overheden in een situatie van strategische internationale handel
met milieubeleid te begrijpen.
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Environmental policy instruments and international rivalry
Talitha Feenstra
1. Een overheid die milieubeleid ontwerpt voor een bedrijf wat concurreert op een
intemationale markt met onvolledige mededinging en belang hecht zowel aan goede
milieukwaliteit als aan winst voor het bedrijf zal bij de keuze van het instrument van
milieubeleid rekening houden met de mate van commitment die het betreffende
instrument verschaft. (hoofdstukken 2 en 3)
2. De accumulatie van kapitaal is een dynamisch proces. Een analyse waarbij
investeringsbeslissingen worden teruggebracht tot een eenmalige keuze van de
kapitaalgoederenvoorraad kan daarom tot verkeerde conclusies leiden.
(hoofdstukken 2 en 3)
3. Een "bank for permits" dat wil zeggen de mogelijkheid voor bedrijven om emissiequota
te heralloceren over de tijd, leidt tot besparingen indien de kosten van emissiereducties
voornamelijk voortvloeien uit investeringen en daarmee verband houdende
aanpassingskosten. (hoofdstuk 4)
4. Wanneer expliciet rekening wordt gehouden met de kooldioxide-opname van bossen,
zal gekozen worden voor minder kap en een groter bos. Dit geldt voor een situatie
waarin het bos initieel al redelijk groot is en gaat gepaard met een lagere reductie in
energiegebruik dan wanneer de kooldioxidedynamiek van bossen wordt genegeerd.
(hoofdstuk 5)
5. Wat complex lijkt is soms (iets) simpeler dan het schijnbaar eenvoudige. (hoofdstuk 6)
6. Als in de situatie beschreven in stelling 1 sprake is van grensoverschrijdende vervuiling,
is voor wat betreft hun dynamische efficiëntie geen algemene uitspraak te doen over
emissieheffingen en -standaards. Geen van beide is beter dan de ander in dit opzicht.
(hoofdstuk 7)
7. Het succes van het station als vestigingsplaats voor middenstand is vooral te danken aan
slechte dan wel gemiste aansluitingen.
8. Wanneer het doel het scheppen van werkgelegenheid is, is beleidsconcurrentie tussen
lagere overheden om bedrijven tot vestiging binnen de gemeentegrenzen te verleiden,
gegeven de korte reisafstanden in Nederland, weinig zinvol.
9. "Onthaasten" veronderstelt een dermate bewuste omgang met tijd dat het daarmee
onmogelijk wordt.
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